Connecticut rule (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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Connecticut rule in Pennsylvania

8 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1898–2006 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Pottetti v. Cliffordgreen
conn · 1959 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006See Pottetti, 150 A.2d at 210 ("A pure bill of discovery is favored in equity and will be granted unless there is some well-founded objection against the exercise of the court's jurisdiction."). [21] We do not find, in Connecticut's law, an unequivocal requirement that such discovery will be granted only where a litigant has averred that absent such discovery his suit will not be able to proceed.

2006See Pottetti, 150 A.2d at 210 ("A pure bill of discovery is favored in equity and will be granted unless there is some well-founded objection against the exercise of the court's jurisdiction."). [21] We do not find, in Connecticut's law, an unequivocal requirement that such discovery will be granted only where a litigant has averred that absent such discovery his suit will not be able to proceed.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Malone v. Santora green
conn · 1949
1 sentence

1955Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 286, 293 .

11955–1955
Kurtz v. Morse Oil Co. green
conn · 1932
2 sentences

1952The Connecticut rule in this regard is stated by our Supreme Court of Errors in Kurts v. Morse Oil Co., 114 Conn. 336 , 342: “We have uniformly held that there was no casual relation between the fact that the operator of a car was licensed or unlicensed, and an injury occurring during its operation, and that the lack of such license could not be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury and was not therefore actionable negligence, either as a ground of recovery or of defense.” One of the defendant’s special defenses is that the plaintiff’s insured permitted his son Joseph to operate the c

1952The Connecticut rule in this regard is stated by our Supreme Court of Errors in Kurts v. Morse Oil Co., 114 Conn. 336 , 342: “We have uniformly held that there was no casual relation between the fact that the operator of a car was licensed or unlicensed, and an injury occurring during its operation, and that the lack of such license could not be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury and was not therefore actionable negligence, either as a ground of recovery or of defense.” One of the defendant’s special defenses is that the plaintiff’s insured permitted his son Joseph to operate the c

11952–1952
National Bank of Commerce of New London v. Howland green
conn · 1941
2 sentences

1951The Connecticut rule relating to the propriety of a cross-complaint is succinctly stated in Puleo v. Goldberg, 129 Conn. 34 , 37: “The test is whether the transactions are distinct and independent or are connected in the sense that the claim under the cross-complaint is so related to that made in the complaint that consideration of the former is essential to a full adjudication of the parties’ rights as to the latter.” See, also, National Bank of Commerce of New London v. Howland, 128 Conn. 307, 312 , and cases there cited.

1951The Connecticut rule relating to the propriety of a cross-complaint is succinctly stated in Puleo v. Goldberg, 129 Conn. 34 , 37: “The test is whether the transactions are distinct and independent or are connected in the sense that the claim under the cross-complaint is so related to that made in the complaint that consideration of the former is essential to a full adjudication of the parties’ rights as to the latter.” See, also, National Bank of Commerce of New London v. Howland, 128 Conn. 307, 312 , and cases there cited.

11951–1951
Puleo v. Goldberg green
conn · 1942
2 sentences

1951The Connecticut rule relating to the propriety of a cross-complaint is succinctly stated in Puleo v. Goldberg, 129 Conn. 34 , 37: “The test is whether the transactions are distinct and independent or are connected in the sense that the claim under the cross-complaint is so related to that made in the complaint that consideration of the former is essential to a full adjudication of the parties’ rights as to the latter.” See, also, National Bank of Commerce of New London v. Howland, 128 Conn. 307, 312 , and cases there cited.

1951The Connecticut rule relating to the propriety of a cross-complaint is succinctly stated in Puleo v. Goldberg, 129 Conn. 34 , 37: “The test is whether the transactions are distinct and independent or are connected in the sense that the claim under the cross-complaint is so related to that made in the complaint that consideration of the former is essential to a full adjudication of the parties’ rights as to the latter.” See, also, National Bank of Commerce of New London v. Howland, 128 Conn. 307, 312 , and cases there cited.

11951–1951
Whitman Hotel Corporation v. Elliott & Watrous Engineering Co. green
conn · 1951
2 sentences

1951“He is absolutely liable for damages which result from that blasting whether he was negligent in his conduct of the operation or not”; Whitman Hotel Corporation v. Elliott & Watrous Engineering Co., 137 Conn. 562, 571 ; and it is held that this rule holds true whether the damages result from the explosion by flying debris or by concussion of the atmosphere or vibration of the earth.

1951“He is absolutely liable for damages which result from that blasting whether he was negligent in his conduct of the operation or not”; Whitman Hotel Corporation v. Elliott & Watrous Engineering Co., 137 Conn. 562, 571 ; and it is held that this rule holds true whether the damages result from the explosion by flying debris or by concussion of the atmosphere or vibration of the earth.

11951–1951
Briganti v. Connecticut Co. green
conn · 1934
2 sentences

1949Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316, 319 ; so long as the plaintiff does not initially offer to prove negligence.

1949Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316, 319 ; so long as the plaintiff does not initially offer to prove negligence.

11949–1949
Viall v. Lionel Manufacturing Co. neutral
conn · 1916
2 sentences

1942Co., 90 Conn. 694, 700 , the Connecticut rule de damages is stated thus: “The employee or-com tractee, immediately upon breach of contract, can sue and re' cover damages for the entire term, or he can wait until the end of the term; in either case his action is for breach of the contract: he has no action for wages or salary for service rem dered subsequent to the breach.” (Citing Perry vs.

1942Co., 90 Conn. 694, 700 , the Connecticut rule de damages is stated thus: “The employee or-com tractee, immediately upon breach of contract, can sue and re' cover damages for the entire term, or he can wait until the end of the term; in either case his action is for breach of the contract: he has no action for wages or salary for service rem dered subsequent to the breach.” (Citing Perry vs.

11942–1942
Hermany v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n green
pa · 1892
1 sentence

1898In this construction, the principle announced in Hermany v. Life Insurance Co., 151 Pa. 17 , opinion by present chief justice, was strictly followed.

11898–1898

Where else courts name it

CT 100 (1917–2025) MA 9 (1957–2011) PA 8 (1898–2006) WA 7 (1975–2026) MD 6 (1962–2013) IL 5 (1955–1984) DE 4 (1959–1967) NY 4 (1899–1998) NJ 3 (1960–1993) GA 3 (1902–1998) AZ 3 (1963–1971) VT 2 (1996–1998) TX 2 (1978–2015) LA 2 (1984–1991) ND 2 (1967–2005) MN 2 (1939–1978) FL 2 (1958–1976)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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