Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Reardon v. Shimelman
green
2 sentences2001Contrary to the Massachusetts rule, the Connecticut rule announced in Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383 , 128 A. 705 (1925) placed the burden on the landowner: The duty of the landlord being to exercise reasonable care to prevent the occurrence of defective or dangerous conditions in the common approaches, the fact that a particular danger arose from the fall of snow or the freezing of ice can afford no ground of distinction. 2001Contrary to the Massachusetts rule, the Connecticut rule announced in Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383 , 128 A. 705 (1925) placed the burden on the landowner: The duty of the landlord being to exercise reasonable care to prevent the occurrence of defective or dangerous conditions in the common approaches, the fact that a particular danger arose from the fall of snow or the freezing of ice can afford no ground of distinction. | 5 | 1975–2001 |
State v. Melton
green
2 sentences2026It is true that illness on the part of defense counsel, as 6 was the case in No. 86159-0-I/7 Melton, is a factual difference from illness of the prosecutor in this case. 97 Wn. 2025It is true that illness on the part of defense counsel, as was the case in 6 No. 86159-0-I/7 Melton, is a factual difference from illness of the prosecutor in this case. 97 Wn. | 2 | 2025–2026 |
Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co.
green
2 sentences2001The Massachusetts rule, otherwise known as the “natural accumulation rule,” stems from the case of Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357 (1883). 2001The Massachusetts rule, otherwise known as the “natural accumulation rule,” stems from the case of Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357 (1883). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Geise v. Lee
green
2 sentences2001Adoption of the Connecticut rule stemmed from “judicial recognition of changing conditions within the ever expanding boundaries of the landlord-tenant relationship.” Geise, 84 Wn.2d at 869 . 2001Adoption of the Connecticut rule stemmed from “judicial recognition of changing conditions within the ever expanding boundaries of the landlord-tenant relationship.” Geise, 84 Wn.2d at 869 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp.
green
2 sentences1975The foregoing cases and their progeny, were implicitly adopted by this court in McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wn.2d 443 , 486 P.2d 1093 (1971). 1975The foregoing cases and their progeny, were implicitly adopted by this court in McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wn.2d 443 , 486 P.2d 1093 (1971). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Langley Park Apartments, SEC. H., Inc. v. Lund
green
2 sentences1975H., Inc. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402 , 199 A.2d 620 (1964); Strong v. Shefveland, 249 Minn. 59 , 81 N.W.2d 247 (1957) (applying the Connecticut rule to a trailer park situation); and Massor v. Yates, 137 Ore. 569 , 3 P.2d 784 (1931). 1975H., Inc. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402 , 199 A.2d 620 (1964); Strong v. Shefveland, 249 Minn. 59 , 81 N.W.2d 247 (1957) (applying the Connecticut rule to a trailer park situation); and Massor v. Yates, 137 Ore. 569 , 3 P.2d 784 (1931). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Strong v. Shefveland
green
2 sentences1975H., Inc. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402 , 199 A.2d 620 (1964); Strong v. Shefveland, 249 Minn. 59 , 81 N.W.2d 247 (1957) (applying the Connecticut rule to a trailer park situation); and Massor v. Yates, 137 Ore. 569 , 3 P.2d 784 (1931). 1975H., Inc. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402 , 199 A.2d 620 (1964); Strong v. Shefveland, 249 Minn. 59 , 81 N.W.2d 247 (1957) (applying the Connecticut rule to a trailer park situation); and Massor v. Yates, 137 Ore. 569 , 3 P.2d 784 (1931). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Massor v. Yates
green
2 sentences1975H., Inc. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402 , 199 A.2d 620 (1964); Strong v. Shefveland, 249 Minn. 59 , 81 N.W.2d 247 (1957) (applying the Connecticut rule to a trailer park situation); and Massor v. Yates, 137 Ore. 569 , 3 P.2d 784 (1931). 1975H., Inc. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402 , 199 A.2d 620 (1964); Strong v. Shefveland, 249 Minn. 59 , 81 N.W.2d 247 (1957) (applying the Connecticut rule to a trailer park situation); and Massor v. Yates, 137 Ore. 569 , 3 P.2d 784 (1931). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.