14 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Lehningergreen2 sentences2002Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 97, 447 A.2d 860 (the fact that some of the monetary compensation sought was for harm arising after the effective date, did not make the statute applicable when the cause of action arose prior to the effective date); see also Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Lehninger, 48 Md.App. 549 , 429 A.2d 538 (1981); Dennis v. Blanchfield, 48 Md.App. 325 , 428 A.2d 80 (1981), modified, 292 Md. 319 , 438 A.2d 1330 (1982) (both these cases stand for the proposition that a medical injury occurs, within the meaning of the effective date clause, even though all of the resulting damage to the patie 2002Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 97, 447 A.2d 860 (the fact that some of the monetary compensation sought was for harm arising after the effective date, did not make the statute applicable when the cause of action arose prior to the effective date); see also Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Lehninger, 48 Md.App. 549 , 429 A.2d 538 (1981); Dennis v. Blanchfield, 48 Md.App. 325 , 428 A.2d 80 (1981), modified, 292 Md. 319 , 438 A.2d 1330 (1982) (both these cases stand for the proposition that a medical injury occurs, within the meaning of the effective date clause, even though all of the resulting damage to the patie | 3 | 3 |
Oxtoby v. McGowangreen2 sentences2002Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 97, 447 A.2d 860 (the fact that some of the monetary compensation sought was for harm arising after the effective date, did not make the statute applicable when the cause of action arose prior to the effective date); see also Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Lehninger, 48 Md.App. 549 , 429 A.2d 538 (1981); Dennis v. Blanchfield, 48 Md.App. 325 , 428 A.2d 80 (1981), modified, 292 Md. 319 , 438 A.2d 1330 (1982) (both these cases stand for the proposition that a medical injury occurs, within the meaning of the effective date clause, even though all of the resulting damage to the patie 1999There, the Court of Appeals, interpreting the effective date clause of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act requiring claimants to submit to arbitration before seeking judicial remedies, determined that the “[health care malpractice claims][a]ct is concerned with the invasion of legally protected interests coupled with harm.” Id. at 94 , 447 A.2d 860 . | 2 | 8 |
Dennis v. Blanchfieldgreen2 sentences2002Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 97, 447 A.2d 860 (the fact that some of the monetary compensation sought was for harm arising after the effective date, did not make the statute applicable when the cause of action arose prior to the effective date); see also Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Lehninger, 48 Md.App. 549 , 429 A.2d 538 (1981); Dennis v. Blanchfield, 48 Md.App. 325 , 428 A.2d 80 (1981), modified, 292 Md. 319 , 438 A.2d 1330 (1982) (both these cases stand for the proposition that a medical injury occurs, within the meaning of the effective date clause, even though all of the resulting damage to the patie 2002Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 97, 447 A.2d 860 (the fact that some of the monetary compensation sought was for harm arising after the effective date, did not make the statute applicable when the cause of action arose prior to the effective date); see also Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Lehninger, 48 Md.App. 549 , 429 A.2d 538 (1981); Dennis v. Blanchfield, 48 Md.App. 325 , 428 A.2d 80 (1981), modified, 292 Md. 319 , 438 A.2d 1330 (1982) (both these cases stand for the proposition that a medical injury occurs, within the meaning of the effective date clause, even though all of the resulting damage to the patie | 1 | 3 |
Edmonds v. Cytology Services of Maryland, Inc.green1 sentence2020We examined the Oxtoby-Hill principle in Edmonds v. Cytology Services of Maryland, Inc., when we considered whether there was a factual dispute as to when Debra Ann Edmonds suffered an “injury” within the meaning of CJP § 5-109. 111 Md. | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. McManus v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's Pension Fundgreen2 sentences1982McManus v. Board of Trustees of Policemen’s Pension Fund, 138 Wis. 133, 135-36 , 119 N.W. 806, 807 (1909): The word "injury,” in ordinary modern usage, is one of very broad designation. 1982McManus v. Board of Trustees of Policemen’s Pension Fund, 138 Wis. 133, 135-36 , 119 N.W. 806, 807 (1909): The word "injury,” in ordinary modern usage, is one of very broad designation. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hill v. Fitzgerald
green
2 sentences2020The Hill Court expressed that, while the HCMCA effective date provision “speaks of ‘medical injury,’ whereas [the effective date clause of CJP § 5-109] refers to ‘injuries,’ the legislature, in [the Court’s] view, intended no substantive distinction in the legal application of the two terms.” 304 Md. at 696-97 . 18 instances where the three-year discovery provision does not operate to bar an action at an earlier date[,]” and “this is so without regard to whether the injury was reasonably discoverable or not.” Hill, 304 Md. at 700 . 2020The Hill Court expressed that, while the HCMCA effective date provision “speaks of ‘medical injury,’ whereas [the effective date clause of CJP § 5-109] refers to ‘injuries,’ the legislature, in [the Court’s] view, intended no substantive distinction in the legal application of the two terms.” 304 Md. at 696-97 . 18 instances where the three-year discovery provision does not operate to bar an action at an earlier date[,]” and “this is so without regard to whether the injury was reasonably discoverable or not.” Hill, 304 Md. at 700 . | 3 | 1996–2020 |
Blanchfield v. Dennis
green
2 sentences2002Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 97, 447 A.2d 860 (the fact that some of the monetary compensation sought was for harm arising after the effective date, did not make the statute applicable when the cause of action arose prior to the effective date); see also Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Lehninger, 48 Md.App. 549 , 429 A.2d 538 (1981); Dennis v. Blanchfield, 48 Md.App. 325 , 428 A.2d 80 (1981), modified, 292 Md. 319 , 438 A.2d 1330 (1982) (both these cases stand for the proposition that a medical injury occurs, within the meaning of the effective date clause, even though all of the resulting damage to the patie 2002Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 97, 447 A.2d 860 (the fact that some of the monetary compensation sought was for harm arising after the effective date, did not make the statute applicable when the cause of action arose prior to the effective date); see also Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Lehninger, 48 Md.App. 549 , 429 A.2d 538 (1981); Dennis v. Blanchfield, 48 Md.App. 325 , 428 A.2d 80 (1981), modified, 292 Md. 319 , 438 A.2d 1330 (1982) (both these cases stand for the proposition that a medical injury occurs, within the meaning of the effective date clause, even though all of the resulting damage to the patie | 2 | 1997–2002 |
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co.
green
2 sentences2000For example, in WSSC, when describing the statute involved in State Farm, we said “that the statute, which provided simply that it would become effective on June 1 of 1964 did not apply to a policy in effect [earlier].” WSSC, 308 Md. at 561 , 520 A.2d at 1321 . 2000For example, in WSSC, when describing the statute involved in State Farm, we said “that the statute, which provided simply that it would become effective on June 1 of 1964 did not apply to a policy in effect [earlier].” WSSC, 308 Md. at 561 , 520 A.2d at 1321 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 516 A.2d 534 (Me.1986). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Mathews v. State
green
1 sentence1981Mathews v. State, 15 Md. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Shrout v. State
green
1 sentence1968Shrout v. State, 238 Md. 170, 174 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Kerber v. Kerber
green
2 sentences1967Kelsey v. Kelsey, 186 Md. 324 , 46 A. 2d 627 (1946) ; Hodges v. Hodges, 213 Md. 322 , 131 A. 2d 703 (1957), decided before the effective date of the rule; Comulada v. Comulada, 234 Md. 287 , 199 A. 2d 197 (1964); Kerber v. Kerber, 240 Md. 312 , 214 A. 2d 164 (1965), decided after January 1, 1963. 1967Kelsey v. Kelsey, 186 Md. 324 , 46 A. 2d 627 (1946) ; Hodges v. Hodges, 213 Md. 322 , 131 A. 2d 703 (1957), decided before the effective date of the rule; Comulada v. Comulada, 234 Md. 287 , 199 A. 2d 197 (1964); Kerber v. Kerber, 240 Md. 312 , 214 A. 2d 164 (1965), decided after January 1, 1963. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Kelsey v. Kelsey
green
2 sentences1967Kelsey v. Kelsey, 186 Md. 324 , 46 A. 2d 627 (1946) ; Hodges v. Hodges, 213 Md. 322 , 131 A. 2d 703 (1957), decided before the effective date of the rule; Comulada v. Comulada, 234 Md. 287 , 199 A. 2d 197 (1964); Kerber v. Kerber, 240 Md. 312 , 214 A. 2d 164 (1965), decided after January 1, 1963. 1967Kelsey v. Kelsey, 186 Md. 324 , 46 A. 2d 627 (1946) ; Hodges v. Hodges, 213 Md. 322 , 131 A. 2d 703 (1957), decided before the effective date of the rule; Comulada v. Comulada, 234 Md. 287 , 199 A. 2d 197 (1964); Kerber v. Kerber, 240 Md. 312 , 214 A. 2d 164 (1965), decided after January 1, 1963. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Comulada v. Comulada
green
2 sentences1967Kelsey v. Kelsey, 186 Md. 324 , 46 A. 2d 627 (1946) ; Hodges v. Hodges, 213 Md. 322 , 131 A. 2d 703 (1957), decided before the effective date of the rule; Comulada v. Comulada, 234 Md. 287 , 199 A. 2d 197 (1964); Kerber v. Kerber, 240 Md. 312 , 214 A. 2d 164 (1965), decided after January 1, 1963. 1967Kelsey v. Kelsey, 186 Md. 324 , 46 A. 2d 627 (1946) ; Hodges v. Hodges, 213 Md. 322 , 131 A. 2d 703 (1957), decided before the effective date of the rule; Comulada v. Comulada, 234 Md. 287 , 199 A. 2d 197 (1964); Kerber v. Kerber, 240 Md. 312 , 214 A. 2d 164 (1965), decided after January 1, 1963. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Taylor v. Taylor
neutral
2 sentences1967But, as was pointed out in Taylor v. Taylor, 238 Md. 312 , 208 A. 2d 685 (1965), the rule provides for stricter requirements in regard to corroboration than did § 32 of Article 16 of the Code of 1957, now repealed, and than does § 4 of Article 35 of the Code of 1957. 1967But, as was pointed out in Taylor v. Taylor, 238 Md. 312 , 208 A. 2d 685 (1965), the rule provides for stricter requirements in regard to corroboration than did § 32 of Article 16 of the Code of 1957, now repealed, and than does § 4 of Article 35 of the Code of 1957. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Hodges v. Hodges
green
2 sentences1967Kelsey v. Kelsey, 186 Md. 324 , 46 A. 2d 627 (1946) ; Hodges v. Hodges, 213 Md. 322 , 131 A. 2d 703 (1957), decided before the effective date of the rule; Comulada v. Comulada, 234 Md. 287 , 199 A. 2d 197 (1964); Kerber v. Kerber, 240 Md. 312 , 214 A. 2d 164 (1965), decided after January 1, 1963. 1967Kelsey v. Kelsey, 186 Md. 324 , 46 A. 2d 627 (1946) ; Hodges v. Hodges, 213 Md. 322 , 131 A. 2d 703 (1957), decided before the effective date of the rule; Comulada v. Comulada, 234 Md. 287 , 199 A. 2d 197 (1964); Kerber v. Kerber, 240 Md. 312 , 214 A. 2d 164 (1965), decided after January 1, 1963. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.