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14 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Broski v. Stategreen2 sentences1993In Broski v. State, 196 Ga. App. 116 (1) ( 395 SE2d 317 ), the accusation charged the appellant with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1) and the appellant contended the failure to recite the words “ ‘to the extent that it [was] less safe for the person to drive’ ” constituted a fatal defect. 1993In Broski v. State, 196 Ga. App. 116 (1) ( 395 SE2d 317 ), the accusation charged the appellant with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1) and the appellant contended the failure to recite the words “ ‘to the extent that it [was] less safe for the person to drive’ ” constituted a fatal defect. | 1 | 2 |
Massa v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th 2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th | 1 | 1 |
Stephens v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th 2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th | 1 | 1 |
Daniel v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Daniel v. State, 298 Ga. App. 245, 248-249 ( 679 SE2d 811 ) (2009). (f) Count 14, under which Crowe was convicted of failure to *533 maintain lane in violation of OCGA § 40-6-48 (1), merged into count 5, under which she was convicted of homicide by vehicle in the second degree, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-393 (c), by violating OCGA § 40-6-48 (1). 2012Daniel v. State, 298 Ga. App. 245, 248-249 ( 679 SE2d 811 ) (2009). (f) Count 14, under which Crowe was convicted of failure to *533 maintain lane in violation of OCGA § 40-6-48 (1), merged into count 5, under which she was convicted of homicide by vehicle in the second degree, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-393 (c), by violating OCGA § 40-6-48 (1). | 1 | 1 |
Mims v. Stategreen2 sentences1995See Mims v. State, 201 Ga. App. 277, 278-279 (1) ( 410 SE2d 824 ) (1991). 1995See Mims v. State, 201 Ga. App. 277, 278-279 (1) ( 410 SE2d 824 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Kuptz v. Stategreen1 sentence1993Cf. Broski, 196 Ga. App. at 116 (1) (holding an accusation charging defendant with driving under the influence of alcohol by being in actual physical control of a moving vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1) was not defective because it did not contain the language “to the extent that it is less safe for the person to drive”); Kuptz, 179 Ga. App. at 150 (4) (holding an accusation couched in the disjunctive, that is, charging defendant with “driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or driving while there was .12 percent | 1 | 1 |
Perano v. Stategreen2 sentences1986Appellant contends that the results of the intoximeter test were inadmissible because the arresting officer did not advise him of his rights under the implied consent law, OCGA §§ 40-5-55 and 40-6-392, “at the time of arrest, or at a time as close in proximity to the instant of arrest as the circumstances of the individual case might warrant . . . .” Perano v. State, 250 Ga. 704, 708 ( 300 SE2d 668 ) (1983). 1986Appellant contends that the results of the intoximeter test were inadmissible because the arresting officer did not advise him of his rights under the implied consent law, OCGA §§ 40-5-55 and 40-6-392, “at the time of arrest, or at a time as close in proximity to the instant of arrest as the circumstances of the individual case might warrant . . . .” Perano v. State, 250 Ga. 704, 708 ( 300 SE2d 668 ) (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Stategreen2 sentences1984See Stewart v. State, 165 Ga. App. 62 (1) ( 299 SE2d 134 ) (1983); see also Garrett v. State, 146 Ga. App. 610 (1) ( 247 SE2d 136 ) (1978). 2. 1984See Stewart v. State, 165 Ga. App. 62 (1) ( 299 SE2d 134 ) (1983); see also Garrett v. State, 146 Ga. App. 610 (1) ( 247 SE2d 136 ) (1978). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Garrett v. Stategreen2 sentences1984See Stewart v. State, 165 Ga. App. 62 (1) ( 299 SE2d 134 ) (1983); see also Garrett v. State, 146 Ga. App. 610 (1) ( 247 SE2d 136 ) (1978). 2. 1984See Stewart v. State, 165 Ga. App. 62 (1) ( 299 SE2d 134 ) (1983); see also Garrett v. State, 146 Ga. App. 610 (1) ( 247 SE2d 136 ) (1978). 2. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2004As Overton’s challenge is based on the sufficiency of the evidence, we employ the test established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 1996Since we determined the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress the breath test, there is no merit to this claim, and the evidence was sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), to support the conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (4). | 4 | 1993–2004 |
Alewine v. State
green
2 sentences2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th 2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Yeary v. State
yellow
2 sentences2012In Yeary v. State, 302 Ga. App. 535 ( 690 SE2d 901 ) (2010), we affirmed Lisa Ann Yeary’s conviction in a bench trial for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5). 2012In Yeary v. State, 302 Ga. App. 535 ( 690 SE2d 901 ) (2010), we affirmed Lisa Ann Yeary’s conviction in a bench trial for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Yeary v. State
green
2 sentences2012In Yeary v. State, 289 Ga. 394 ( 711 SE2d 694 ) (2011), the Supreme Court vacated our judgment and remanded the case to this Court “for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.” Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this Court, and we consider the need for further proceedings. 2012In Yeary v. State, 289 Ga. 394 ( 711 SE2d 694 ) (2011), the Supreme Court vacated our judgment and remanded the case to this Court “for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.” Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this Court, and we consider the need for further proceedings. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Jones v. State
green
2 sentences1993Barton v. State, 79 Ga. App. 380 ( 53 SE2d 707 ) (1949); Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610 ( 44 SE2d 174 ) (1947). 1993Barton v. State, 79 Ga. App. 380 ( 53 SE2d 707 ) (1949); Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610 ( 44 SE2d 174 ) (1947). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Barton v. State
green
2 sentences1993Barton v. State, 79 Ga. App. 380 ( 53 SE2d 707 ) (1949); Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610 ( 44 SE2d 174 ) (1947). 1993Barton v. State, 79 Ga. App. 380 ( 53 SE2d 707 ) (1949); Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610 ( 44 SE2d 174 ) (1947). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Taylor v. State
green
2 sentences1988Taylor v. State, 184 Ga. App. 368 ( 361 SE2d 667 ). 1988Taylor v. State, 184 Ga. App. 368 ( 361 SE2d 667 ). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Melton v. State
green
2 sentences1986Thus it is clear that, in keeping with Lester, Peters, Atkins, and Melton v. State, 175 Ga. App. 472 ( 333 SE2d 682 ) (1985), a second prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of *539 OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1) after an acquittal for driving with .12 percent blood alcohol content would not violate Mr. Hogan's rights as provided in OCGA § 16-1-8 (b) (1). 1986Thus it is clear that, in keeping with Lester, Peters, Atkins, and Melton v. State, 175 Ga. App. 472 ( 333 SE2d 682 ) (1985), a second prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of *539 OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1) after an acquittal for driving with .12 percent blood alcohol content would not violate Mr. Hogan's rights as provided in OCGA § 16-1-8 (b) (1). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.