effective date rule in Florida

2025Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(e) states, “A sentencing error may not be raised on appeal unless the alleged error has first been brought to the attention of the lower tribunal: (1) at the time of sentencing; or (2) by motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b).” Even in the case of fundamental error, the Florida Supreme Court has held that “for defendants whose initial briefs were filed after the effective date of rule 2 3.800(b)(2), the failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule 3.800(b) or by objection during the sentencing hearing

2025Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(e)(1)-(2) provides that “[a] sentencing error may not be raised on appeal unless the alleged error has first been brought to the attention of the lower tribunal: (1) at the time of sentencing; or (2) by motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b).” In Brannon v. State, 850 So. 2d 452, 456 (Fla. 2003), the Florida Supreme Court succinctly synopsized the effect of this provision as follows: “for defendants whose initial briefs were filed after the effective date of rule 5 3.800(b)(2), the failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing er

2019More recently, Pearlstein v. King, 610 So. 2d 445, 445-46 (Fla. 1992), concluded that a new rule of civil procedure imposing a “120-day time limit for serving a defendant after filing an initial pleading . . . applie[d] to complaints filed prior to . . . the effective date of the rule” but that the 120-day period began from the rule’s effective date.

2019After noting that “[r]ules of procedure are prospective unless specifically provided otherwise,” this Court explained that its decision was a “prospective application” of the new rule and “not a true retroactive application,” the latter of which would have required service “within 120 days of filing [the] complaint.” Id. at 446 .

2025Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(e) states, “A sentencing error may not be raised on appeal unless the alleged error has first been brought to the attention of the lower tribunal: (1) at the time of sentencing; or (2) by motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b).” Even in the case of fundamental error, the Florida Supreme Court has held that “for defendants whose initial briefs were filed after the effective date of rule 2 3.800(b)(2), the failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule 3.800(b) or by objection during the sentencing hearing

2014See Jackson v. State, 983 So.2d 562, 569 (Fla.2008) (“ ‘[F]or defendants whose initial briefs were filed after the effective date of rule 3.800(b)(2), the failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule 3.800(b) or by objection during the sentencing hearing forecloses them from raising the error on direct appeal.’ ” (quoting Brannon v. State, 850 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.2003))).

2012See Franqui v. State, 59 So.3d 82 , 95 n. 13 (Fla.2011). .

2012See Franqui, 59 So.3d at 95 n. 13. .

2004See Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 773 So.2d 1098, 1099 (Fla.2000) (establishing January 1, 2001, as effective date of rule).

2003See Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 773 So.2d 1098, 1099 (Fla.2000) (establishing January 1, 2001, as the effective date of the rule).

2004Our supreme court made clear in Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800 & Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), 9.140, & 9.600, 761 So.2d 1015 (Fla.2000) (hereafter Amendments II ), that Rule 3.800(b) must be used to preserve both fundamental and non-fundamental sentencing errors. [T]he amended rule is intended to provide one mechanism whereby all sentencing errors may be preserved for appellate review....

2003Id. at 1156.

2004In a somewhat analogous circumstance, however, the Supreme Court in Mendez-Perez v. Perez-Perez, 656 So.2d 458, 460 (Fla.1995), held that an amendment to rule 1.540(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, was not retroactive, because rules of procedure “are prospective unless specifically provided otherwise.” See also Pearlstein v. King, 610 So.2d 445, 446 (Fla.1992).

1997In Mendez-Perez , this Court concluded that "[u]nder the rule in effect when Mendez-Perez's divorce was final, she had one year to bring a motion under rule 1.540(b)." 656 So.2d at 460 .

1999The state's reliance on Finch v. State, 717 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) is misplaced because there, unlike the instant case, the time for raising the claim pursuant to Rule 3.850 had expired prior to Rule 9.140(j) becoming effective.

1998See Finch v. State, 717 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

2013Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(e), in turn, provides that “[a] sentencing error may not be raised on appeal unless the alleged error has first been brought to the attention of the lower tribunal: (1) at the time of sentencing; or (2) by motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b).” In Brannon v. State, 850 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.2003), the supreme court held that “for defendants whose initial briefs were filed after the effective date of rule 3.800(b)(2), the failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule 3.800(b) or by objection during the s

2008Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(e) in turn provides that "[a] sentencing error may not be raised on appeal unless the alleged error has first been brought to the attention of the lower tribunal: (1) at the time of sentencing; or (2) by motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)." In Brannon v. State, 850 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.2003), we held "that for defendants whose initial briefs were filed after the effective date of rule 3.800(b)(2), the failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule 3.800(b) or by objection during the sentencing hearing

2005See Reddell v. Reddell, 900 So.2d 670 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

2005See Nicoletti v. Nicoletti, 902 So.2d 215, 216-17 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

2005See Brannon v. State, 850 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.2003)(“for defendants whose initial briefs were filed after the effective date of rule 3.800(b)(2), the failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule 3.800(b) or by objection during the sentencing hearing forecloses them from raising the error on direct appeal”); Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, 978 (Fla.2001)(confirming that “lack of remorse is admissible to rebut evidence of remorse or other mitigation”).

2004P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)a. ("A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may otherwise directly appeal only . . . the lower tribunal's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. . . ."); Otero v. State, 793 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Winter v. State, 781 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 799 So.2d 219 (Fla.2001); Harrell v. State, 721 So.2d 1185, 1186-87 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing C.W. v. State, 637 So.2d 28, 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Booker v. State, 497 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Page v. State, 376 So.2d 901, 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Wesley v. State, 375 So.2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d D

2004P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)a. ("A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may otherwise directly appeal only . . . the lower tribunal's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. . . ."); Otero v. State, 793 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Winter v. State, 781 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 799 So.2d 219 (Fla.2001); Harrell v. State, 721 So.2d 1185, 1186-87 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing C.W. v. State, 637 So.2d 28, 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Booker v. State, 497 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Page v. State, 376 So.2d 901, 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Wesley v. State, 375 So.2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d D

2004P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)a. ("A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may otherwise directly appeal only . . . the lower tribunal's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. . . ."); Otero v. State, 793 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Winter v. State, 781 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 799 So.2d 219 (Fla.2001); Harrell v. State, 721 So.2d 1185, 1186-87 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing C.W. v. State, 637 So.2d 28, 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Booker v. State, 497 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Page v. State, 376 So.2d 901, 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Wesley v. State, 375 So.2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d D

2004P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)a. ("A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may otherwise directly appeal only . . . the lower tribunal's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. . . ."); Otero v. State, 793 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Winter v. State, 781 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 799 So.2d 219 (Fla.2001); Harrell v. State, 721 So.2d 1185, 1186-87 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing C.W. v. State, 637 So.2d 28, 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Booker v. State, 497 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Page v. State, 376 So.2d 901, 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Wesley v. State, 375 So.2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d D

2004In Brannon , the court made it explicitly clear that "for defendants whose initial briefs were filed after the effective date of rule 3.800(b)(2), the failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule *1173 3.800(b) or by objection during the sentencing hearing forecloses them from raising the error on direct appeal." 850 So.2d at 456 ; see also Lewis v. State, 827 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Geri v. State, 797 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Durr .

2004P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)a. ("A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may otherwise directly appeal only . . . the lower tribunal's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. . . ."); Otero v. State, 793 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Winter v. State, 781 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 799 So.2d 219 (Fla.2001); Harrell v. State, 721 So.2d 1185, 1186-87 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing C.W. v. State, 637 So.2d 28, 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Booker v. State, 497 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Page v. State, 376 So.2d 901, 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Wesley v. State, 375 So.2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d D