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15 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1896–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinoisgreen1 sentence2008Relying on the rationale behind the direct purchaser rule; see, e.g., Illinois *473 Brick Co. v. Illinois, supra, 431 U.S. 720 ; as well as the common-law bar against remote and speculative damages, the defendants also reject the state’s “multiplier” theory of damages, under which each dollar of an overcharge that actually affected a Connecticut business is alleged to have resulted in more than a dollar’s worth of harm to the state’s economy. | 1 | 1 |
Hartford National Bank & Trust Co. v. Tuckergreen1 sentence1990"It cannot be disputed that an improper return day affects the court's jurisdiction." Brandriff v. Sellas, 40 Conn. Sup. 243 , 244 CT Page 333 (1985); see also Hartford National Bank Trust Co. v. Tucker, 178 Conn. 472 , 478-79 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20 , 38 , 761 A.2d 1268 (2000). 2002Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20 , 38 , 761 A.2d 1268 (2000). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Parsons v. United Technologies Corp.
green
1 sentence2001Parsons v. United Technologies Corporation , 243 Conn. 66 , 88-89 (1997). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Velardi v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992Yanow v. Teal Industries, 178 Conn. 371 , 423 A.2d 77 (1979); Diulio v. Goulet, 2 Conn. App. 701 , 483 A.2d 1099 (1984). 1992Yanow v. Teal Industries, 178 Conn. 371 , 423 A.2d 77 (1979); Diulio v. Goulet, 2 Conn. App. 701 , 483 A.2d 1099 (1984). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
DiUlio v. Goulet
green
2 sentences1992Yanow v. Teal Industries, 178 Conn. 371 , 423 A.2d 77 (1979); Diulio v. Goulet, 2 Conn. App. 701 , 483 A.2d 1099 (1984). 1992Yanow v. Teal Industries, 178 Conn. 371 , 423 A.2d 77 (1979); Diulio v. Goulet, 2 Conn. App. 701 , 483 A.2d 1099 (1984). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Local 530, AFSCME, Council 15 v. City of New Haven
green
1 sentence1992Similarly, neither the circumstances of the federal court action or the questions asked by the arbitrator constitute "evident impartiality" within the meaning of such cases as Local 530, AFCME Council 15 v. New Haven, 9 Conn. App. 260 , 273 (19 6). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
National Labor Relations Board v. Webb Ford, Inc.
green
1 sentence1992The defendants further claim that the arbitrator should be disqualified on the grounds that the questions that he asked during the course of the arbitration were "excessively adversarial." The circumstances asserted by the defendants in the Motion to Disqualify do not constitute conduct that deprived the hearing of that fundamental fairness and impartiality required by due process under the rule of such cases as NLRB v. Webb Ford, Inc., 689 F.2d 733 , 736 (Cir. 1982). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Robert S. Weiss & Co. v. Mullins
green
1 sentence1991"To acquire a right-of-way by prescription, the party claiming the right must prove a use which I open, visible, continuous and uninterrupted for fifteen years and made under a claim of right." Robert S. Weiss Co. v. Mullins, 196 Conn. 614 , 618 (1985). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Brandriff v. Sellas
green
1 sentence1990"It cannot be disputed that an improper return day affects the court's jurisdiction." Brandriff v. Sellas, 40 Conn. Sup. 243 , 244 CT Page 333 (1985); see also Hartford National Bank Trust Co. v. Tucker, 178 Conn. 472 , 478-79 (1979). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Ruscito v. F-Dyne Electronics Co.
green
2 sentences1986“It is fundamental that ‘[ijnterest by our law is allowed on the ground of some contract express or implied to pay it, or as damage for the breach of some contract, or the violation of some duty.’ ” Ruscito v. F-Dyne Electronics Co., 177 Conn. 149, 163 , 411 A.2d 1371 (1979). 1986“It is fundamental that ‘[ijnterest by our law is allowed on the ground of some contract express or implied to pay it, or as damage for the breach of some contract, or the violation of some duty.’ ” Ruscito v. F-Dyne Electronics Co., 177 Conn. 149, 163 , 411 A.2d 1371 (1979). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia
green
2 sentences1976For a classification to withstand constitutional attack, it “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 , 40 S. Ct. 560 , 64 L. 1976For a classification to withstand constitutional attack, it “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 , 40 S. Ct. 560 , 64 L. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence1971They argue that the interrogation, if it may be so characterized, came in point of sequence prior to warning them of their rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Johnson v. Lewis
green
1 sentence1970Birdsey v. Kosienski, 140 Conn. 403, 412 ; Padula v. Padula, 138 Conn. 102, 108 ; Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank & Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 514 ; Johnson v. Lewis, supra. The defendants further claim that there had been no abandonment by the plaintiffs of their access to William Street over the fifteen-foot strip. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank & Trust Co.
green
1 sentence1970Birdsey v. Kosienski, 140 Conn. 403, 412 ; Padula v. Padula, 138 Conn. 102, 108 ; Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank & Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 514 ; Johnson v. Lewis, supra. The defendants further claim that there had been no abandonment by the plaintiffs of their access to William Street over the fifteen-foot strip. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Birdsey v. Kosienski
green
2 sentences1970Relying on Birdsey v. Kosienski, supra, they argue that one of the essential elements necessary to remove the application of the Statute of Frauds is an abandonment of certain rights — here, the alleged abandonment by the plaintiffs of access to their property over the fifteen-foot strip. 1970Birdsey v. Kosienski, 140 Conn. 403, 412 ; Padula v. Padula, 138 Conn. 102, 108 ; Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank & Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 514 ; Johnson v. Lewis, supra. The defendants further claim that there had been no abandonment by the plaintiffs of their access to William Street over the fifteen-foot strip. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Padula v. Padula
green
1 sentence1970Birdsey v. Kosienski, 140 Conn. 403, 412 ; Padula v. Padula, 138 Conn. 102, 108 ; Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank & Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 514 ; Johnson v. Lewis, supra. The defendants further claim that there had been no abandonment by the plaintiffs of their access to William Street over the fifteen-foot strip. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Roberts v. Merwin
green
2 sentences1950The defendants further claim, citing Roberts v. Merwin, 80 Conn. 347 , 68 A. 377 , that the plaintiff has attempted to establish the boundary line by the weakness of the defendants’ title rather than by the strength of her own. 1950The defendants further claim, citing Roberts v. Merwin, 80 Conn. 347 , 68 A. 377 , that the plaintiff has attempted to establish the boundary line by the weakness of the defendants’ title rather than by the strength of her own. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Clowes v. Miller
neutral
2 sentences1949Clowes v. Miller, 74 Conn. 287, 295 , 50 A. 728 , relied on by them, goes no further than to hold that relief in equity will be denied where enforcement would “defeat the primary object of the agreement and the real understanding of the parties.” The effect in law of the extensions was to carry the option forward; the mistake claimed to have been made by the defendants was unilateral and consisted of a failure to understand the legal effect of their. action. 1949Clowes v. Miller, 74 Conn. 287, 295 , 50 A. 728 , relied on by them, goes no further than to hold that relief in equity will be denied where enforcement would “defeat the primary object of the agreement and the real understanding of the parties.” The effect in law of the extensions was to carry the option forward; the mistake claimed to have been made by the defendants was unilateral and consisted of a failure to understand the legal effect of their. action. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Travelers Insurance v. Mayo
neutral
2 sentences1936Co. v. Mayo, 103 Conn. 341 , 130 Atl. 379 , that even if the garnishment preceded the receipt of notice of the assignment, yet this plaintiff cannot prevail since it is not shown that he was misled by the lack of that notice or had some other superior equity. 1936Co. v. Mayo, 103 Conn. 341 , 130 Atl. 379 , that even if the garnishment preceded the receipt of notice of the assignment, yet this plaintiff cannot prevail since it is not shown that he was misled by the lack of that notice or had some other superior equity. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Heath v. White
green
1 sentence1896The case of Heath v. White, 5 Conn. 228, 235 , was referred to, where this court said : “ There is no possibility of deciding who is the father of a child begotten on a lewd woman. | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.