above-stated rule in Louisiana

2007Co. (1959), 237 La. 973 , 112 So.2d 680 , where this court observed: `* * * Moreover, since in a great number of factual situations it has been shown that wind is often not the sole contributing cause of the loss or damage, acceptance has been accorded the view that it is sufficient, in order to recover upon a windstorm insurance policy not otherwise limited or defined, that the wind was the proximate or efficient cause of the loss or damage, notwithstanding other factors contributing thereto.

2007Co. (1959), 237 La. 973 , 112 So.2d 680 , where this court observed: `* * * Moreover, since in a great number of factual situations it has been shown that wind is often not the sole contributing cause of the loss or damage, acceptance has been accorded the view that it is sufficient, in order to recover upon a windstorm insurance policy not otherwise limited or defined, that the wind was the proximate or efficient cause of the loss or damage, notwithstanding other factors contributing thereto.

2001Quoting Penalber v. Blount, 550 So.2d 577 (La.1989), the Montalvo court stated: Intentionally tortious actions, ostensibly performed for a client's benefit, will not shroud an attorney with immunity.

1998Quoting Penalber v. Blount, 550 So.2d 577 (La.1989), the Montalvo court stated: Intentionally tortious actions, ostensibly performed for a client's benefit, will not shroud an attorney with immunity.

2022CHS, Inc., 484 B.R. at 309 .

2006Citing Mike Marcello, Inc. v. Louisiana Gaming Control Bd., 04-0488 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/6/05), 903 So.2d 545 , Prest points out that an intervenor takes the proceedings as she finds them and cannot urge matters that enlarge or change the issues presented.

1973The above-stated rule of administrative law was clearly applied in Brahy v. Federal Radio Commission, 61 App.D.C. 204 , 59 F.2d 879 , wherein notice was sent to plaintiff stating that a hearing was to be held in order to consider renewal of his broadcasting license.

1973The above-stated rule of administrative law was clearly applied in Brahy v. Federal Radio Commission, 61 App.D.C. 204 , 59 F.2d 879 , wherein notice was sent to plaintiff stating that a hearing was to be held in order to consider renewal of his broadcasting license.

1972It may be noted that the only possible exception to this line of jurisprudence is O’Keefe v. Burke, 226 La. 1026 , 78 So.2d 161 (1955), and, as pointed out by Judge Regan, of the Fourth Circuit, in quoting from Judge S. Sanford Levy, as the trial judge, and which has been pointed out by the late Henry G.

1972It may be noted that the only possible exception to this line of jurisprudence is O’Keefe v. Burke, 226 La. 1026 , 78 So.2d 161 (1955), and, as pointed out by Judge Regan, of the Fourth Circuit, in quoting from Judge S. Sanford Levy, as the trial judge, and which has been pointed out by the late Henry G.

1967In Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495 , 86 So.2d 160 (1956), which presented a similar situation, the Supreme Court applied the above-stated rule of the Moseman case to an annuity contract and said: "At the outset it must be recognized that life insurance policies made payable to the insured [annuitant], or to his executors, administrators, or assigns, are community property if taken out during the marriage.

1967Estate of Moseman, 38 La.

1965Plaintiff cites the recent case of Kendall v. State, Department of Highways, 168 So. 2d 840, at p. 843 (La.App.2d Cir.1964), writs refused, 247 La. 341 , 170 So.2d 864 , February 5, 1965, which said: "* * * Regardless of whether the cause of action arose out of Articles 2315 or 667 of the LSA-Civil Code, whenever a governmental agency engages in an undertaking with a public purpose and public benefit which directly results in a damaging of private property the `or damaged' provision of the above quoted constitutional article [LSA-Const. Art. 1, § 2] is self-operating and creates a cause of act

1955Co., supra, the court stated [ 131 La. 313 , 59 So. 729 ]: “Under repeated decisions, plaintiff ¿ánnot recover over and above the value of the land (now in possession of defendant for railroad use) at the ,. time it went into the possession, and use of the defendant.” In Gumbel v. New Orleans, Terminal Co., it was observed [ 197 La. 439 , 1 So.2d 689 ]: “ * * * The right to compensation for the value of the property taken, and damages to the adjacent land is limited to the value of the portion of the property occupied and 'mined as of the date when the defendant occupied and began to use the p

1955Co., supra, the court stated [ 131 La. 313 , 59 So. 729 ]: "Under repeated decisions, plaintiff cannot recover over and above the value of the land (now in possession of defendant for railroad use) at the time it went into the possession and use of the defendant." In Gumbel v. New Orleans Terminal Co., it was observed [ 197 La. 439 , 1 So.2d 689 ]: "* * * The right to compensation for the value of the property taken and damages to the adjacent land is limited to the value of the portion of the property occupied and determined as of the date when the defendant occupied and began to use the prop

1955Co., supra, the court stated [ 131 La. 313 , 59 So. 729 ]: “Under repeated decisions, plaintiff ¿ánnot recover over and above the value of the land (now in possession of defendant for railroad use) at the ,. time it went into the possession, and use of the defendant.” In Gumbel v. New Orleans, Terminal Co., it was observed [ 197 La. 439 , 1 So.2d 689 ]: “ * * * The right to compensation for the value of the property taken, and damages to the adjacent land is limited to the value of the portion of the property occupied and 'mined as of the date when the defendant occupied and began to use the p

1955Co., supra, the court stated [ 131 La. 313 , 59 So. 729 ]: "Under repeated decisions, plaintiff cannot recover over and above the value of the land (now in possession of defendant for railroad use) at the time it went into the possession and use of the defendant." In Gumbel v. New Orleans Terminal Co., it was observed [ 197 La. 439 , 1 So.2d 689 ]: "* * * The right to compensation for the value of the property taken and damages to the adjacent land is limited to the value of the portion of the property occupied and determined as of the date when the defendant occupied and began to use the prop

1938Glover v. Doty, 1 Rob. 130 ; Succession of Lampton, 35 La.Ann. 418 ; Chamberlain v. City of New Orleans, 48 La.Ann, 1055, 20 So. 169 .” (Italics ours.) It is manifest that the above-stated principle of law is applicable to the case at bar.

1938Glover v. Doty, 1 Rob. 130 ; Succession of Lampton, 35 La.Ann. 418 ; Chamberlain v. City of New Orleans, 48 La.Ann, 1055, 20 So. 169 .” (Italics ours.) It is manifest that the above-stated principle of law is applicable to the case at bar.

1938Glover v. Doty, 1 Rob. 130 ; Succession of Lampton, 35 La.Ann. 418 ; Chamberlain v. City of New Orleans, 48 La.Ann, 1055, 20 So. 169 .” (Italics ours.) It is manifest that the above-stated principle of law is applicable to the case at bar.

1933In 17 Corpus Juris, p. 809, § 135, it is stated that: “Where the natural and proximate consequence of a wrongful act has been to involve plaintiff in litigation with others, there may, as a general rule, be a recovery in damages against the author of such act of the reasonable expenses incurred in such litigation, together with compensation for attorneys’ fees, and such costs as may have been awarded against plaintiff; but such expenses must be the natural and proximate consequence of the injury complained of, and must have been necessarily incurred.” As supporting the above-stated rule, the f

1933Ann. 690 , 17 So. 244, 246 , and Dyke v. Walker, 5 L.