Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
14 California opinions name it 2 courts 1928–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.green2 sentences2024In reaching today’s holding, the court recites and applies the most deferential formulations of rational basis review: “ ‘The underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not have been “ever actually articulated” by lawmakers, nor “be empirically substantiated.” ’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.) “A court . . . ‘may engage in “ ‘rational speculation’ ” as to the justifications for the legislative choice . . . 22 PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS Liu, J., dissenting “whether or not” any such speculation has “a foundation in the record.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 30.) “ ‘ “[W]e must accept any gross generalizat 2024In reaching today’s holding, the court recites and applies the most deferential formulations of rational basis review: “ ‘The underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not have been “ever actually articulated” by lawmakers, nor “be empirically substantiated.” ’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.) “A court . . . ‘may engage in “ ‘rational speculation’ ” as to the justifications for the legislative choice . . . 22 PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS Liu, J., dissenting “whether or not” any such speculation has “a foundation in the record.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 30.) “ ‘ “[W]e must accept any gross generalizat | 1 | 1 |
In Re Dukegreen1 sentence2013N.D.Ala. 1993) 153 B.R. 913, 918 [§ 1329 “permits a modification of a plan’s treatment of a claim, which must be strictly and narrowly construed as an exception to the binding effect of § 1327(a)”].) Thus, if plaintiff is successful in her appeal, she can move to modify the confirmation plan to reduce her payments, i.e., eliminate them, to defendants. *1310 We conclude, utilizing established rules for construing federal statutes, section 1327(a) does not require us to find the present appeal is moot. | 1 | 1 |
Abood v. Detroit Board of Educationred2 sentences1989(Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) 431 U.S. 209, 233, fn. 29 [ 52 L.Ed.2d 261, 233 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 ].) Consequently the treatment of bar dues remains an unsettled question. 1989(Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) 431 U.S. 209, 233, fn. 29 [ 52 L.Ed.2d 261, 233 , 97 S.Ct. 1782 ].) Consequently the treatment of bar dues remains an unsettled question. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1965(Davis v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 582, 595 [ 66 S.Ct. 1256 , 90 L.Ed. 1453 ]; Zap v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 624, 632-633 [ 66 S.Ct. 1277 , 90 L.Ed. 1477 ]; Harris v. United States (1946) 331 U.S. 145, 154 [ 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 ]; Abel v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 217, 234-238 [ 80 S.Ct. 683 , 4 L.Ed.2d 668 ].) A typical treatment of the rule is found in Zap v. United, States, supra, in which the disputed issue was whether incriminating evidence (a check) could be seized in the course of a search to which the defendant had consented by contract. 1965(Davis v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 582, 595 [ 66 S.Ct. 1256 , 90 L.Ed. 1453 ]; Zap v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 624, 632-633 [ 66 S.Ct. 1277 , 90 L.Ed. 1477 ]; Harris v. United States (1946) 331 U.S. 145, 154 [ 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 ]; Abel v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 217, 234-238 [ 80 S.Ct. 683 , 4 L.Ed.2d 668 ].) A typical treatment of the rule is found in Zap v. United, States, supra, in which the disputed issue was whether incriminating evidence (a check) could be seized in the course of a search to which the defendant had consented by contract. | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. United Statesred2 sentences1965(Davis v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 582, 595 [ 66 S.Ct. 1256 , 90 L.Ed. 1453 ]; Zap v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 624, 632-633 [ 66 S.Ct. 1277 , 90 L.Ed. 1477 ]; Harris v. United States (1946) 331 U.S. 145, 154 [ 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 ]; Abel v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 217, 234-238 [ 80 S.Ct. 683 , 4 L.Ed.2d 668 ].) A typical treatment of the rule is found in Zap v. United, States, supra, in which the disputed issue was whether incriminating evidence (a check) could be seized in the course of a search to which the defendant had consented by contract. 1965(Davis v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 582, 595 [ 66 S.Ct. 1256 , 90 L.Ed. 1453 ]; Zap v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 624, 632-633 [ 66 S.Ct. 1277 , 90 L.Ed. 1477 ]; Harris v. United States (1946) 331 U.S. 145, 154 [ 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 ]; Abel v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 217, 234-238 [ 80 S.Ct. 683 , 4 L.Ed.2d 668 ].) A typical treatment of the rule is found in Zap v. United, States, supra, in which the disputed issue was whether incriminating evidence (a check) could be seized in the course of a search to which the defendant had consented by contract. | 1 | 1 |
Zap v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1965(Davis v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 582, 595 [ 66 S.Ct. 1256 , 90 L.Ed. 1453 ]; Zap v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 624, 632-633 [ 66 S.Ct. 1277 , 90 L.Ed. 1477 ]; Harris v. United States (1946) 331 U.S. 145, 154 [ 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 ]; Abel v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 217, 234-238 [ 80 S.Ct. 683 , 4 L.Ed.2d 668 ].) A typical treatment of the rule is found in Zap v. United, States, supra, in which the disputed issue was whether incriminating evidence (a check) could be seized in the course of a search to which the defendant had consented by contract. 1965(Davis v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 582, 595 [ 66 S.Ct. 1256 , 90 L.Ed. 1453 ]; Zap v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 624, 632-633 [ 66 S.Ct. 1277 , 90 L.Ed. 1477 ]; Harris v. United States (1946) 331 U.S. 145, 154 [ 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 ]; Abel v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 217, 234-238 [ 80 S.Ct. 683 , 4 L.Ed.2d 668 ].) A typical treatment of the rule is found in Zap v. United, States, supra, in which the disputed issue was whether incriminating evidence (a check) could be seized in the course of a search to which the defendant had consented by contract. | 1 | 1 |
Abel v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1965(Davis v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 582, 595 [ 66 S.Ct. 1256 , 90 L.Ed. 1453 ]; Zap v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 624, 632-633 [ 66 S.Ct. 1277 , 90 L.Ed. 1477 ]; Harris v. United States (1946) 331 U.S. 145, 154 [ 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 ]; Abel v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 217, 234-238 [ 80 S.Ct. 683 , 4 L.Ed.2d 668 ].) A typical treatment of the rule is found in Zap v. United, States, supra, in which the disputed issue was whether incriminating evidence (a check) could be seized in the course of a search to which the defendant had consented by contract. 1965(Davis v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 582, 595 [ 66 S.Ct. 1256 , 90 L.Ed. 1453 ]; Zap v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 624, 632-633 [ 66 S.Ct. 1277 , 90 L.Ed. 1477 ]; Harris v. United States (1946) 331 U.S. 145, 154 [ 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 ]; Abel v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 217, 234-238 [ 80 S.Ct. 683 , 4 L.Ed.2d 668 ].) A typical treatment of the rule is found in Zap v. United, States, supra, in which the disputed issue was whether incriminating evidence (a check) could be seized in the course of a search to which the defendant had consented by contract. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hovey v. Bradbury
green
2 sentences1939As was said in Hovey v. Bradbury, 112 Cal. 620 , at page 625 [ 44 Pac. 1077, 1078 ]: “Nor, when we come to view plaintiff’s conduct generally, can there be seen any act or omission upon his part which would justify so stern a treatment of his claim as its rejection under the doctrine of loches. 1939As was said in Hovey v. Bradbury, 112 Cal. 620 , at page 625 [ 44 Pac. 1077, 1078 ]: “Nor, when we come to view plaintiff’s conduct generally, can there be seen any act or omission upon his part which would justify so stern a treatment of his claim as its rejection under the doctrine of loches. | 3 | 1928–1939 |
Halaco Engineering Co. v. South Central Coast Regional Commission
green
2 sentences2022One type of arbitrary or capricious conduct recognized by California courts is “ ‘a stubborn insistence on following unauthorized conduct.’ ” (Halaco, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 79 .) Here, the superior court impliedly found the DMV was stubborn in its misapplication of the three-hour presumption more than four years after the Supreme Court set forth the proper treatment of that presumption and the role of expert testimony in rebutting the presumption. 2022One type of arbitrary or capricious conduct recognized by California courts is “ ‘a stubborn insistence on following unauthorized conduct.’ ” (Halaco, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 79 .) Here, the superior court impliedly found the DMV was stubborn in its misapplication of the three-hour presumption more than four years after the Supreme Court set forth the proper treatment of that presumption and the role of expert testimony in rebutting the presumption. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Doody v. Ryan
green
2 sentences2015Again, it [sic] not necessarily mean that you are involved, but if you were, then that’s what that would apply to okay.’ ” (Doody, supra, 649 F.3d at p. 992 .) 8 detective prefaced his simple statement of the Miranda warnings by telling defendant that he was “not under arrest or anything like that.” According to defendant, by doing so, Detective Sierra “suggested [the warnings were] a mere formality that did not actually apply to [defendant] since he was not under arrest” and thus “implied [defendant] had no need for counsel.” Defendant also contends that the detective’s treatment of the warni 2014Again, it [sic] not necessarily mean that you are involved, but if you were, then that’s what that would apply to okay.’ ” (Doody, supra, 649 F.3d at p. 992 .) 8 detective prefaced his simple statement of the Miranda warnings by telling defendant that he was “not under arrest or anything like that.” According to defendant, by doing so, Detective Sierra “suggested [the warnings were] a mere formality that did not actually apply to [defendant] since he was not under arrest” and thus “implied [defendant] had no need for counsel.” Defendant also contends that the detective’s treatment of the warni | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024In reaching today’s holding, the court recites and applies the most deferential formulations of rational basis review: “ ‘The underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not have been “ever actually articulated” by lawmakers, nor “be empirically substantiated.” ’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.) “A court . . . ‘may engage in “ ‘rational speculation’ ” as to the justifications for the legislative choice . . . 22 PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS Liu, J., dissenting “whether or not” any such speculation has “a foundation in the record.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 30.) “ ‘ “[W]e must accept any gross generalizat | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Warden v. State Bar of California
green
1 sentence2024In reaching today’s holding, the court recites and applies the most deferential formulations of rational basis review: “ ‘The underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not have been “ever actually articulated” by lawmakers, nor “be empirically substantiated.” ’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.) “A court . . . ‘may engage in “ ‘rational speculation’ ” as to the justifications for the legislative choice . . . 22 PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS Liu, J., dissenting “whether or not” any such speculation has “a foundation in the record.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 30.) “ ‘ “[W]e must accept any gross generalizat | 1 | 2024–2024 |
James C. v. Christine C.
green
1 sentence2024The treatment of the standard of review in Marriage of James—which is limited to a couple of passing references to abuse of discretion in the description of James’s arguments (see Marriage of James, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1272, 1276)—is unilluminating, since as we note above, abuse of discretion is not a unified standard and can mean different things in different contexts. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz
green
1 sentence2024In reaching today’s holding, the court recites and applies the most deferential formulations of rational basis review: “ ‘The underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not have been “ever actually articulated” by lawmakers, nor “be empirically substantiated.” ’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.) “A court . . . ‘may engage in “ ‘rational speculation’ ” as to the justifications for the legislative choice . . . 22 PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS Liu, J., dissenting “whether or not” any such speculation has “a foundation in the record.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 30.) “ ‘ “[W]e must accept any gross generalizat | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Capers
green
1 sentence2021“The government violates a defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process when it interferes with the exercise of a defendant’s right to present witnesses on [her] own behalf.” (People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1008 .) Our cases require a defendant to show that interference was “egregious and improper” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 55 ), “was a substantial cause of [the] witness’s refusal to testify,” and “ ‘at least a reasonable possibility that the witness could have given testimony that would have been both material and favorable.’ ” (Capers, at p. 1008). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. DePriest
green
1 sentence2021“The government violates a defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process when it interferes with the exercise of a defendant’s right to present witnesses on [her] own behalf.” (People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1008 .) Our cases require a defendant to show that interference was “egregious and improper” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 55 ), “was a substantial cause of [the] witness’s refusal to testify,” and “ ‘at least a reasonable possibility that the witness could have given testimony that would have been both material and favorable.’ ” (Capers, at p. 1008). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Privette v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1998We then discuss our decision in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 , 854 P.2d 721 , as well as the Court of Appeal cases that have considered whether Privette bars recovery only under section 416 or also under section 413. 1998We then discuss our decision in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 , 854 P.2d 721 , as well as the Court of Appeal cases that have considered whether Privette bars recovery only under section 416 or also under section 413. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.