Connecticut rule in Massachusetts

2011That common-law principle applies to punitive damages awarded under CUTPA, Merrill argues, “because the clear rule of construction, set forth in a long and unbroken line of Connecticut Supreme Court cases, is that statutes are presumed to incorporate common-law standards unless the intention to depart from the common law ‘is clearly and plainly expressed.’ ’’ Id. at 6, quoting Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 838-39 (2003); see also Hunte v. Blumenthal, 238 Comm. 146, 153 (1996), where the Court stated: “In the absence of guidance from the language of the statute or the legislative histoi

2011That common-law principle applies to punitive damages awarded under CUTPA, Merrill argues, “because the clear rule of construction, set forth in a long and unbroken line of Connecticut Supreme Court cases, is that statutes are presumed to incorporate common-law standards unless the intention to depart from the common law ‘is clearly and plainly expressed.’ ’’ Id. at 6, quoting Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 838-39 (2003); see also Hunte v. Blumenthal, 238 Comm. 146, 153 (1996), where the Court stated: “In the absence of guidance from the language of the statute or the legislative histoi

2010In 1989, however, the Supreme Court of Connecticut added a new variant to the so-called Connecticut rule, providing that “in the absence of unusual circumstances, a property owner, in fulfilling the duty owed to invitees upon his property to exercise reasonable diligence in removing dangerous accumulations of snow and ice, may await the end of a storm and a reasonable time thereafter before removing ice and snow from outside walks and steps.” Kraus v. Newton, 211 Conn. 191, 197-198 (1989).

2010In 1989, however, the Supreme Court of Connecticut added a new variant to the so-called Connecticut rule, providing that “in the absence of unusual circumstances, a property owner, in fulfilling the duty owed to invitees upon his property to exercise reasonable diligence in removing dangerous accumulations of snow and ice, may await the end of a storm and a reasonable time thereafter before removing ice and snow from outside walks and steps.” Kraus v. Newton, 211 Conn. 191, 197-198 (1989).

2010See Rosenberg v. Chapman Nat’l Bank, 126 Me. 403, 405 (1927). 17 The reasonable care standard we adopt is sometimes referred to as the “Connecticut rule,” because of the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s decision in Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383 (1925), rejecting the Massachusetts rule of natural accumulation and adopting instead a rule requiring a landlord to exercise reasonable care in preventing dangerous conditions in common areas due to accumulations of snow and ice.

2010See, e.g., Makeeff v. Bismarck, 693 N.W.2d 639, 642 (N.D. 2005); 2 N.J.

2010See Rosenberg v. Chapman Nat’l Bank, 126 Me. 403, 405 (1927). 17 The reasonable care standard we adopt is sometimes referred to as the “Connecticut rule,” because of the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s decision in Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383 (1925), rejecting the Massachusetts rule of natural accumulation and adopting instead a rule requiring a landlord to exercise reasonable care in preventing dangerous conditions in common areas due to accumulations of snow and ice.

2004Where the circumstances of the case are unique or involve the matter of first impression, we “review the decision of the single justice to determine whether it is supported by sufficient evidence, constitutes an abuse of discretion, and is free from any error of law.” Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. 324, 333 (2003), quoting Matter of McInerney, 389 Mass. 528, 530 (1983).

2004Where the circumstances of the case are unique or involve the matter of first impression, we “review the decision of the single justice to determine whether it is supported by sufficient evidence, constitutes an abuse of discretion, and is free from any error of law.” Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. 324, 333 (2003), quoting Matter of McInerney, 389 Mass. 528, 530 (1983).

2004See Bieluch v. Bieluch, 190 Conn. 813, 819 (1983) (discussing Connecticut privilege statute, which was template for G.

1998Compare Nichols Associates, Inc. v. Starr, 4 Mass.App.Ct. 91, 96 (1976) (Massachusetts surveying firm brought suit against Connecticut developer over contract for surveying work; while at least half the work was ultimately done by the plaintiff in Massachusetts, there was no indication the parties had contemplated any work being done in the Commonwealth; in the circumstances, no personal jurisdiction existed over Connecticut defendant).

1995The purpose of the motor vehicle exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the worker’s compensation law is “to distinguish between ‘simple negligence on the job’ from negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle.” Dias v. Adams, 189 Conn. 354, 359-60 , 456 A.2d 309, 312 (1983).

1995The purpose of the motor vehicle exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the worker’s compensation law is “to distinguish between ‘simple negligence on the job’ from negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle.” Dias v. Adams, 189 Conn. 354, 359-60 , 456 A.2d 309, 312 (1983).

1977We do not regard the Connecticut rule of law as so repugnant to the declared policy of this State that we would not enforce it in appropriate circumstances. 5 On the other hand, the law of the forum allowing recovery against a fellow employee has been applied to a local accident in disregard of the exemption contained in the law of the State *310 of employment, perhaps on the ground that the exemption of the foreign law is obnoxious to the forum’s public policy (Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 233 [1969]), or on the simple assertion that the law of the place of the alleged tort governs all ques

1977We do not regard the Connecticut rule of law as so repugnant to the declared policy of this State that we would not enforce it in appropriate circumstances. 5 On the other hand, the law of the forum allowing recovery against a fellow employee has been applied to a local accident in disregard of the exemption contained in the law of the State *310 of employment, perhaps on the ground that the exemption of the foreign law is obnoxious to the forum’s public policy (Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 233 [1969]), or on the simple assertion that the law of the place of the alleged tort governs all ques

1957Baldwin v. Porter, 12 Conn. 473, 482 (although holding that, on its particular facts, the true owner was not estopped to assert his title), states the Connecticut rule as follows: “It is a general principle, that no man can . . . transfer title to that which .he does not own ....

1957Baldwin v. Porter, 12 Conn. 473, 482 (although holding that, on its particular facts, the true owner was not estopped to assert his title), states the Connecticut rule as follows: “It is a general principle, that no man can . . . transfer title to that which .he does not own ....