Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1974–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Craig v. Swartsgreen1 sentence2017Any person who operates a motor vehicle is deemed to have consented to a chemical test to determine his or her blood alcohol content, provided that the chemical test is administered by, or at the direction of, a police officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that such person operated a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [2] [a] [1]; Matter of Craig v Smarts, 68 AD3d 1407, 1408 [2009]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Anders v. California
green
2 sentences2021Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v California ( 386 US 738 ), in which he moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for the appellant. 2021Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v California ( 386 US 738 ), in which she moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for the appellant. | 4 | 2015–2021 |
Matter of Roenbeck v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs.
green
1 sentence2025Moreover, the hearing evidence demonstrated that the trooper lawfully arrested the petitioner and that the petitioner refused the trooper's request to submit to a chemical test after having been given sufficient warnings of the consequences of such refusal ( see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][c]; Matter of Kirch v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. , 232 AD3d at 791; Matter of Roenbeck v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. , 221 AD3d at 1014-1015 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Engle
neutral
1 sentence2020Contrary to the petitioner's contention, substantial evidence supports a finding that the lieutenant who first encountered the petitioner, whether acting in the performance of his public service function or in the performance of his role as an agent of law enforcement, was justified in approaching the petitioner's vehicle, upon observing the petitioner slumped over in the driver's seat of the vehicle, and in opening the unlocked driver's side door, when the petitioner did not respond to several attempts to awaken him by knocking on the window ( see People v De Bour , 40 NY2d 210, 215 ; People | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. De Bour
green
1 sentence2020Contrary to the petitioner's contention, substantial evidence supports a finding that the lieutenant who first encountered the petitioner, whether acting in the performance of his public service function or in the performance of his role as an agent of law enforcement, was justified in approaching the petitioner's vehicle, upon observing the petitioner slumped over in the driver's seat of the vehicle, and in opening the unlocked driver's side door, when the petitioner did not respond to several attempts to awaken him by knocking on the window ( see People v De Bour , 40 NY2d 210, 215 ; People | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Spencer
green
1 sentence2020Contrary to the petitioner's contention, substantial evidence supports a finding that the lieutenant who first encountered the petitioner, whether acting in the performance of his public service function or in the performance of his role as an agent of law enforcement, was justified in approaching the petitioner's vehicle, upon observing the petitioner slumped over in the driver's seat of the vehicle, and in opening the unlocked driver's side door, when the petitioner did not respond to several attempts to awaken him by knocking on the window ( see People v De Bour , 40 NY2d 210, 215 ; People | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Iannone
green
1 sentence2010No jurisdictional defect was established, and neither this claim nor defendant’s related claim that the failure to charge a separate violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (1) unconstitutionally assumed his guilt was preserved for review (see CPL 210.20; People v Iannone, 45 NY2d at 600 ). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Miller
green
1 sentence2001The People contend that in this case the strict liability portion of the offense — the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2) and (3) — is nothing more than an aggravating circumstance and thus there can be attempt liability under the statute (see, People v Fullan, 92 NY2d 690 , supra; People v Miller, 87 NY2d 211 , supra). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Fullan
green
1 sentence2001The People contend that in this case the strict liability portion of the offense — the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2) and (3) — is nothing more than an aggravating circumstance and thus there can be attempt liability under the statute (see, People v Fullan, 92 NY2d 690 , supra; People v Miller, 87 NY2d 211 , supra). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. . Molineux
green
1 sentence2000This is an application by the People, pursuant to People v Ventimiglia ( 52 NY2d 350 ) and People v Molineux ( 168 NY 264 ), for permission to present testimony that the defendant, who is charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 1192 (3) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, had been previously convicted of the same crime in violation of subdivision (2). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Ventimiglia
green
1 sentence2000This is an application by the People, pursuant to People v Ventimiglia ( 52 NY2d 350 ) and People v Molineux ( 168 NY 264 ), for permission to present testimony that the defendant, who is charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 1192 (3) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, had been previously convicted of the same crime in violation of subdivision (2). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Kaeppel
green
1 sentence1974Where, however, only une uniform traffic ticket is served and one simplified information is filed, for example, charging a violation of subdivision 3 of section 1192, section 1196 provides that a defendant may be found guilty of but one of the enumerated subdivisions of section 1192 (see People v. Kaeppel, 74 Misc 2d 220, 222 ). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.