vindictive prosecution claim in California

2021Consequently, a video showing Bishopp did not resist would show he did not aid and abet Saenz’s Estes robbery, although he still would be an aider and abettor of the theft. 2 The vindictive prosecution doctrine prohibits “the prosecution from taking certain actions against a criminal defendant, such as increasing the charges, in retaliation for the defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights.” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) A presumption of vindictiveness arises when the prosecutor increases the criminal charges under circumstances showing a reasonable likelihood of vindictive

2021(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) “A vindictive prosecution claim may be established ‘“by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.”’” (Short v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 905 , 915 (Short); accord, 17 United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 380-381, 384 (Goodwin).) In the absence of direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” (Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 373 (Twiggs); accord, Goodwin,

2020(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) “A vindictive prosecution claim may be established ‘ “by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.” ’ ” (Short, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 915, quoting U.S. v. Brown (9th Cir. 2017) 875 F.3d 1235, 1240 ; accord, United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 380-381, 384 (Goodwin).) In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” (Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Ca

2020(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) “A vindictive prosecution claim may be established ‘ “by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.” ’ ” (Short, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 915, quoting U.S. v. Brown (9th Cir. 2017) 875 F.3d 1235, 1240 ; accord, United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 380-381, 384 (Goodwin).) In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” (Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Ca

2020He also argues the doctrine of vindictive prosecution barred the People 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 . 3 The trial court issued a certificate of probable cause authorizing this appeal. (§ 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b).) 2. from adding a new charge of child endangerment with great bodily injury.

2020He also argues the doctrine of vindictive prosecution barred the People 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 . 3 The trial court issued a certificate of probable cause authorizing this appeal. (§ 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b).) 2. from adding a new charge of child endangerment with great bodily injury.

2017Nor are we persuaded that the doctrine of vindictive prosecution applies where, as here, independent decisions are 15 made by separate federal and state prosecutors.10 United States v. Ng (2d Cir. 1983) 699 F.2d 63 (Ng) is instructive.

2017Nor are we persuaded that the doctrine of vindictive prosecution applies where, as here, independent decisions are made by separate federal and state prosecutors. 10 United States v. Ng (2d Cir. 1983) 699 F.2d 63 ( Ng ) is instructive.

2016Since the state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments, it has no interest in foreclosing appeals therefrom by imposing unreasonable conditions on the right to *816 appeal.' " ( People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355 , 365, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 1 P.3d 650 .) In light of these principles, the vindictive-prosecution doctrine has developed as a prophylactic rule that "aims to free the defendant of the apprehension that the exercise of a right designed to guarantee that his or her trial is fair will be met with a retaliatory increase in the charge and potential period of incarceration to

2016Since the state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments, it has no interest in foreclosing appeals therefrom by imposing unreasonable conditions on the right to *816 appeal.' " ( People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355 , 365, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 1 P.3d 650 .) In light of these principles, the vindictive-prosecution doctrine has developed as a prophylactic rule that "aims to free the defendant of the apprehension that the exercise of a right designed to guarantee that his or her trial is fair will be met with a retaliatory increase in the charge and potential period of incarceration to

2016(See, e.g., People v. Jurado , supra , 38 Cal.4th at p. 98 , 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ; People v. Lucas , supra , 12 Cal.4th at pp. 477-478, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ; *831 People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342 , 438-439, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 68 P.3d 1 .) A contrary conclusion, of course, would provide less due process protection to capital defendants than to non-capital defendants.

2016(See, e.g., People v. Jurado , supra , 38 Cal.4th at p. 98 , 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ; People v. Lucas , supra , 12 Cal.4th at pp. 477-478, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ; *831 People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342 , 438-439, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 68 P.3d 1 .) A contrary conclusion, of course, would provide less due process protection to capital defendants than to non-capital defendants.

2016(See, e.g., United States v. DeMarco , supra , 550 F.2d at p. 1227 ; United States v. Krezdorn (5th Cir. 1983) 718 F.2d 1360 , 1364-1365 (en banc); United States v. Andrews (6th Cir. 1980) 633 F.2d 449 , 453-454 (en banc) [examining the prosecutor's actions and stake in deterrence to determine whether a reasonable person would find a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness]; *824 United States v. Schoolcraft (3d Cir. 1989) 879 F.2d 64 , 68 ["The defendant bears the initial burden of proof in a vindictive prosecution claim and is required to establish the appearance of vindictiveness."]; United

2016(See, e.g., United States v. DeMarco, supra, 550 F.2d at p. 1227 ; United States v. Krezdorn (5th Cir. 1983) 718 F.2d 1360 , 1364–1365 (en banc); United States v. Andrews (6th Cir. 1980) 633 F.2d 449 , 453–454 (en banc) [examining the prosecutor’s actions and stake in deterrence to determine whether a reasonable person would find a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness]; United States v. Schoolcraft (3d Cir. 1989) 879 F.2d 64, 68 [“The defendant bears the initial burden of proof in a vindictive prosecution claim and is required to establish the appearance of vindictiveness.”]; United States v

2016(See, e.g., United States v. DeMarco , supra , 550 F.2d at p. 1227 ; United States v. Krezdorn (5th Cir. 1983) 718 F.2d 1360 , 1364-1365 (en banc); United States v. Andrews (6th Cir. 1980) 633 F.2d 449 , 453-454 (en banc) [examining the prosecutor's actions and stake in deterrence to determine whether a reasonable person would find a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness]; *824 United States v. Schoolcraft (3d Cir. 1989) 879 F.2d 64 , 68 ["The defendant bears the initial burden of proof in a vindictive prosecution claim and is required to establish the appearance of vindictiveness."]; United

2016(See, e.g., United States v. DeMarco, supra, 550 F.2d at p. 1227 ; United States v. Krezdorn (5th Cir. 1983) 718 F.2d 1360 , 1364–1365 (en banc); United States v. Andrews (6th Cir. 1980) 633 F.2d 449 , 453–454 (en banc) [examining the prosecutor’s actions and stake in deterrence to determine whether a reasonable person would find a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness]; United States v. Schoolcraft (3d Cir. 1989) 879 F.2d 64, 68 [“The defendant bears the initial burden of proof in a vindictive prosecution claim and is required to establish the appearance of vindictiveness.”]; United States v

2016(See, e.g., United States v. DeMarco , supra , 550 F.2d at p. 1227 ; United States v. Krezdorn (5th Cir. 1983) 718 F.2d 1360 , 1364-1365 (en banc); United States v. Andrews (6th Cir. 1980) 633 F.2d 449 , 453-454 (en banc) [examining the prosecutor's actions and stake in deterrence to determine whether a reasonable person would find a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness]; *824 United States v. Schoolcraft (3d Cir. 1989) 879 F.2d 64 , 68 ["The defendant bears the initial burden of proof in a vindictive prosecution claim and is required to establish the appearance of vindictiveness."]; United

2016(See, e.g., United States v. DeMarco, supra, 550 F.2d at p. 1227 ; United States v. Krezdorn (5th Cir. 1983) 718 F.2d 1360 , 1364–1365 (en banc); United States v. Andrews (6th Cir. 1980) 633 F.2d 449 , 453–454 (en banc) [examining the prosecutor’s actions and stake in deterrence to determine whether a reasonable person would find a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness]; United States v. Schoolcraft (3d Cir. 1989) 879 F.2d 64, 68 [“The defendant bears the initial burden of proof in a vindictive prosecution claim and is required to establish the appearance of vindictiveness.”]; United States v

2016(See Kellett , supra , 63 Cal.2d at p. 827 , 48 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 409 P.2d 206 .) The People suggest that if Kellett did not require them to join the charges in the first instance, it cannot appear vindictive to add them to the case after a successful appeal.

2016(See Kellett , supra , 63 Cal.2d at p. 827 , 48 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 409 P.2d 206 .) The People suggest that if Kellett did not require them to join the charges in the first instance, it cannot appear vindictive to add them to the case after a successful appeal.

2016(See, e.g., People v. Jurado , supra , 38 Cal.4th at p. 98 , 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ; People v. Lucas , supra , 12 Cal.4th at pp. 477-478, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ; *831 People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342 , 438-439, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 68 P.3d 1 .) A contrary conclusion, of course, would provide less due process protection to capital defendants than to non-capital defendants.

2016(See, e.g., People v. Jurado , supra , 38 Cal.4th at p. 98 , 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ; People v. Lucas , supra , 12 Cal.4th at pp. 477-478, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ; *831 People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342 , 438-439, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 68 P.3d 1 .) A contrary conclusion, of course, would provide less due process protection to capital defendants than to non-capital defendants.

2016(See, e.g., Esposito , supra , 968 F.2d at p. 306 ; Valli , supra , 187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 803-805, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 335 .) The People's proposal is considerably broader than those holdings, however.

2016(See, e.g., Esposito, supra, 968 F.2d at p. 306 ; Valli, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 803–805.) The People’s proposal is considerably broader than those holdings, however.

2016A defendant's exercise of a right of appeal must be free and unfettered.' "]; United States v. DeMarco (9th Cir. 1977) 550 F.2d 1224 , 1227 [vindictive-prosecution doctrine designed to prevent chilling exercise of rights by other defendants making similar choice in the future].) This is a particular concern in capital cases, which tend to be highly publicized and rarely reversed. 6 By guarding against the fear of retaliation, the vindictive-prosecution doctrine works to safeguard the rights of the accused and promote the legitimacy of the courts as a check on the power of the State.

2016(See, e.g., United States v. DeMarco , supra , 550 F.2d at p. 1227 ; United States v. Krezdorn (5th Cir. 1983) 718 F.2d 1360 , 1364-1365 (en banc); United States v. Andrews (6th Cir. 1980) 633 F.2d 449 , 453-454 (en banc) [examining the prosecutor's actions and stake in deterrence to determine whether a reasonable person would find a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness]; *824 United States v. Schoolcraft (3d Cir. 1989) 879 F.2d 64 , 68 ["The defendant bears the initial burden of proof in a vindictive prosecution claim and is required to establish the appearance of vindictiveness."]; United

2016(See People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550 , 566, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ; § 1239, subd. (b).) However, the vindictive-prosecution doctrine protects not only the defendant in an individual case, but also other defendants. ( North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711 , 724-725, 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 .) Why?

2016(See People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550 , 566, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ; § 1239, subd. (b).) However, the vindictive-prosecution doctrine protects not only the defendant in an individual case, but also other defendants. ( North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711 , 724-725, 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 .) Why?

2021Generally, “[w]e will not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal.” (In re Campbell (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 742, 756 .) However, defendant contends his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to make this objection.

2019(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th. 72, 98.) “The constitutional protection against prosecutorial vindictiveness is based on the fundamental notion that it ‘would be patently unconstitutional’ to ‘chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them.’ ” (In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 873 (Bower).) “In vindictive prosecution cases it is the Government’s attempt or threat to ‘up the ante’ by bringing new or more serious charges in response to the exercise of protected rights that violates the due process guarantee.” (United States v. Robison (9th Cir.

2016(Id. at p. 503 [“We cannot conclude that Blackledge and Thigpen [v. Roberts (1984) 468 U.S. 27 ] clearly establish a different rule than that applied by the Wisconsin court.”]; see Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362 , 404–406 [federal review of state habeas claims].) We decline to follow those federal courts that have categorically declined to apply the vindictive-prosecution rule to situations in which the defendant is charged, post-appeal, with different criminal conduct, as opposed to a heightened charge for the same conduct.