grant of absolute immunity in Connecticut

2022Further, it is important to consider whether there is a sound public policy reason for permitting the complete freedom of expression that a grant of absolute immunity provides.’’ (Citation omitted.) Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 567 , 606 A.2d 693 (1992).

2022Further, it is important to consider whether there is a sound public policy reason for permitting the complete freedom of expression that a grant of absolute immunity provides.’’ (Citation omitted.) Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 567 , 606 A.2d 693 (1992).

2019These same reasons support the extension of the same scope of immunity to attorneys appointed pursuant to § 46b-54.'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 547-48, 877 A.2d 773 .

2012Kelley also must be read in light of the Supreme Court’s more recent opinion in Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 274 Conn. 533 , 877 A.2d 773 (2005), in which the court appears to have asserted a somewhat different basis for upholding the immunity of a quasi-judicial officer than expressed in Kelley .

2024Our Supreme Court recently summarized that a pro- ceeding will only be considered quasi-judicial if ‘‘the proceeding at issue is specifically authorized by law, applies law to fact in an adjudicatory manner, contains adequate procedural safeguards, and is supported by a public policy encouraging absolute immunity for pro- ceeding participants.’’ Khan v. Yale University, 347 Conn. 1, 10 , 295 A.3d 855 (2023).

2022Furthermore, it bears emphasis that, although estab- lished by statute, the Office of the Statewide Bar Coun- sel acts as an arm of the court to effectuate its ‘‘inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar.’’ Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 523 , 461 A.2d 938 (1983); see also Statewide Grievance Commit- tee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 239 , 558 A.2d 986 (1989) (statewide bar officials act as ‘‘arm of the court’’ in carrying out duties because ‘‘[t]he regulation of attorney conduct is . . . within the court’s i

2022Furthermore, it bears emphasis that, although estab- lished by statute, the Office of the Statewide Bar Coun- sel acts as an arm of the court to effectuate its ‘‘inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar.’’ Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 523 , 461 A.2d 938 (1983); see also Statewide Grievance Commit- tee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 239 , 558 A.2d 986 (1989) (statewide bar officials act as ‘‘arm of the court’’ in carrying out duties because ‘‘[t]he regulation of attorney conduct is . . . within the court’s i

2022Furthermore, it bears emphasis that, although estab- lished by statute, the Office of the Statewide Bar Coun- sel acts as an arm of the court to effectuate its ‘‘inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar.’’ Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 523 , 461 A.2d 938 (1983); see also Statewide Grievance Commit- tee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 239 , 558 A.2d 986 (1989) (statewide bar officials act as ‘‘arm of the court’’ in carrying out duties because ‘‘[t]he regulation of attorney conduct is . . . within the court’s i

2022Furthermore, it bears emphasis that, although estab- lished by statute, the Office of the Statewide Bar Coun- sel acts as an arm of the court to effectuate its ‘‘inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar.’’ Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 523 , 461 A.2d 938 (1983); see also Statewide Grievance Commit- tee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 239 , 558 A.2d 986 (1989) (statewide bar officials act as ‘‘arm of the court’’ in carrying out duties because ‘‘[t]he regulation of attorney conduct is . . . within the court’s i

2022Those factors ‘‘are not exclu- sive nor must all factors militate in favor of a determina- tion that a proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature for a court to conclude that the proceeding is, in fact, quasi- judicial.’’ Priore v. Haig, 196 Conn. App. 675 , 697, 230 A.3d 714 , cert. granted, 335 Conn. 955 , 239 A.3d 317 (2020).

2020Thus, ‘‘in determining whether a statement is made in the course of a judicial proceeding [and, pending its pertinence to the proceeding, subjecting it to absolute immunity], it is important to consider whether there is a sound public policy reason for permitting the complete freedom of expression that a grant of absolute immunity provides.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 839 .

2012Further, it is important to consider whether there is a sound public policy reason for permitting the complete freedom of expression that a grant of absolute immunity provides.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 567 ; see also Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., supra, 271 Conn. 88 (investigation by police department’s internal affairs division constituted quasi-judicial proceeding, thereby affording absolute immunity to citizen complainant whose claim had given rise to investigation); Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 252 , 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (absolute privilege afforded to letter sent to employment

2012Further, it is important to consider whether there is a sound public policy reason for permitting the complete freedom of expression that a grant of absolute immunity provides.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 567 ; see also Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., supra, 271 Conn. 88 (investigation by police department’s internal affairs division constituted quasi-judicial proceeding, thereby affording absolute immunity to citizen complainant whose claim had given rise to investigation); Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 252 , 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (absolute privilege afforded to letter sent to employment

2012Further, it is important to consider whether there is a sound public policy reason for permitting the complete freedom of expression that a grant of absolute immunity provides.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 567 ; see also Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., supra, 271 Conn. 88 (investigation by police department’s internal affairs division constituted quasi-judicial proceeding, thereby affording absolute immunity to citizen complainant whose claim had given rise to investigation); Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 252 , 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (absolute privilege afforded to letter sent to employment

2012Further, it is important to consider whether there is a sound public policy reason for permitting the complete freedom of expression that a grant of absolute immunity provides.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 567 ; see also Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., supra, 271 Conn. 88 (investigation by police department’s internal affairs division constituted quasi-judicial proceeding, thereby affording absolute immunity to citizen complainant whose claim had given rise to investigation); Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 252 , 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (absolute privilege afforded to letter sent to employment

2011In other words, whether and what form of immunity applies in any given case is a matter of policy that requires a balancing of interests.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 471 , quoting Rioux v. Barry, supra, 283 Conn. 346 .

2007In other words, “whether and what form of immunity applies in any given case is a matter of policy that requires a balancing of interests.” Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 346 , 927 A.2d 304 (2007).

2007In other words, “whether and what form of immunity applies in any given case is a matter of policy that requires a balancing of interests.” Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 346 , 927 A.2d 304 (2007).

2005Courts have reasoned that the duty of a guardian ad litem to secure the best interests of the minor children places the guardian “squarely within the judicial process to accomplish that goal”; Kurzawa v. Mueller, supra, 1458 ; and, therefore, that a grant of absolute immunity is both appropriate and necessary in order to ensure that the guardian will be able to “function without the worry of possible later harassment and intimidation from dissatisfied parents.” Id.

2005Courts have reasoned that the duty of a guardian ad litem to secure the best interests of the minor children places the guardian “squarely within the judicial process to accomplish that goal”; Kurzawa v. Mueller, supra, 1458 ; and, therefore, that a grant of absolute immunity is both appropriate and necessary in order to ensure that the guardian will be able to “function without the worry of possible later harassment and intimidation from dissatisfied parents.” Id.

2000If federal common law does not provide such an absolute privilege, how does federal law condition or qualify the doctrine of sovereign immunity with respect to tribal employees?" Standard of Review "A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 544 , 590 A.2d 914 (1991).

2000If federal common law does not provide such an absolute privilege, how does federal law condition or qualify the doctrine of sovereign immunity with respect to tribal employees?" Standard of Review "A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 544 , 590 A.2d 914 (1991).