12 New York opinions name it 5 courts 1953–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
N.Y.A.A.D., Inc. v. Stategreen2 sentences2003The Court noted that the Act’s plain language expressed the Legislature’s intent that either new or salvaged airbags certified by a nationally recognized testing body be installed as replacement systems, fulfilling the Act’s “primary purpose of discouraging airbag theft and repair shop fraud.” ( 298 AD2d 741, 742 [2002].) The Court held that Supreme Court improperly “construed the effective date clause to also require ‘the promulgation of rules or regulations to implement the certification standards described in section 8.’ The effective date clause, however, includes no such provision, requir 2003The Court noted that the Act’s plain language expressed the Legislature’s intent that either new or salvaged airbags certified by a nationally recognized testing body be installed as replacement systems, fulfilling the Act’s “primary purpose of discouraging airbag theft and repair shop fraud.” ( 298 AD2d 741, 742 [2002].) The Court held that Supreme Court improperly “construed the effective date clause to also require ‘the promulgation of rules or regulations to implement the certification standards described in section 8.’ The effective date clause, however, includes no such provision, requir | 2 | 2 |
N.Y.A.A.D., Inc. v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Based on the necessity of the implementation of the coupon system to the functioning of the procedure set forth in the amended version of Tax Law § 471-e, we conclude that the effective date clause at issue in this case makes this case distinguishable from N.Y.A.A.D., Inc. v State of New York ( 1 NY3d 245 [2003]), which contains a similar clause in the legislation at issue therein, i.e., the Airbag Safety and Anti-theft Act (Act) (L 1996, ch 161). 2008There were no standards established by a nationally recognized body for the use of salvaged airbags prior to March 1999, and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles failed to promulgate any rules or regulations necessary to implement the Act (see N.Y.A.A.D., 1 NY3d at 247). | 1 | 1 |
Goldman v. Goldmangreen1 sentence2004Although the Attorney General argues that even Schantz’s acquisition of the mortgage conflicted with attorney disciplinary rules, the argument that such mortgages predating the court rules are inequitable has been recently rejected (see Goldman v Goldman, 95 NY2d 120, 122-123 [2000], supra). | 1 | 1 |
Amer. Trial Lawyers Assoc. v. NJ Supreme Ct.green1 sentence2004Branch v New Jersey Supreme Ct., 126 NJ Super 577, 593, 316 A2d 19, 28 [1974] [rejecting a challenge to a rule regulating “contingent fee contracts made and partly performed prior to” the effective date of the rule], affd 66 NJ 258, 330 A2d 350 [1974]). | 1 | 1 |
Riley v. County of Broomegreen1 sentence2002Corp. v Campagna, 48 NY2d 813, 815 ; see McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 212, at 371), we conclude that the Act’s effective date clause should not be read to make such regulations a condition precedent, thereby eviscerating the statute’s intent (see Riley v County of Broome, 263 AD2d 267, 270 , affd 95 NY2d 455 ; Pardi v Barone, 257 AD2d 42, 44 ; see generally McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 111). | 1 | 1 |
Riley v. County of Broomegreen1 sentence2002Corp. v Campagna, 48 NY2d 813, 815 ; see McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 212, at 371), we conclude that the Act’s effective date clause should not be read to make such regulations a condition precedent, thereby eviscerating the statute’s intent (see Riley v County of Broome, 263 AD2d 267, 270 , affd 95 NY2d 455 ; Pardi v Barone, 257 AD2d 42, 44 ; see generally McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 111). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Salvano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
green
1 sentence2008While the Attorney General has declined to take a position as to whether the application for confirmation is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) or the CPLR, it is clear that this matter involving the sale of securities is governed by the FAA (Matter of Salvano v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 85 NY2d 173 [1995]; Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v Afridi, 13 AD3d 248 [1st Dept 2004]). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Afridi
green
1 sentence2008While the Attorney General has declined to take a position as to whether the application for confirmation is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) or the CPLR, it is clear that this matter involving the sale of securities is governed by the FAA (Matter of Salvano v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 85 NY2d 173 [1995]; Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v Afridi, 13 AD3d 248 [1st Dept 2004]). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court
green
1 sentence2004Branch v New Jersey Supreme Ct., 126 NJ Super 577, 593, 316 A2d 19, 28 [1974] [rejecting a challenge to a rule regulating “contingent fee contracts made and partly performed prior to” the effective date of the rule], affd 66 NJ 258, 330 A2d 350 [1974]). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Pardi v. Barone
green
1 sentence2002Corp. v Campagna, 48 NY2d 813, 815 ; see McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 212, at 371), we conclude that the Act’s effective date clause should not be read to make such regulations a condition precedent, thereby eviscerating the statute’s intent (see Riley v County of Broome, 263 AD2d 267, 270 , affd 95 NY2d 455 ; Pardi v Barone, 257 AD2d 42, 44 ; see generally McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 111). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
35 Park Ave. Corp. v. Campagna
green
1 sentence2002Corp. v Campagna, 48 NY2d 813, 815 ; see McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 212, at 371), we conclude that the Act’s effective date clause should not be read to make such regulations a condition precedent, thereby eviscerating the statute’s intent (see Riley v County of Broome, 263 AD2d 267, 270 , affd 95 NY2d 455 ; Pardi v Barone, 257 AD2d 42, 44 ; see generally McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 111). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Antommarchi
green
1 sentence1994Since jury selection in this case occurred well before the effective date of the rule enunciated in Antommarchi (supra), we find no violation of the defendant’s right to be present during the material stages of his trial, as that right was understood prior to October 27, 1992. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Suitte
green
1 sentence1994The defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised by his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Bynum, 70 NY2d 858, 859 ), or without merit (see, People v Coleman, 70 NY2d 817, 819 ; People v Canty, 60 NY2d 830, 832 ; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 ; People v Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759 , 761; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 ). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Coleman
green
1 sentence1994The defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised by his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Bynum, 70 NY2d 858, 859 ), or without merit (see, People v Coleman, 70 NY2d 817, 819 ; People v Canty, 60 NY2d 830, 832 ; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 ; People v Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759 , 761; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 ). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Canty
green
1 sentence1994The defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised by his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Bynum, 70 NY2d 858, 859 ), or without merit (see, People v Coleman, 70 NY2d 817, 819 ; People v Canty, 60 NY2d 830, 832 ; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 ; People v Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759 , 761; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 ). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Contes
green
1 sentence1994The defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised by his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Bynum, 70 NY2d 858, 859 ), or without merit (see, People v Coleman, 70 NY2d 817, 819 ; People v Canty, 60 NY2d 830, 832 ; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 ; People v Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759 , 761; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 ). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Rippe v. Board of Education
green
1 sentence1994In Matter of Rippe v Board of Educ. ( 64 NY2d 281 , supra), the Court of Appeals held that the rights granted under section 30.13 applied only to teachers receiving a probationary appointment after the effective date of the rule, August 1, 1975, and only as to a tenure area created by the rule (Matter of Rippe v Board of Educ., supra, at 284). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Bynum
green
1 sentence1994The defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised by his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Bynum, 70 NY2d 858, 859 ), or without merit (see, People v Coleman, 70 NY2d 817, 819 ; People v Canty, 60 NY2d 830, 832 ; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 ; People v Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759 , 761; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 ). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Sloan
green
2 sentences1994With respect to the second side-bar inquiry objected to by the defendant, we conclude that the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals in People v Sloan ( 79 NY2d 386 , supra) is not applicable herein. 1994Since jury selection in this case occurred well before the effective date of the rule enunciated in Sloan (supra), the defendant’s claim must be rejected. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Goldberg v. Linden Towers Cooperative No. 5, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1990The action and motion for summary judgment were brought by plaintiff before the effective date of the rule authorizing sanctions and thus, 22 NYCRR subpart 130-1 does not govern this appeal (see, Frerks v Iandoli, 147 AD2d 672 ). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Roth
green
1 sentence1986In any event, State Administrative Procedure Act § 202 (7) reads in part: "A proceeding to contest any rule on the grounds of noncompliance with the procedural requirements of this section or of section two hundred two-a of this chapter must be commenced within four months from the effective date of the rule.” (The 1984 amendment concerning judicial review is found in § 202 [8] and is substantially to the same effect.) In People v Roth ( 129 Misc 2d 381 ) the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation adopted the Federal list of hazardous materials under a Federal statute that preempted the St | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Ess Pee Bee Realty Corp. v. Gabel
neutral
1 sentence1968(Matter of Ess Pee Bee Realty Corp. v. Gabel, 52 Misc 2d 1033 , affd. 28 A D 2d 822, mot. for lv. to app. den. 20 NY 2d 644 ). | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Schoeffer v. Lowell Adams Factors Corp.
neutral
1 sentence1953These views are confirmed by the decisions of the Appellate Division of this department in Tausik v. Tausik ( 280 App. Div. 887 ), and Field v. Field ( 281 App. Div. 657 ), decided after the effective date of the rule, in which the Appellate Division in this department held that general examinations before trial in matrimonial actions will not be permitted as a matter of policy in the absence of special circumstances. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Newspaper Realty Corp. v. Butler
green
1 sentence1953These views are confirmed by the decisions of the Appellate Division of this department in Tausik v. Tausik ( 280 App. Div. 887 ), and Field v. Field ( 281 App. Div. 657 ), decided after the effective date of the rule, in which the Appellate Division in this department held that general examinations before trial in matrimonial actions will not be permitted as a matter of policy in the absence of special circumstances. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.