dispositional phase violation in Connecticut

2008State v. Strickland, 243 Conn. 339, 354 , 703 A.2d 109 (1997).

2008State v. Strickland, 243 Conn. 339, 354 , 703 A.2d 109 (1997).

2018Id.

2018In Blake , the defendant argued that the trial court violated his right to allocution "when it denied his request for a continuance of the dispositional phase of the violation of probation hearing to wait for a final resolution of the underlying criminal charges." Id., at 588-89 , 958 A.2d 1236 .

2018In Blake , the defendant argued that the trial court violated his right to allocution "when it denied his request for a continuance of the dispositional phase of the violation of probation hearing to wait for a final resolution of the underlying criminal charges." Id., at 588-89 , 958 A.2d 1236 .

2010Id., 487-88 .

2009This appeal followed. 1 Before considering the defendant’s precise claims on appeal, we first note that “the rules of evidence do not *283 apply to probation proceedings.” State v. Quinones, 92 Conn. App. 389, 392 , 885 A.2d 227 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 904 , 891 A.2d 4 (2006); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 1-1 (d) (4).

2009This appeal followed. 1 Before considering the defendant’s precise claims on appeal, we first note that “the rules of evidence do not *283 apply to probation proceedings.” State v. Quinones, 92 Conn. App. 389, 392 , 885 A.2d 227 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 904 , 891 A.2d 4 (2006); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 1-1 (d) (4).

2009This appeal followed. 1 Before considering the defendant’s precise claims on appeal, we first note that “the rules of evidence do not *283 apply to probation proceedings.” State v. Quinones, 92 Conn. App. 389, 392 , 885 A.2d 227 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 904 , 891 A.2d 4 (2006); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 1-1 (d) (4).

2009This appeal followed. 1 Before considering the defendant’s precise claims on appeal, we first note that “the rules of evidence do not *283 apply to probation proceedings.” State v. Quinones, 92 Conn. App. 389, 392 , 885 A.2d 227 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 904 , 891 A.2d 4 (2006); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 1-1 (d) (4).

2008On the basis of our review of that court’s opinion, it is clear that certain fundamental precepts were in play: first, that although a motion for a continuance traditionally involves the exercise of the trial court’s discretion that ordinarily will not be disturbed in the absence of clear abuse; State v. Fabricatore, 89 Conn. App. 729, 734-35 , 875 A.2d 48 (2005), aff'd, 281 Conn. 469 , 915 A.2d 872 (2007); the basis for the particular motion in this case was the exercise of a right—allocution—which is based on the rules of practice, as well as decisional law, and is not discretionary; and sec

2008On the basis of our review of that court’s opinion, it is clear that certain fundamental precepts were in play: first, that although a motion for a continuance traditionally involves the exercise of the trial court’s discretion that ordinarily will not be disturbed in the absence of clear abuse; State v. Fabricatore, 89 Conn. App. 729, 734-35 , 875 A.2d 48 (2005), aff'd, 281 Conn. 469 , 915 A.2d 872 (2007); the basis for the particular motion in this case was the exercise of a right—allocution—which is based on the rules of practice, as well as decisional law, and is not discretionary; and sec

2008State v. Blake, 108 Conn. App. 336, 342, 344 , 947 A.2d 998 (2008). 4 We granted the defendant’s petition for certification limited to the following issue: "Did tire Appellate Court improperly decline to reach the merits of the defendant’s claim that the trial court had violated his right to allocution *590 by denying his request for a continuance at the dispositional phase of the violation of probation hearing?” State v. Blake, 288 Conn. 914 , 954 A.2d 185 (2008). 5 Thus, contrary to the way the issue lor certification was framed; see footnote 4 of this opinion; the Appellate Court majority d

2008State v. Blake, 108 Conn. App. 336, 342, 344 , 947 A.2d 998 (2008). 4 We granted the defendant’s petition for certification limited to the following issue: "Did tire Appellate Court improperly decline to reach the merits of the defendant’s claim that the trial court had violated his right to allocution *590 by denying his request for a continuance at the dispositional phase of the violation of probation hearing?” State v. Blake, 288 Conn. 914 , 954 A.2d 185 (2008). 5 Thus, contrary to the way the issue lor certification was framed; see footnote 4 of this opinion; the Appellate Court majority d

2008On the basis of our review of that court’s opinion, it is clear that certain fundamental precepts were in play: first, that although a motion for a continuance traditionally involves the exercise of the trial court’s discretion that ordinarily will not be disturbed in the absence of clear abuse; State v. Fabricatore, 89 Conn. App. 729, 734-35 , 875 A.2d 48 (2005), aff'd, 281 Conn. 469 , 915 A.2d 872 (2007); the basis for the particular motion in this case was the exercise of a right—allocution—which is based on the rules of practice, as well as decisional law, and is not discretionary; and sec

2008On the basis of our review of that court’s opinion, it is clear that certain fundamental precepts were in play: first, that although a motion for a continuance traditionally involves the exercise of the trial court’s discretion that ordinarily will not be disturbed in the absence of clear abuse; State v. Fabricatore, 89 Conn. App. 729, 734-35 , 875 A.2d 48 (2005), aff'd, 281 Conn. 469 , 915 A.2d 872 (2007); the basis for the particular motion in this case was the exercise of a right—allocution—which is based on the rules of practice, as well as decisional law, and is not discretionary; and sec

2002"The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent. . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208 , 231 , 764 A.2d 739 (2001); In re Bruce R ., 234 Conn. 194 , 200 (1995).

2002"The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent. . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208 , 231 , 764 A.2d 739 (2001); In re Bruce R ., 234 Conn. 194 , 200 (1995).

2002"The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent. . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208 , 231 , 764 A.2d 739 (2001); In re Bruce R ., 234 Conn. 194 , 200 (1995).

2002During CT Page 3604 the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.' [ In re Eden F ., 250 Conn. at 689 ]." In re Quanitra M ., 60 Conn. App. at 103 .

2002During CT Page 3604 the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.' [ In re Eden F ., 250 Conn. at 689 ]." In re Quanitra M ., 60 Conn. App. at 103 .

2000In his limited appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly failed to provide him with the opportu nity to address the court in the dispositional phase of the violation of probation hearing. 2 Although he concedes that he never asked to speak to the court, he asks us to review the matter as we did in State v. Johnson, 50 Conn. App. 46 , 717 A.2d 786 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 923 , 722 A.2d 811 (1998), and remand the case to the trial court for another dispositional phase of the probation revocation proceeding.

2000In his limited appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly failed to provide him with the opportu nity to address the court in the dispositional phase of the violation of probation hearing. 2 Although he concedes that he never asked to speak to the court, he asks us to review the matter as we did in State v. Johnson, 50 Conn. App. 46 , 717 A.2d 786 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 923 , 722 A.2d 811 (1998), and remand the case to the trial court for another dispositional phase of the probation revocation proceeding.

2000In his limited appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly failed to provide him with the opportu nity to address the court in the dispositional phase of the violation of probation hearing. 2 Although he concedes that he never asked to speak to the court, he asks us to review the matter as we did in State v. Johnson, 50 Conn. App. 46 , 717 A.2d 786 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 923 , 722 A.2d 811 (1998), and remand the case to the trial court for another dispositional phase of the probation revocation proceeding.

2000In his limited appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly failed to provide him with the opportu nity to address the court in the dispositional phase of the violation of probation hearing. 2 Although he concedes that he never asked to speak to the court, he asks us to review the matter as we did in State v. Johnson, 50 Conn. App. 46 , 717 A.2d 786 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 923 , 722 A.2d 811 (1998), and remand the case to the trial court for another dispositional phase of the probation revocation proceeding.

2000In arriving at that decision, the trial court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding the seven factors delineated in General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 17a-112 (e), now § 17a-112 (d).” In re Galen F., 54 Conn. App. 590, 597 , 737 A.2d 499 (1999).

2000In arriving at that decision, the trial court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding the seven factors delineated in General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 17a-112 (e), now § 17a-112 (d).” In re Galen F., 54 Conn. App. 590, 597 , 737 A.2d 499 (1999).