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14 California opinions name it 1 courts 1995–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2024The FEHA prohibits an employer from failing “to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee . . . with a known physical or mental disability.” (§ 12940, subd. (n); Gelfo, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 61 .) “The purpose of the interactive process is to determine what accommodation[] is required.” (Brown, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at 1109.) Thus, an “employer cannot be held liable for failing to engage in [the] interactive process when the emp 2024The FEHA prohibits an employer from failing “to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee . . . with a known physical or mental disability.” (§ 12940, subd. (n); Gelfo, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 61 .) “The purpose of the interactive process is to determine what accommodation[] is required.” (Brown, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at 1109.) Thus, an “employer cannot be held liable for failing to engage in [the] interactive process when the emp | 2 | 2 |
Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corporationgreen2 sentences2024The FEHA prohibits an employer from failing “to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee . . . with a known physical or mental disability.” (§ 12940, subd. (n); Gelfo, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 61 .) “The purpose of the interactive process is to determine what accommodation[] is required.” (Brown, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at 1109.) Thus, an “employer cannot be held liable for failing to engage in [the] interactive process when the emp 2021First, the employee must request an accommodation.” (Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 54 (Gelfo).) “Second, the parties must engage in an interactive process regarding the requested accommodation and, if the process fails, responsibility for the failure rests with the party who failed to participate in good faith.” (Ibid.) Thus, while a reasonable accommodation claim is independent of an interactive process claim, “each necessarily implicates the other.” (Ibid.) Davidson argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her reasonable accommodation requ | 1 | 5 |
Auburn Woods I Homeowners Ass'n v. Fair Employment & Housing Commissiongreen1 sentence2025Code, § 12927, subd. (c)(1); accord, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 , subds. (f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(B).) “In order to establish discrimination based on a refusal to provide reasonable accommodations, a party must establish that he or she (1) suffers from a disability as defined in FEHA, (2) the discriminating party knew of, or should have known of, the disability, (3) accommodation is necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling, and (4) the discriminating party refused to make this accommodation.” (Auburn Woods, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1592 ; accord, Giebeler v. M&B Associates (9t | 1 | 1 |
Giebeler v. M & B ASSOCIATESgreen1 sentence2025Code, § 12927, subd. (c)(1); accord, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 , subds. (f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(B).) “In order to establish discrimination based on a refusal to provide reasonable accommodations, a party must establish that he or she (1) suffers from a disability as defined in FEHA, (2) the discriminating party knew of, or should have known of, the disability, (3) accommodation is necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling, and (4) the discriminating party refused to make this accommodation.” (Auburn Woods, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1592 ; accord, Giebeler v. M&B Associates (9t | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Millsgreen2 sentences2021Generally 19 construed, this allegation amounts only to the contention that [the plaintiff’s] medical licensing qualifications should be relaxed in light of his disability.” (Harris, supra, 572 F.3d at p. 74 ; see ibid. [because the plaintiff “asks only for the state’s ‘understanding’ of the reasons why he committed those actions [that resulted in the loss of his license], he cannot demonstrate that he is ‘otherwise qualified’ for a medical license”].) In contrast, Singh’s allegations identify how his alleged disability affected his inability to meet the four-attempt rule and how the Medical B 2021Generally 19 construed, this allegation amounts only to the contention that [the plaintiff’s] medical licensing qualifications should be relaxed in light of his disability.” (Harris, supra, 572 F.3d at p. 74 ; see ibid. [because the plaintiff “asks only for the state’s ‘understanding’ of the reasons why he committed those actions [that resulted in the loss of his license], he cannot demonstrate that he is ‘otherwise qualified’ for a medical license”].) In contrast, Singh’s allegations identify how his alleged disability affected his inability to meet the four-attempt rule and how the Medical B | 1 | 1 |
Nadaf-Rahrov v. the Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.green2 sentences2009On Scotch’s claim of failure to make a reasonable accommodation in violation of section 12940, subdivision (m), we follow Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 975-976 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 190 ] (Nadaf-Rahrov) in defining reasonable accommodation to mean “a modification or adjustment to the workplace that enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired.” AIC offered Scotch a reasonable accommodation. 2009On Scotch’s claim of failure to make a reasonable accommodation in violation of section 12940, subdivision (m), we follow Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 975-976 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 190 ] (Nadaf-Rahrov) in defining reasonable accommodation to mean “a modification or adjustment to the workplace that enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired.” AIC offered Scotch a reasonable accommodation. | 1 | 1 |
David Weber v. Strippit, Inc. Idex Corp. James Blackstonegreen2 sentences2006(Kelly, supra, 410 F.3d at pp. 675-676.) The court noted it *59 is “in the nature of any ‘regarded as disabled’ claim that an employee who seeks protections not accorded to one who is impaired but not regarded as disabled does so because of the additional component—‘regarded as’ disabled.” (Id. at p. 676.) Thus, that “rationale provides no basis for denying validity to a reasonable accommodation claim.” (Ibid.) The court also rejected the argument that accommodating perceived disabilities would “ ‘do nothing to encourage . . . employees to educate employers of their capabilities’ or to ‘encour 2006(Weber v. Strippit, Inc. (8th Cir. 1999) 186 F.3d 907, 915-917 (Weber).) In Weber , the court found that application of the reasonable accommodation requirement in cases of perceived disability under the ADA “would lead to bizarre results” by entitling nondisabled employees to an accommodation denied to similarly situated employees based on their employers’ misperceptions. ( Weber, supra, 186 F.3d at pp. 916-917.) The Ninth Circuit followed suit in Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 1226, 1232-1233 (Kaplan). 16 In Kaplan , a police officer, *56 unable to hold a gun or g | 1 | 1 |
Frederick Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas Thomas H. Stephensgreen1 sentence2006(Weber v. Strippit, Inc. (8th Cir. 1999) 186 F.3d 907, 915-917 (Weber).) In Weber , the court found that application of the reasonable accommodation requirement in cases of perceived disability under the ADA “would lead to bizarre results” by entitling nondisabled employees to an accommodation denied to similarly situated employees based on their employers’ misperceptions. ( Weber, supra, 186 F.3d at pp. 916-917.) The Ninth Circuit followed suit in Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 1226, 1232-1233 (Kaplan). 16 In Kaplan , a police officer, *56 unable to hold a gun or g | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wilson v. County of Orange
green
2 sentences2024The FEHA prohibits an employer from failing “to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee . . . with a known physical or mental disability.” (§ 12940, subd. (n); Gelfo, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 61 .) “The purpose of the interactive process is to determine what accommodation[] is required.” (Brown, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at 1109.) Thus, an “employer cannot be held liable for failing to engage in [the] interactive process when the emp 2024The FEHA prohibits an employer from failing “to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee . . . with a known physical or mental disability.” (§ 12940, subd. (n); Gelfo, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 61 .) “The purpose of the interactive process is to determine what accommodation[] is required.” (Brown, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at 1109.) Thus, an “employer cannot be held liable for failing to engage in [the] interactive process when the emp | 2 | 2024–2024 |
James C. v. Christine C.
green
1 sentence2026In a subsequent disability accommodation request signed by Leahy on June 6 and filed on June 11 (the June 6 request), Leahy asked for a continuance of the June 13 hearing, saying she was unable to proceed without full accommodation and that a continuance was the only reasonable accommodation under rule 1.100(a)(3) pending a writ of mandate review and decision by this court, citing In re Marriage of James & Christine C. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1261 [the trial court erred in denying a continuance as an accommodation when none of the specified grounds for denial were present]. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Kelvin D. Peebles v. John E. Potter, 1 Postmaster General, United States Postal Service
green
1 sentence2025(Peebles v. Potter (8th Cir. 2004) 354 F.3d 761, 767 .) 13 Slotkin’s disability status, and defendants’ knowledge and refusal to grant her requested accommodation, is not in dispute. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Groff v. DeJoy
green
1 sentence2024(Groff v. DeJoy, supra, 600 U.S. at p. 472 .) “[A] hardship that is attributable to employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion in general, or to the very notion of accommodating religious practice cannot be considered ‘undue.’ If bias or hostility to a religious practice or a religious accommodation provided a defense to a reasonable accommodation claim, Title VII would be at war with itself.” (Ibid.) CDCR argues accommodating Brown’s unavailability would “interfere” with CDCR’s apprenticeship program but its citations to the record do not establish this fact. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Major v. Western Home Insurance
green
1 sentence2024(See Major, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1217 .) The modified version of CACI No. 2541 read to the jury simply stated in relevant part that plaintiff must prove “Solano County knew of [her] mental condition that limited her ability to work.” The County’s special instructions, on the other hand, went beyond this basic knowledge requirement to clarify, based on particular facts in the record, that (1) the County had no duty to reasonably accommodate plaintiff’s disability until it became aware of both her disability and the resulting restrictions and (2) the County was not required to provide pl | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Moore v. Regents of the University of California
green
1 sentence2021(Moore, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 243 .) The appellate court reversed as to that cause of action, explaining that an employee “need not have an 11 actual disability, but need only be regarded by the employer as having one, to be able to make out claims under section 12940, subdivisions (m) and (n).” (Ibid.) Here, Davidson’s disability is not in dispute. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Linda Miller v. National Casualty Company, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae
green
1 sentence2017In Miller v. National Casualty Co. (8th Cir. 1995) 61 F.3d 627, 629-630 , the Eight Circuit, in affirming summary judgment on a reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA, held that a relative’s statements that the employee was “ ‘mentally falling apart’ ” and “ ‘[s]he’s really lost it’ ” and the family was “ ‘trying to get her into the hospital’ ” were insufficient to put an employer on notice of the employee’s manic-depression. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Edward R. Williams Angelynne Williams, H/w v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department, Edward R. Williams
red
2 sentences2006Turning first to a point acknowledged in passing in Kaplan and Weber , the court said: “[T]he statutory text of the ADA does not in any way ‘distinguish between [actually] disabled and “regarded as” individuals in requiring accommodation.’ [Citation.]” (Williams, supra, 380 F.3d at p. 774 .) Williams acknowledged the possibility, noted in Kaplan and Weber , that applying the reasonable accommodation requirement in favor of “regarded as” disabled employees could produce a “bizarre result.” (Williams, supra, 380 F.3d at p. 774 .) Nonetheless, that remote possibility provided “no basis for an acr 2006Turning first to a point acknowledged in passing in Kaplan and Weber , the court said: “[T]he statutory text of the ADA does not in any way ‘distinguish between [actually] disabled and “regarded as” individuals in requiring accommodation.’ [Citation.]” (Williams, supra, 380 F.3d at p. 774 .) Williams acknowledged the possibility, noted in Kaplan and Weber , that applying the reasonable accommodation requirement in favor of “regarded as” disabled employees could produce a “bizarre result.” (Williams, supra, 380 F.3d at p. 774 .) Nonetheless, that remote possibility provided “no basis for an acr | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Rodgers v. Lehman
green
2 sentences1995(Rodgers v. Lehman, supra, 869 F.2d 253 , 258.) A number of federal decisions have held the reasonable accommodation requirement of the federal Rehabilitation Act does not preclude termination based not on alcoholism or other addictive substance abuse but on misconduct. 1995(Rodgers v. Lehman, supra, 869 F.2d 253 , 258.) A number of federal decisions have held the reasonable accommodation requirement of the federal Rehabilitation Act does not preclude termination based not on alcoholism or other addictive substance abuse but on misconduct. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Department
green
1 sentence1995In Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dept. (3d Cir. 1988) 840 F.2d 1139 ], the Third Circuit affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant police department where an officer had been terminated for use of illegal drugs. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.