foreclosure hearing in Connecticut

1996In addition, the special defenses are, in essence, a challenge to the foreclosure action and are therefore equitable." Furthermore, "[a] defendant cannot by the assertion of defenses and counterclaims which are `legal' in nature, convert a foreclosure case from its essential equitable nature to a legal cause of action thereby requiring a jury trial." People's Bank v. Podd , Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 287559 (September 7, 1993, Leheny, J.); see also Bank of New Haven v. Liner , Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia/Milford, Docket No. 034516

1996In addition, the special defenses are, CT Page 1414-B in essence, a challenge to the foreclosure action and are therefore equitable." Furthermore, "[a] defendant cannot by the assertion of defenses and counterclaims which are `legal' in nature, convert a foreclosure case from its essential equitable nature to a legal cause of action thereby requiring a jury trial." People's Bank v. Podd, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 287559 (September 7, 1993, Leheny, J.); see also Bank of New Haven v. Liner, Superior Court, Judicial District of Ansonia/Milford, Docke

1994Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 369 , 439 A.2d 396 (1981). "[I]t is imperative that a defendant disclose any defenses to the mortgage debt prior to the hearing . . . [or] the defendants' failure to disclose a defense in a timely manner [will bar] them from later contesting liability at the foreclosure hearing." Suffield Bank v. Berman, supra, 373 .

1994Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 369 , 439 A.2d 396 (1981). "[I]t is imperative that a defendant disclose any defenses to the mortgage debt prior to the hearing . . . [or] the defendants' failure to disclose a defense in a timely manner [will bar] them from later contesting liability at the foreclosure hearing." Suffield Bank v. Berman, supra, 373 .

1993Maresca v. DeMatteo, 6 Conn. App. 691 , 506 A.2d 1096 (1986) (defense of usury) (timeliness of the filing of a motion for deficiency judgment in a strict foreclosure); see also Baybank Connecticut, N.A. v. Thumlert, 222 Conn. 784 , 610 A.2d 658 (1992) (the defense of laches as to the issue of timeliness in filing the motion for deficiency in a foreclosure by sale proceeding under General Statutes § 49-28); 5 Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn. 563 , 409 A.2d 1020 (1979) (the constitutionality of § 49-14).

1993Maresca v. DeMatteo, 6 Conn. App. 691 , 506 A.2d 1096 (1986) (defense of usury) (timeliness of the filing of a motion for deficiency judgment in a strict foreclosure); see also Baybank Connecticut, N.A. v. Thumlert, 222 Conn. 784 , 610 A.2d 658 (1992) (the defense of laches as to the issue of timeliness in filing the motion for deficiency in a foreclosure by sale proceeding under General Statutes § 49-28); 5 Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn. 563 , 409 A.2d 1020 (1979) (the constitutionality of § 49-14).

1993Maresca v. DeMatteo, 6 Conn. App. 691 , 506 A.2d 1096 (1986) (defense of usury) (timeliness of the filing of a motion for deficiency judgment in a strict foreclosure); see also Baybank Connecticut, N.A. v. Thumlert, 222 Conn. 784 , 610 A.2d 658 (1992) (the defense of laches as to the issue of timeliness in filing the motion for deficiency in a foreclosure by sale proceeding under General Statutes § 49-28); 5 Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn. 563 , 409 A.2d 1020 (1979) (the constitutionality of § 49-14).

1993Maresca v. DeMatteo, 6 Conn. App. 691 , 506 A.2d 1096 (1986) (defense of usury) (timeliness of the filing of a motion for deficiency judgment in a strict foreclosure); see also Baybank Connecticut, N.A. v. Thumlert, 222 Conn. 784 , 610 A.2d 658 (1992) (the defense of laches as to the issue of timeliness in filing the motion for deficiency in a foreclosure by sale proceeding under General Statutes § 49-28); 5 Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn. 563 , 409 A.2d 1020 (1979) (the constitutionality of § 49-14).

2021See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Virgulak, 192 Conn. App. 688 , 705, 218 A.3d 596 (concluding that trial court did not err in denying foreclosure claim when mortgage, as executed, was nullity because it purported to secure nonexistent debt and reformation of mortgage, as trial court properly determined, was not warranted), cert. granted, 333 Conn. 945 , 219 A.3d 375 (2019); Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Perez, supra, 146 Conn. App. 843 (concluding that reversal of portion of judgment reforming mortgage ‘‘necessarily’’ required reversal of foreclosure judgment predicated on erro

2021See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Virgulak, 192 Conn. App. 688 , 705, 218 A.3d 596 (concluding that trial court did not err in denying foreclosure claim when mortgage, as executed, was nullity because it purported to secure nonexistent debt and reformation of mortgage, as trial court properly determined, was not warranted), cert. granted, 333 Conn. 945 , 219 A.3d 375 (2019); Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Perez, supra, 146 Conn. App. 843 (concluding that reversal of portion of judgment reforming mortgage ‘‘necessarily’’ required reversal of foreclosure judgment predicated on erro

2021See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Virgulak, 192 Conn. App. 688 , 705, 218 A.3d 596 (concluding that trial court did not err in denying foreclosure claim when mortgage, as executed, was nullity because it purported to secure nonexistent debt and reformation of mortgage, as trial court properly determined, was not warranted), cert. granted, 333 Conn. 945 , 219 A.3d 375 (2019); Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Perez, supra, 146 Conn. App. 843 (concluding that reversal of portion of judgment reforming mortgage ‘‘necessarily’’ required reversal of foreclosure judgment predicated on erro

2021See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Virgulak, 192 Conn. App. 688 , 705, 218 A.3d 596 (concluding that trial court did not err in denying foreclosure claim when mortgage, as executed, was nullity because it purported to secure nonexistent debt and reformation of mortgage, as trial court properly determined, was not warranted), cert. granted, 333 Conn. 945 , 219 A.3d 375 (2019); Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Perez, supra, 146 Conn. App. 843 (concluding that reversal of portion of judgment reforming mortgage ‘‘necessarily’’ required reversal of foreclosure judgment predicated on erro

2019Corp. v. Voll , supra, 38 Conn. App. at 207 , 660 A.2d 358 (deficiency judgment allows note holder to "recover the difference between the amount due on the underlying debt and the amount received upon foreclosure" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); see also TD Bank, N.A. v. Doran , 162 Conn. App. 460 , 468, 131 A.3d 288 (2016) ("the strict foreclosure hearing establishes the amount of the debt owed by the defendant"); Federal Deposit Ins.

2019Corp. v. Voll , supra, 38 Conn. App. at 207 , 660 A.2d 358 (deficiency judgment allows note holder to "recover the difference between the amount due on the underlying debt and the amount received upon foreclosure" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); see also TD Bank, N.A. v. Doran , 162 Conn. App. 460 , 468, 131 A.3d 288 (2016) ("the strict foreclosure hearing establishes the amount of the debt owed by the defendant"); Federal Deposit Ins.

2019In rejecting the plaintiff’s foreclosure claim, the majority looks to the trial court’s memorandum of deci- sion and the plaintiff’s pleadings filed thereafter and concludes that the court properly exercised its discre- tion in determining that the plaintiff’s claim was inade- quately briefed and ‘‘without merit.’’ Moreover, the majority, relying on our well established mortgage fore- closure case law that ‘‘the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is the owner of the note and mortgage, that the defendant mortgagor has defaulted on the note and that the conditions pr

2019In rejecting the plaintiff’s foreclosure claim, the majority looks to the trial court’s memorandum of deci- sion and the plaintiff’s pleadings filed thereafter and concludes that the court properly exercised its discre- tion in determining that the plaintiff’s claim was inade- quately briefed and ‘‘without merit.’’ Moreover, the majority, relying on our well established mortgage fore- closure case law that ‘‘the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is the owner of the note and mortgage, that the defendant mortgagor has defaulted on the note and that the conditions pr

2016The purpose of a strict foreclosure hearing is distinct from that of a deficiency judgment hearing. ‘‘[I]n a strict foreclosure, the vesting of title operates to reduce the debt by the value of the property.’’ National City Mort- gage Co. v. Stoecker, 92 Conn. App. 787, 794 , 888 A.2d 95 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 925 , 895 A.2d 799 (2006).

2016The purpose of a strict foreclosure hearing is distinct from that of a deficiency judgment hearing. ‘‘[I]n a strict foreclosure, the vesting of title operates to reduce the debt by the value of the property.’’ National City Mort- gage Co. v. Stoecker, 92 Conn. App. 787, 794 , 888 A.2d 95 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 925 , 895 A.2d 799 (2006).

2016The purpose of a strict foreclosure hearing is distinct from that of a deficiency judgment hearing. ‘‘[I]n a strict foreclosure, the vesting of title operates to reduce the debt by the value of the property.’’ National City Mort- gage Co. v. Stoecker, 92 Conn. App. 787, 794 , 888 A.2d 95 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 925 , 895 A.2d 799 (2006).

2016The purpose of a strict foreclosure hearing is distinct from that of a deficiency judgment hearing. ‘‘[I]n a strict foreclosure, the vesting of title operates to reduce the debt by the value of the property.’’ National City Mort- gage Co. v. Stoecker, 92 Conn. App. 787, 794 , 888 A.2d 95 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 925 , 895 A.2d 799 (2006).

2001Generally, "[a] claim that an action is barred by the lapse of the statute of limitations must be pleaded as a special defense, not raised by a motion to strike." Forbes v. Ballaro , 31 Conn. App. 235 , 239 (1993).

1993For example, in Cronin v. Gager-Crawford Co., 128 Conn. 688, 693 , 25 A.2d 652 (1942), our Supreme Court noted that it is “ ‘well established that since the confirmation of a foreclosure sale is the final determination by the court that the mortgaged property was sold at a fair price, the defense of inadequacy of price cannot be raised in subsequent proceedings, and for the purpose of a deficiency decree the price obtained at the sale is conclusive on the question of the market value of the property.’ ” Some defenses may be raised to a motion for deficiency judgment, but not those that were or

1993For example, in Cronin v. Gager-Crawford Co., 128 Conn. 688, 693 , 25 A.2d 652 (1942), our Supreme Court noted that it is “ ‘well established that since the confirmation of a foreclosure sale is the final determination by the court that the mortgaged property was sold at a fair price, the defense of inadequacy of price cannot be raised in subsequent proceedings, and for the purpose of a deficiency decree the price obtained at the sale is conclusive on the question of the market value of the property.’ ” Some defenses may be raised to a motion for deficiency judgment, but not those that were or

1991Defendants argue that the instant action "presents both legal and equitable issues and that defendants raised the legal issues in their special defenses and counterclaim." Defendants argue that "[t]he instant foreclosure action is not based upon an original debt of either defendant but rather their guarantees of financing agreement between the plaintiff's predecessor in interest and a business establishment with which neither defendant was connected at the time of the default." Defendants argue that "[t]he distinction is important in determining the `relative importance' of the parties' claims

1991Defendants argue that the instant action "presents both legal and equitable issues and that defendants raised the legal issues in their special defenses and counterclaim." Defendants argue that "[t]he instant foreclosure action is not based upon an original debt of either defendant but rather their guarantees of financing agreement between the plaintiff's predecessor in interest and a business establishment with which neither defendant was connected at the time of the default." Defendants argue that "[t]he distinction is important in determining the `relative importance' of the parties' claims

1991Defendants argue that the instant action "presents both legal and equitable issues and that defendants raised the legal issues in their special defenses and counterclaim." Defendants argue that "[t]he instant foreclosure action is not based upon an original debt of either defendant but rather their guarantees of financing agreement between the plaintiff's predecessor in interest and a business establishment with which neither defendant was connected at the time of the default." Defendants argue that "[t]he distinction is important in determining the `relative importance' of the parties' claims

1991Defendants argue that the instant action "presents both legal and equitable issues and that defendants raised the legal issues in their special defenses and counterclaim." Defendants argue that "[t]he instant foreclosure action is not based upon an original debt of either defendant but rather their guarantees of financing agreement between the plaintiff's predecessor in interest and a business establishment with which neither defendant was connected at the time of the default." Defendants argue that "[t]he distinction is important in determining the `relative importance' of the parties' claims