7 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1921–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brooks v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See id. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences1986The above-stated test has been called the “true ‘test’ of extraneous offense admissibility.” Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d at 346 . 1986Furthermore, as noted above, the above-stated test has been called the “true ‘test’ of extraneous offense admissibility.” Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). | 1 | 1 |
Boyd v. Life Insurance Co. of the Southwestgreen1 sentence1980See Vela v. Shacklett, 12 S.W.2d 1007, 1008 (Tex.Com.App.1929, judgmt adopted) (prepayment provision in loan agreement giving borrower privilege to repay before maturity upon payment of three months’ advance interest does not render contract usurious); Gulf Coast Investment Corp. v. Prichard, 438 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas) (prepayment penalty cannot be considered interest), writ ref’d n. r. e. per curiam, 447 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.1969); Boyd v. Life Insurance Co. of the Southwest, 546 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref’d) (prepayment charge not interest). | 1 | 1 |
Vela v. Shacklettgreen1 sentence1980See Vela v. Shacklett, 12 S.W.2d 1007, 1008 (Tex.Com.App.1929, judgmt adopted) (prepayment provision in loan agreement giving borrower privilege to repay before maturity upon payment of three months’ advance interest does not render contract usurious); Gulf Coast Investment Corp. v. Prichard, 438 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas) (prepayment penalty cannot be considered interest), writ ref’d n. r. e. per curiam, 447 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.1969); Boyd v. Life Insurance Co. of the Southwest, 546 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref’d) (prepayment charge not interest). | 1 | 1 |
Gulf Coast Investment Corporation v. Prichardgreen1 sentence1980See Vela v. Shacklett, 12 S.W.2d 1007, 1008 (Tex.Com.App.1929, judgmt adopted) (prepayment provision in loan agreement giving borrower privilege to repay before maturity upon payment of three months’ advance interest does not render contract usurious); Gulf Coast Investment Corp. v. Prichard, 438 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas) (prepayment penalty cannot be considered interest), writ ref’d n. r. e. per curiam, 447 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.1969); Boyd v. Life Insurance Co. of the Southwest, 546 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref’d) (prepayment charge not interest). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Murphy v. State
green
1 sentence1986In Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), the defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated robbery and complained that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed an extraneous offense to be admitted into evidence for the purpose of showing motive, and to attack the credibility of two witnesses, one of whom was the defendant. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Rains v. State
green
2 sentences1986However, if the supporting statement was made after a motive or inducement existed to fabricate, the supporting statement is inadmissible.'" On Motion for Rehearing, this Court in Rains, supra, thoroughly reviewed Texas precedent, found that the above-stated rule has been consistent from the beginning, and reaffirmed it. 1986However, if the supporting statement was made after a motive or inducement existed to fabricate, the supporting statement is inadmissible.’ ” On Motion for Rehearing, this Court in Rains, supra, thoroughly reviewed Texas precedent, found that the above-stated rule has been consistent from the beginning, and reaffirmed it. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
H. L. \Brownie\" Choate
green
1 sentence1980See Vela v. Shacklett, 12 S.W.2d 1007, 1008 (Tex.Com.App.1929, judgmt adopted) (prepayment provision in loan agreement giving borrower privilege to repay before maturity upon payment of three months’ advance interest does not render contract usurious); Gulf Coast Investment Corp. v. Prichard, 438 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas) (prepayment penalty cannot be considered interest), writ ref’d n. r. e. per curiam, 447 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.1969); Boyd v. Life Insurance Co. of the Southwest, 546 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref’d) (prepayment charge not interest). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Krause v. City of El Paso
green
2 sentences1959Krause v. City of El Paso, 101 Tex. 211 , 106 S.W. 121 , 14 L.R.A.,N.S., 582. 1959Krause v. City of El Paso, 101 Tex. 211 , 106 S.W. 121 , 14 L.R.A.,N.S., 582. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Smith County Oil & Gas Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.
neutral
1 sentence1937Co., 112 S.W.2d 220 , decided by. this court May 19, 1937, and wherein it was held, as follows c “Under the repeated holdings of this court and of the Supreme Court, under such circumstances, the only matter with which the courts are concerned is whether or not there was substantial evidence before the Railroad Commission to sustain its order in the premises.” Under the above-stated rule, the only inquiry in the instant case was whether there was any substantial evidence to sustain the action of the Railroad Commission in granting the permit to drill the second well as an exception to rule 37, | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Craig v. Cartwright
green
1 sentence1921The charges held erroneous in Craig v. Cartwright, 65 Tex. 413 , a ease strongly relied upon by defendants in error, were predicated upon the above-stated rule without reference to its modification through the provisions of section 17 of the act of 1841. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.