100 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1917–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Farnumgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., State v. Farnum, 275 Conn. 26, 33 , 878 A.2d 1095 (2005); State v. Grant, 177 Conn. 140, 144 , 411 A.2d 917 (1979); State v. Tillman, supra, 152 Conn. 18 ; but see State v. Oliveras, 210 Conn. 751, 757 , 557 A.2d 534 (1989) (leav- ing open reviewability question with respect to recently reformulated corpus delicti rule). 2019See, e.g., State v. Farnum, 275 Conn. 26, 33 , 878 A.2d 1095 (2005); State v. Grant, 177 Conn. 140, 144 , 411 A.2d 917 (1979); State v. Tillman, supra, 152 Conn. 18 ; but see State v. Oliveras, 210 Conn. 751, 757 , 557 A.2d 534 (1989) (leav- ing open reviewability question with respect to recently reformulated corpus delicti rule). | 2 | 2 |
State v. DeJesusgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20, 33 , 627 A.2d 862 (1993) (to constitute recklessness, defendant must objectively disregard risk that constituted gross deviation from reasonable standard of care and must have ‘‘subjectively realized and chose to ignore [that] substantial risk’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. DeJesus, 194 Conn. 376 , 389 n.13, 481 A.2d 1277 (1984) (‘‘The Connecticut test for the degree of force in self-defense is a subjective-objective one. 2025See, e.g., State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20, 33 , 627 A.2d 862 (1993) (to constitute recklessness, defendant must objectively disregard risk that constituted gross deviation from reasonable standard of care and must have ‘‘subjectively realized and chose to ignore [that] substantial risk’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. DeJesus, 194 Conn. 376 , 389 n.13, 481 A.2d 1277 (1984) (‘‘The Connecticut test for the degree of force in self-defense is a subjective-objective one. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Salzgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20, 33 , 627 A.2d 862 (1993) (to constitute recklessness, defendant must objectively disregard risk that constituted gross deviation from reasonable standard of care and must have ‘‘subjectively realized and chose to ignore [that] substantial risk’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. DeJesus, 194 Conn. 376 , 389 n.13, 481 A.2d 1277 (1984) (‘‘The Connecticut test for the degree of force in self-defense is a subjective-objective one. 2025See, e.g., State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20, 33 , 627 A.2d 862 (1993) (to constitute recklessness, defendant must objectively disregard risk that constituted gross deviation from reasonable standard of care and must have ‘‘subjectively realized and chose to ignore [that] substantial risk’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. DeJesus, 194 Conn. 376 , 389 n.13, 481 A.2d 1277 (1984) (‘‘The Connecticut test for the degree of force in self-defense is a subjective-objective one. | 1 | 1 |
Stockwell v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus 2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus | 1 | 1 |
Striefel v. Charles-Keyt-Leaman Partnershipgreen2 sentences2022Because the possessor is acting through ignorance or mistake, and would amend his occupation were the true boundary line known to him, his possession lacks the element of hostility necessary for adverse possession.’’ Id.; see Striefel v. Charles-Keyt-Leaman Partnership, 733 A.2d 984 , 992 n.9 (Me. 1999) (‘‘Historically, two distinct lines of thought have emerged regarding the intent necessary to establish title by adverse possession in mistaken boundary cases. 2022Because the possessor is acting through ignorance or mistake, and would amend his occupation were the true boundary line known to him, his possession lacks the element of hostility necessary for adverse possession.’’ Id.; see Striefel v. Charles-Keyt-Leaman Partnership, 733 A.2d 984 , 992 n.9 (Me. 1999) (‘‘Historically, two distinct lines of thought have emerged regarding the intent necessary to establish title by adverse possession in mistaken boundary cases. | 1 | 1 |
Henry v. Statewide Grievance Committeegreen2 sentences2020See Henry v. Statewide Grievance Com- mittee, 111 Conn. App. 12 , 27–28, 957 A.2d 547 (2008) (holding any impropri- ety in relying on allegedly irrelevant factual findings in finding violations of rules of professional conduct necessarily harmless if other evidence existed sufficient to support court’s ultimate findings). 9 Practice Book § 2-39 provides: ‘‘(a) Upon being informed that a lawyer admitted to the Connecticut bar has resigned, been disbarred, suspended or otherwise disciplined, or placed on inactive disability status in another jurisdiction, and that said discipline or inactive dis 2020See Henry v. Statewide Grievance Com- mittee, 111 Conn. App. 12 , 27–28, 957 A.2d 547 (2008) (holding any impropri- ety in relying on allegedly irrelevant factual findings in finding violations of rules of professional conduct necessarily harmless if other evidence existed sufficient to support court’s ultimate findings). 9 Practice Book § 2-39 provides: ‘‘(a) Upon being informed that a lawyer admitted to the Connecticut bar has resigned, been disbarred, suspended or otherwise disciplined, or placed on inactive disability status in another jurisdiction, and that said discipline or inactive dis | 1 | 1 |
Weidenbacher v. Duclosgreen2 sentences2019See Weidenbacher v. Duclos , 234 Conn. 51 , 63, 661 A.2d 988 (1995). 2019See Weidenbacher v. Duclos , 234 Conn. 51 , 63, 661 A.2d 988 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kemahgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411 , 420–21, 957 A.2d 852 (2008) (review of court’s interpretation of General Statutes §§ 52-146d and 52-146e is plenary); In re Wil- liam H., 88 Conn. App. 511 , 517–18, 870 A.2d 1102 (2005) (review of court’s interpretation of § 46b-124 and its application to facts of case is plenary). ‘‘It . . . is well established that we are required to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter . . . . 2016See State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411 , 420–21, 957 A.2d 852 (2008) (review of court’s interpretation of General Statutes §§ 52-146d and 52-146e is plenary); In re Wil- liam H., 88 Conn. App. 511 , 517–18, 870 A.2d 1102 (2005) (review of court’s interpretation of § 46b-124 and its application to facts of case is plenary). ‘‘It . . . is well established that we are required to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter . . . . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Geislergreen2 sentences2015See id. 4 At no point did the defendant suggest that this court’s review of the constitutionality of the death penalty should be limited exclusively to the theory that a new consensus had emerged in opposition to that punishment. 5 In addition, the state dedicated no less than six pages to arguing that ‘‘Connecticut’s standard[s] of decency [have] not evolved to the point that the death penalty has been rejected . . . .’’ State v. Santiago, Conn. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, April Term, 2013, State’s Supplemental Brief p. 18. 2015See generally id., pp. 18–23. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Savagegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gethersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Knight v. Breckheimergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Murphygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Taftgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carino v. Watsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hensley v. Eckerhartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Mansongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Menillogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Batson v. Kentuckygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bradwell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Oquendogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Beardsley v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Oliverasgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., State v. Farnum, 275 Conn. 26, 33 , 878 A.2d 1095 (2005); State v. Grant, 177 Conn. 140, 144 , 411 A.2d 917 (1979); State v. Tillman, supra, 152 Conn. 18 ; but see State v. Oliveras, 210 Conn. 751, 757 , 557 A.2d 534 (1989) (leav- ing open reviewability question with respect to recently reformulated corpus delicti rule). 2019See, e.g., State v. Farnum, 275 Conn. 26, 33 , 878 A.2d 1095 (2005); State v. Grant, 177 Conn. 140, 144 , 411 A.2d 917 (1979); State v. Tillman, supra, 152 Conn. 18 ; but see State v. Oliveras, 210 Conn. 751, 757 , 557 A.2d 534 (1989) (leav- ing open reviewability question with respect to recently reformulated corpus delicti rule). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Doucette
green
2 sentences1962It would do violence to reason and challenge one’s credulity in the face of all these facts to hold other than that the corpus delicti was established by the Connecticut rule so recently affirmed in State v. Doucette, supra, 99 . 1962It would do violence to reason and challenge one’s credulity in the face of all these facts to hold other than that the corpus delicti was established by the Connecticut rule so recently affirmed in State v. Doucette, supra, 99 . | 4 | 1961–1962 |
In re Weissman
green
2 sentences2020See footnote 9 of this opinion; In re Weissman, 203 Conn. 380, 383 , 524 A.2d 1141 (1987). 2020See footnote 9 of this opinion; In re Weissman, 203 Conn. 380, 383 , 524 A.2d 1141 (1987). | 2 | 1996–2020 |
State v. Grant
green
2 sentences2019See, e.g., State v. Farnum, 275 Conn. 26, 33 , 878 A.2d 1095 (2005); State v. Grant, 177 Conn. 140, 144 , 411 A.2d 917 (1979); State v. Tillman, supra, 152 Conn. 18 ; but see State v. Oliveras, 210 Conn. 751, 757 , 557 A.2d 534 (1989) (leav- ing open reviewability question with respect to recently reformulated corpus delicti rule). 2019See, e.g., State v. Farnum, 275 Conn. 26, 33 , 878 A.2d 1095 (2005); State v. Grant, 177 Conn. 140, 144 , 411 A.2d 917 (1979); State v. Tillman, supra, 152 Conn. 18 ; but see State v. Oliveras, 210 Conn. 751, 757 , 557 A.2d 534 (1989) (leav- ing open reviewability question with respect to recently reformulated corpus delicti rule). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Fowler v. Weiss
green
2 sentences1999The Connecticut test to determine whether the parties intended to bind themselves contractually prior to the execution of a formal contract is set out in Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49 Conn. App. 152 , 160 (1998); Fowler v. Weiss, 15 Conn. App. 690 , 693 (1988). 1999The Connecticut test to determine whether the parties intended to bind themselves contractually prior to the execution of a formal contract is set out in Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49 Conn. App. 152 , 160 (1998); Fowler v. Weiss, 15 Conn. App. 690 , 693 (1988). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999The Connecticut test to determine whether the parties intended to bind themselves contractually prior to the execution of a formal contract is set out in Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49 Conn. App. 152 , 160 (1998); Fowler v. Weiss, 15 Conn. App. 690 , 693 (1988). 1999The Connecticut test to determine whether the parties intended to bind themselves contractually prior to the execution of a formal contract is set out in Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49 Conn. App. 152 , 160 (1998); Fowler v. Weiss, 15 Conn. App. 690 , 693 (1988). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Chrysler Credit Corporation v. Fairfield Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
green
2 sentences1993Chrysler Credit Corporation v. Fairfield Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 180 Conn. 223 , 226 (1982); Practice Book 142 et. seq. 1993Chrysler Credit Corporation v. Fairfield Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 180 Conn. 223 , 226 (1982); Practice Book 142 et. seq. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Briganti v. Connecticut Co.
green
2 sentences1991Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316 , 319 ; so long as the plaintiff does not initially offer to prove negligence. 1991Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316 , 319 ; so long as the plaintiff does not initially offer to prove negligence. | 2 | 1949–1991 |
Meglio v. Comeau
green
2 sentences1975“The fact that there were . . . [those] two distinct defenses brought into operation the rule expressed in Meglio v. Comeau, 137 Conn. 551, 553 , 79 A.2d 187 : ‘The Connecticut rule may be stated as follows: If there is no error in the instructions as to one of two distinct defenses, a general verdict for the defendant should be sustained. ... 1975“The fact that there were . . . [those] two distinct defenses brought into operation the rule expressed in Meglio v. Comeau, 137 Conn. 551, 553 , 79 A.2d 187 : ‘The Connecticut rule may be stated as follows: If there is no error in the instructions as to one of two distinct defenses, a general verdict for the defendant should be sustained. ... | 2 | 1964–1975 |
Kelley v. Bonney
green
2 sentences2023Although the District Court acknowledged that it was ‘‘reluctant to alter the landscape of Connecticut’s immunity law’’ by extending absolute immunity to state- ments made during the proceedings of a nongovernmen- tal entity—an area it said Connecticut courts have not resolved; id., 224; the court concluded that extending such immunity in the present case was warranted, both as a matter of public policy; id., 225–26; and under the six factor test that this court had used to identify quasi- judicial proceedings in Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 567 , 606 A.2d 693 (1992). 2023Although the District Court acknowledged that it was ‘‘reluctant to alter the landscape of Connecticut’s immunity law’’ by extending absolute immunity to state- ments made during the proceedings of a nongovernmen- tal entity—an area it said Connecticut courts have not resolved; id., 224; the court concluded that extending such immunity in the present case was warranted, both as a matter of public policy; id., 225–26; and under the six factor test that this court had used to identify quasi- judicial proceedings in Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 567 , 606 A.2d 693 (1992). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Lesser v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co.
green
2 sentences2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus 2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Radican v. Hughes
green
2 sentences2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus 2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Washington v. Comm'r of Corr.
green
2 sentences2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus 2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Toffolon v. Town of Avon
green
2 sentences2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus 2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Mauro
green
2 sentences2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus 2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Campbell
green
2 sentences2022Id., 343. 27 See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 328 Conn. 444, 546 , 180 A.3d 882 (2018) (‘‘[D]irect evidence of . . . state of mind is rarely available. . . . 2022Id., 343. 27 See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 328 Conn. 444, 546 , 180 A.3d 882 (2018) (‘‘[D]irect evidence of . . . state of mind is rarely available. . . . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Cleaveland v. Gabriel
green
2 sentences2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus 2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Fernwood Realty, LLC v. Aerocision, LLC.
green
2 sentences2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus 2022The Connecticut analysis puts the issue in these terms: ‘‘[T]he nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which [the realty] was appropriated at the time the annexation was made . . . .’’ Capen v. Peck- ham, supra, 35 Conn. 94 ; see Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. 219 (observing that ‘‘the trial court’s finding that the tanks were not specially adapted to some special or peculiar use of the land, when viewed in light of the trial court’s concomitant finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the bus | 1 | 2022–2022 |
McDermott v. Calvary Baptist Church
green
2 sentences2021The Connecticut rule that the owner of property abut- ting on a highway has an obligation to use reasonable care to keep his premises in such a condition as not to endanger travelers was followed in McDermott v. Calvary Baptist Church, 263 Conn. 378 , 819 A.2d 795 (2003), where a tree fell from a church yard onto a visitor in an adjacent parking lot. 2021The Connecticut rule that the owner of property abut- ting on a highway has an obligation to use reasonable care to keep his premises in such a condition as not to endanger travelers was followed in McDermott v. Calvary Baptist Church, 263 Conn. 378 , 819 A.2d 795 (2003), where a tree fell from a church yard onto a visitor in an adjacent parking lot. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In re William H.
green
2 sentences2016See State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411 , 420–21, 957 A.2d 852 (2008) (review of court’s interpretation of General Statutes §§ 52-146d and 52-146e is plenary); In re Wil- liam H., 88 Conn. App. 511 , 517–18, 870 A.2d 1102 (2005) (review of court’s interpretation of § 46b-124 and its application to facts of case is plenary). ‘‘It . . . is well established that we are required to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter . . . . 2016See State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411 , 420–21, 957 A.2d 852 (2008) (review of court’s interpretation of General Statutes §§ 52-146d and 52-146e is plenary); In re Wil- liam H., 88 Conn. App. 511 , 517–18, 870 A.2d 1102 (2005) (review of court’s interpretation of § 46b-124 and its application to facts of case is plenary). ‘‘It . . . is well established that we are required to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter . . . . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Gupta
green
2 sentences2015Although the concerns which underlie the federal rule cannot be completely obviated when the materials are allowed in the jury room, the dangers can be minimized by the judicious exercise of discretion by the trial court in deciding which items ought to be admitted as full exhibits.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gupta, 297 Conn. 211, 239 , 998 A.2d 1085 (2010); see also C. 2015Although the concerns which underlie the federal rule cannot be completely obviated when the materials are allowed in the jury room, the dangers can be minimized by the judicious exercise of discretion by the trial court in deciding which items ought to be admitted as full exhibits.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gupta, 297 Conn. 211, 239 , 998 A.2d 1085 (2010); see also C. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Bryant green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Assn. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Cross v. Huttenlocher green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Friedman v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Bishop v. Kelly green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Brown green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Begley v. Kohl & Madden Printing Ink Co. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Ann Howard's Apricots Restaurant, Inc. v. Commission On Human Rights & Opportunities green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Donkin v. Donkin neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Frazier v. Manson green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Thalheim v. Town of Greenwich green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Rivera green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Vaughan green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Warner v. Konover green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Roy v. Centennial Insurance green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Berry v. Loiseau green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Gaulton v. Reno Paint & Wallpaper Co. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Carter v. City of Bristol neutral | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.