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14 California opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hullgreen2 sentences2024The Supreme Court has made clear “that section 170.3(d) prescribes the exclusive means of appellate review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge.” (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 268 .) Section 170.3, subdivision (d) provides: “The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought only by the parties to the proceeding. 2023Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d)2 provides, in relevant part: “The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought only by the parties to the proceeding.” This means section 170.3, subdivision (d) “prescribes the exclusive means of appellate review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge motion.” (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 276 .) We lack the power to review on appeal an order the Legislature has made nonappealable. | 5 | 10 |
People v. Broxsongreen2 sentences1993Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d), provides, “The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the decision . . . .” Our Supreme Court in People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 276 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526 , 820 P.2d 1036 ] concluded that this statute “prescribes the exclusive means of appellate review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge motion.” (Accord, People v. Broxson (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 977, 1993Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d), provides, “The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the decision . . . .” Our Supreme Court in People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 276 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526 , 820 P.2d 1036 ] concluded that this statute “prescribes the exclusive means of appellate review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge motion.” (Accord, People v. Broxson (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 977, | 3 | 3 |
People v. Webbgreen2 sentences2025Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 522 [expedited writ procedure is the exclusive means for reviewing an unsuccessful peremptory challenge].) 3. 2021The petition for the writ shall be filed and served within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the court’s order determining the question of disqualification.” (Italics added.) The statute’s use of the word “only” means the “expedited [writ] procedure is the exclusive means for reviewing an unsuccessful peremptory challenge filed under section 170.6.” (People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 522 .) Foster did not file a writ of mandate seeking review of the August 2018 order denying his Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge. | 1 | 2 |
Hemingway v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2014Section 170.3(d) provides: ‘The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the decision and only by the parties to the proceeding.’ (§ 170.3(d); see Stats. 1984, ch. 1555, § 1 et seq., pp. 5479-5484.)” (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 269 .) “[The issue is] whether a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d) (footnote omitted) . . . is the exclusive means by which a party may | 1 | 1 |
Zilog, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara Cty.green1 sentence2014Section 170.3(d) provides: ‘The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the decision and only by the parties to the proceeding.’ (§ 170.3(d); see Stats. 1984, ch. 1555, § 1 et seq., pp. 5479-5484.)” (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 269 .) “[The issue is] whether a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d) (footnote omitted) . . . is the exclusive means by which a party may | 1 | 1 |
In Re James S.green2 sentences2013Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d), is the exclusive means by which a party may seek review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge against a trial judge].) 4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 5 “Juvenile courts, relying on the Marsden model, have permitted the parents, who have a statutory and a due process right to competent counsel, to air their complaints about appointed counsel and request new counsel be appointed. (§ 317.5; In re James S. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 930, 935, fn. 13 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 295 ].)” (In re V.V. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 392, 398 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3 2013Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d), is the exclusive means by which a party may seek review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge against a trial judge].) 4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 5 “Juvenile courts, relying on the Marsden model, have permitted the parents, who have a statutory and a due process right to competent counsel, to air their complaints about appointed counsel and request new counsel be appointed. (§ 317.5; In re James S. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 930, 935, fn. 13 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 295 ].)” (In re V.V. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 392, 398 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3 | 1 | 1 |
In Re ZNgreen2 sentences2013Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d), is the exclusive means by which a party may seek review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge against a trial judge].) 4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 5 “Juvenile courts, relying on the Marsden model, have permitted the parents, who have a statutory and a due process right to competent counsel, to air their complaints about appointed counsel and request new counsel be appointed. (§ 317.5; In re James S. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 930, 935, fn. 13 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 295 ].)” (In re V.V. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 392, 398 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3 2013Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d), is the exclusive means by which a party may seek review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge against a trial judge].) 4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 5 “Juvenile courts, relying on the Marsden model, have permitted the parents, who have a statutory and a due process right to competent counsel, to air their complaints about appointed counsel and request new counsel be appointed. (§ 317.5; In re James S. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 930, 935, fn. 13 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 295 ].)” (In re V.V. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 392, 398 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3 | 1 | 1 |
Sacramento County Department of Health & Human Services v. V.G.green2 sentences2013Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d), is the exclusive means by which a party may seek review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge against a trial judge].) 4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 5 “Juvenile courts, relying on the Marsden model, have permitted the parents, who have a statutory and a due process right to competent counsel, to air their complaints about appointed counsel and request new counsel be appointed. (§ 317.5; In re James S. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 930, 935, fn. 13 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 295 ].)” (In re V.V. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 392, 398 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3 2013Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d), is the exclusive means by which a party may seek review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge against a trial judge].) 4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 5 “Juvenile courts, relying on the Marsden model, have permitted the parents, who have a statutory and a due process right to competent counsel, to air their complaints about appointed counsel and request new counsel be appointed. (§ 317.5; In re James S. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 930, 935, fn. 13 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 295 ].)” (In re V.V. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 392, 398 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3 | 1 | 1 |
Guedalia v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1992On October 21, 1991, the People timely filed the instant petition seeking extraordinary relief, “the exclusive means of appellate review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge motion.” (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 276 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526 , 820 P.2d 1036 ]; accord, People v. Broxson (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 977, 979 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 917 ]; Guedalia v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1156, 1163 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 99 ].) On October 22, 1991, we stayed trial of the underlying proceeding pending receipt of opposition and further order of this court, and we advised the parties that we were c 1992On October 21, 1991, the People timely filed the instant petition seeking extraordinary relief, “the exclusive means of appellate review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge motion.” (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 276 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526 , 820 P.2d 1036 ]; accord, People v. Broxson (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 977, 979 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 917 ]; Guedalia v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1156, 1163 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 99 ].) On October 22, 1991, we stayed trial of the underlying proceeding pending receipt of opposition and further order of this court, and we advised the parties that we were c | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lickter v. Lickter
green
1 sentence2013(Lickter v. Lickter (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 728 ; see Ross & Cohen, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (The Rutter Group 2013) ¶ 3:84.1, p. 3-32.) 3 Generally, a writ petition is the exclusive means for obtaining review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge. (§ 170.3, subd. (d).) However, we consider this claim on appeal because Stretton filed an application under the vexatious litigant statute seeking to file a writ petition, but the acting presiding justice denied the application. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
JENNIFER T. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2013(Z)(3)(A).)” (Jennifer T., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 260 .) 7 Rule 8.450(f)(2) states in pertinent part: “If a notice of intent is . .. late, the superior court clerk must promptly: [¶] (A) Mark the notice of intent ‘Received [date] but not filed;’ [¶] (B) Return the marked notice of intent to the party with a notice stating that: [¶] (i) The notice of intent was not filed . . . because it is late; and [$ (ii) The party should contact his or her attorney as soon as possible to discuss this notice, because the time available to take appropriate steps to protect the party’s interests may be | 1 | 2013–2013 |