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5 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1851–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Colorado v. Connellygreen2 sentences2018The test for determining voluntariness is whether the statement was the "product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker," Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218 , 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), or "induced by such duress or coercion that the suspect's 'will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.' " United States v. Locklear , 829 F.2d 1314 , 1317 (1987) (quoting Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 225 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ); see Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 , 167, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that "coercive 2018The test for determining voluntariness is whether the statement was the "product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker," Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218 , 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), or "induced by such duress or coercion that the suspect's 'will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.' " United States v. Locklear , 829 F.2d 1314 , 1317 (1987) (quoting Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 225 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ); see Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 , 167, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that "coercive | 1 | 1 |
Briley v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2015See Linwood Earl Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 532 , 540, 273 S.E.2d 48 , 53 (1980) ("Cross-examination on a part of a transaction enables the opposing party to elicit evidence on redirect examination of the whole transaction at least to the extent that it relates to the same subject." (quoting United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069 , 1081 (5th Cir.1979) )). 2015See Linwood Earl Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 532 , 540, 273 S.E.2d 48 , 53 (1980) ("Cross-examination on a part of a transaction enables the opposing party to elicit evidence on redirect examination of the whole transaction at least to the extent that it relates to the same subject." (quoting United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069 , 1081 (5th Cir.1979) )). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Barrentinegreen1 sentence2015See Linwood Earl Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 532 , 540, 273 S.E.2d 48 , 53 (1980) ("Cross-examination on a part of a transaction enables the opposing party to elicit evidence on redirect examination of the whole transaction at least to the extent that it relates to the same subject." (quoting United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069 , 1081 (5th Cir.1979) )). | 1 | 1 |
NAJLA Associates, Inc. v. William L. Griffith & Co.green2 sentences1997See NAJLA, 253 Va. at 87 , 480 S.E.2d at 494 ; Richmond Medical Supply Co., 235 Va. at 586 , 369 S.E.2d at 409 ; Roanoke Hospital, 215 Va. at 801 , 214 S.E.2d at 160 . 1997See NAJLA, 253 Va. at 87 , 480 S.E.2d at 494 ; Richmond Medical Supply Co., 235 Va. at 586 , 369 S.E.2d at 409 ; Roanoke Hospital, 215 Va. at 801 , 214 S.E.2d at 160 . | 1 | 1 |
APL Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green1 sentence1996The court considers the following factors, among others, to be relevant in applying the above-stated test: (1) Severity of the plaintiff’s injuries (see Suggs, 152 F.R.D. at 506 , holding that an insurance company investigating an accident which resulted in serious injury or death would more likely conduct its investigation in anticipation of litigation than if the accident was less severe); (2) Whether it is immediately apparent that the negligence, if any, would likely be solely with the insurance company’s insured (see, id., holding when an insurance company conducts an investigation where | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Haynes Lee Locklear, D/B/A Riggs Motors
green
1 sentence2018The test for determining voluntariness is whether the statement was the "product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker," Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218 , 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), or "induced by such duress or coercion that the suspect's 'will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.' " United States v. Locklear , 829 F.2d 1314 , 1317 (1987) (quoting Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 225 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ); see Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 , 167, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that "coercive | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
green
2 sentences2018The test for determining voluntariness is whether the statement was the "product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker," Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218 , 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), or "induced by such duress or coercion that the suspect's 'will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.' " United States v. Locklear , 829 F.2d 1314 , 1317 (1987) (quoting Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 225 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ); see Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 , 167, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that "coercive 2018The test for determining voluntariness is whether the statement was the "product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker," Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218 , 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), or "induced by such duress or coercion that the suspect's 'will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.' " United States v. Locklear , 829 F.2d 1314 , 1317 (1987) (quoting Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 225 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ); see Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 , 167, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that "coercive | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Com. v. Squire
green
2 sentences2018Accordingly, as to those subsidiary factual findings, we will again apply the above-stated standard of review: whether those findings are " 'plainly wrong or without evidence to support [them].' " DeMille , 283 Va. at 323, 720 S.E.2d 69 (quoting Squire , 278 Va. at 751 , 685 S.E.2d 631 ). 2018Accordingly, as to those subsidiary factual findings, we will again apply the above-stated standard of review: whether those findings are " 'plainly wrong or without evidence to support [them].' " DeMille , 283 Va. at 323, 720 S.E.2d 69 (quoting Squire , 278 Va. at 751 , 685 S.E.2d 631 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Savino v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2015Consistent with the above-stated standard of review, "[o]nce a party has *269 'opened the door' to inquiry into a subject, the permissible scope of examination on the subject by the opposing party is 'a matter for the exercise of discretion by the trial court,' and we will not disturb the court's action on appeal unless it plainly appears that the court abused its discretion." Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534 , 545, 391 S.E.2d 276 , 282 (1990) (quoting Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423 , 438, 304 S.E.2d 271 , 279-80 (1983) ). 2015Consistent with the above-stated standard of review, "[o]nce a party has *269 'opened the door' to inquiry into a subject, the permissible scope of examination on the subject by the opposing party is 'a matter for the exercise of discretion by the trial court,' and we will not disturb the court's action on appeal unless it plainly appears that the court abused its discretion." Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534 , 545, 391 S.E.2d 276 , 282 (1990) (quoting Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423 , 438, 304 S.E.2d 271 , 279-80 (1983) ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bunch v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2015Consistent with the above-stated standard of review, "[o]nce a party has *269 'opened the door' to inquiry into a subject, the permissible scope of examination on the subject by the opposing party is 'a matter for the exercise of discretion by the trial court,' and we will not disturb the court's action on appeal unless it plainly appears that the court abused its discretion." Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534 , 545, 391 S.E.2d 276 , 282 (1990) (quoting Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423 , 438, 304 S.E.2d 271 , 279-80 (1983) ). 2015Consistent with the above-stated standard of review, "[o]nce a party has *269 'opened the door' to inquiry into a subject, the permissible scope of examination on the subject by the opposing party is 'a matter for the exercise of discretion by the trial court,' and we will not disturb the court's action on appeal unless it plainly appears that the court abused its discretion." Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534 , 545, 391 S.E.2d 276 , 282 (1990) (quoting Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423 , 438, 304 S.E.2d 271 , 279-80 (1983) ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Richmond Medical Supply Co. v. Clifton
green
2 sentences1997See NAJLA, 253 Va. at 87 , 480 S.E.2d at 494 ; Richmond Medical Supply Co., 235 Va. at 586 , 369 S.E.2d at 409 ; Roanoke Hospital, 215 Va. at 801 , 214 S.E.2d at 160 . 1997See NAJLA, 253 Va. at 87 , 480 S.E.2d at 494 ; Richmond Medical Supply Co., 235 Va. at 586 , 369 S.E.2d at 409 ; Roanoke Hospital, 215 Va. at 801 , 214 S.E.2d at 160 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Roanoke Hospital Ass'n v. Doyle & Russell, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997See NAJLA, 253 Va. at 87 , 480 S.E.2d at 494 ; Richmond Medical Supply Co., 235 Va. at 586 , 369 S.E.2d at 409 ; Roanoke Hospital, 215 Va. at 801 , 214 S.E.2d at 160 . 1997See NAJLA, 253 Va. at 87 , 480 S.E.2d at 494 ; Richmond Medical Supply Co., 235 Va. at 586 , 369 S.E.2d at 409 ; Roanoke Hospital, 215 Va. at 801 , 214 S.E.2d at 160 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Murray Sheet Metal Company, Incorporated, and Arkwright Mutual Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1996The court considers the following factors, among others, to be relevant in applying the above-stated test: (1) Severity of the plaintiff’s injuries (see Suggs, 152 F.R.D. at 506 , holding that an insurance company investigating an accident which resulted in serious injury or death would more likely conduct its investigation in anticipation of litigation than if the accident was less severe); (2) Whether it is immediately apparent that the negligence, if any, would likely be solely with the insurance company’s insured (see, id., holding when an insurance company conducts an investigation where | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Basinger v. Glacier Carriers, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996The court considers the following factors, among others, to be relevant in applying the above-stated test: (1) Severity of the plaintiff’s injuries (see Suggs, 152 F.R.D. at 506 , holding that an insurance company investigating an accident which resulted in serious injury or death would more likely conduct its investigation in anticipation of litigation than if the accident was less severe); (2) Whether it is immediately apparent that the negligence, if any, would likely be solely with the insurance company’s insured (see, id., holding when an insurance company conducts an investigation where | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Pete Rinaldi's Fast Foods, Inc. v. Great American Insurance Companies
green
1 sentence1996The court considers the following factors, among others, to be relevant in applying the above-stated test: (1) Severity of the plaintiff’s injuries (see Suggs, 152 F.R.D. at 506 , holding that an insurance company investigating an accident which resulted in serious injury or death would more likely conduct its investigation in anticipation of litigation than if the accident was less severe); (2) Whether it is immediately apparent that the negligence, if any, would likely be solely with the insurance company’s insured (see, id., holding when an insurance company conducts an investigation where | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Blough v. Food Lion, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996The court considers the following factors, among others, to be relevant in applying the above-stated test: (1) Severity of the plaintiff’s injuries (see Suggs, 152 F.R.D. at 506 , holding that an insurance company investigating an accident which resulted in serious injury or death would more likely conduct its investigation in anticipation of litigation than if the accident was less severe); (2) Whether it is immediately apparent that the negligence, if any, would likely be solely with the insurance company’s insured (see, id., holding when an insurance company conducts an investigation where | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Suggs v. Whitaker
green
2 sentences1996The court considers the following factors, among others, to be relevant in applying the above-stated test: (1) Severity of the plaintiff’s injuries (see Suggs, 152 F.R.D. at 506 , holding that an insurance company investigating an accident which resulted in serious injury or death would more likely conduct its investigation in anticipation of litigation than if the accident was less severe); (2) Whether it is immediately apparent that the negligence, if any, would likely be solely with the insurance company’s insured (see, id., holding when an insurance company conducts an investigation where 1996The court considers the following factors, among others, to be relevant in applying the above-stated test: (1) Severity of the plaintiff’s injuries (see Suggs, 152 F.R.D. at 506 , holding that an insurance company investigating an accident which resulted in serious injury or death would more likely conduct its investigation in anticipation of litigation than if the accident was less severe); (2) Whether it is immediately apparent that the negligence, if any, would likely be solely with the insurance company’s insured (see, id., holding when an insurance company conducts an investigation where | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Brewis v. Lawson
green
1 sentence1851Brewis v. Lawson, 76 Va. 36 ; Watts v. Taylor, 80 Va. 627 . | 1 | 1851–1851 |
Watts v. Taylor's Adm'r
neutral
1 sentence1851Brewis v. Lawson, 76 Va. 36 ; Watts v. Taylor, 80 Va. 627 . | 1 | 1851–1851 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.