political question doctrine in Michigan

2005In re MCI, supra. Cf. Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 217 ; 82 S Ct 691 ; 7 L Ed 2d 663 (1962) (referring in the context of the political question doctrine to the impropriety of courts resolving matters in which there is a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards”).

2005In re MCI, supra. Cf. Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 217 ; 82 S Ct 691 ; 7 L Ed 2d 663 (1962) (referring in the context of the political question doctrine to the impropriety of courts resolving matters in which there is a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards”).

1996Analysis of an issue under the political question doctrine, requires a three-part inquiry: “(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate *266 branch of Government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations [for maintaining respect between the three branches] counsel against judicial intervention?” [House Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560, 574 ; 506 NW2d 190 (1993), quoting Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996, 998 ; 100 S Ct 533 ; 62 L Ed 2d 428 (

1993Because we find that the mucc and mepf have standing to bring this lawsuit, we need not decide whether the remaining plaintiffs have legislator standing. 17 In view of the fact that the organizational standing allows us to decide all the issues raised by all the parties, our standing discussion need go no further._ *574 III The political question doctrine requires analysis of three inquiries: "(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of Government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond ar

1996Analysis of an issue under the political question doctrine, requires a three-part inquiry: “(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate *266 branch of Government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations [for maintaining respect between the three branches] counsel against judicial intervention?” [House Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560, 574 ; 506 NW2d 190 (1993), quoting Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996, 998 ; 100 S Ct 533 ; 62 L Ed 2d 428 (

1993Because we find that the mucc and mepf have standing to bring this lawsuit, we need not decide whether the remaining plaintiffs have legislator standing. 17 In view of the fact that the organizational standing allows us to decide all the issues raised by all the parties, our standing discussion need go no further._ *574 III The political question doctrine requires analysis of three inquiries: "(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of Government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond ar

2024The trial court relied on the decision in Conlin, 313 Mich App 243 , for the proposition that it had manageable judicial standards for interpreting and applying the State Committee’s bylaws.

2016THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION “The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is grounded in the principle of separation of powers” and “has been compared to the political question doctrine and the exhaustion doctrine, both of which are also concepts rooted in separation of powers principles.” Travelers Ins, 465 Mich at 196 .

2014Id. at 171 .1 In House Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560 ; 506 NW2d 190 (1993), we addressed the political-question doctrine and considered whether under Const 1963, art 5, § 2 the Governor had the power to transfer all powers and duties from a legislatively created department of the executive branch responsible for environmental protection to a gubernatorially created department that had the same purpose.

2014Id. at 171 . 1 In House Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560 ; 506 NW2d 190 (1993), we addressed the political-question doctrine and considered whether under Const 1963, art 5, § 2 the Governor had the power to transfer all powers and duties from a legislatively created department of the executive branch responsible for environmental protection to a gubernatorially created department that had the same purpose.

2012Id. at _; 132 S Ct at 1427 .

2012Id. at _; 132 S Ct at 1427 .

2012As the United States Supreme Court has stated, the Framers of the Constitution recognized the “sharp necessity to separate the legislative from the judicial power .. . .” Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211, 221 ; 115 S Ct 1447 ; 131 L Ed 2d 328 (1995).

2012As the United States Supreme Court has stated, the Framers of the Constitution recognized the “sharp necessity to separate the legislative from the judicial power .. . .” Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211, 221 ; 115 S Ct 1447 ; 131 L Ed 2d 328 (1995).

2012For an extensive discussion of the concept of separation of powers and the political question doctrine, see Bendix Safety Restraints Group, Allied Signal, Inc v City of Troy, 215 Mich App 289, 294-300 ; 544 NW2d 481 (1996) (O’Connell, J., concurring).

2012For an extensive discussion of the concept of separation of powers and the political question doctrine, see Bendix Safety Restraints Group, Allied Signal, Inc v City of Troy, 215 Mich App 289, 294-300 ; 544 NW2d 481 (1996) (O’Connell, J., concurring).

2005In re MCI, supra. Cf. Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 217 ; 82 S Ct 691 ; 7 L Ed 2d 663 (1962) (referring in the context of the political question doctrine to the impropriety of courts resolving matters in which there is a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards”).

2001PURPOSE OF THE DOCTRINE The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is grounded in the principle of separation of powers. 12 The doctrine has been compared to the political question doctrine and the exhaustion doctrine, both of which are also concepts rooted in separation of powers principles. 13 “All of the doctrines that cluster about Article IH—not only standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like—relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prude

2001PURPOSE OF THE DOCTRINE The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is grounded in the principle of separation of powers. 12 The doctrine has been compared to the political question doctrine and the exhaustion doctrine, both of which are also concepts rooted in separation of powers principles. 13 “All of the doctrines that cluster about Article IH—not only standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like—relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prude

2001PURPOSE OF THE DOCTRINE The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is grounded in the principle of separation of powers. 12 The doctrine has been compared to the political question doctrine and the exhaustion doctrine, both of which are also concepts rooted in separation of powers principles. 13 “All of the doctrines that cluster about Article IH—not only standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like—relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prude

2001PURPOSE OF THE DOCTRINE The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is grounded in the principle of separation of powers. 12 The doctrine has been compared to the political question doctrine and the exhaustion doctrine, both of which are also concepts rooted in separation of powers principles. 13 “All of the doctrines that cluster about Article IH—not only standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like—relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prude

2000For the reasons that gave rise to the political question doctrine of judicial restraint, see, e.g., Straus v Governor, 230 Mich App 222, 225-226 ; 583 NW2d 520 (1998), aff’d 459 Mich 526 ; 592 NW2d 53 (1999), we conclude that these approaches are inappropriate.

2000For the reasons that gave rise to the political question doctrine of judicial restraint, see, e.g., Straus v Governor, 230 Mich App 222, 225-226 ; 583 NW2d 520 (1998), aff’d 459 Mich 526 ; 592 NW2d 53 (1999), we conclude that these approaches are inappropriate.

2000For the reasons that gave rise to the political question doctrine of judicial restraint, see, e.g., Straus v Governor, 230 Mich App 222, 225-226 ; 583 NW2d 520 (1998), aff’d 459 Mich 526 ; 592 NW2d 53 (1999), we conclude that these approaches are inappropriate.

2000For the reasons that gave rise to the political question doctrine of judicial restraint, see, e.g., Straus v Governor, 230 Mich App 222, 225-226 ; 583 NW2d 520 (1998), aff’d 459 Mich 526 ; 592 NW2d 53 (1999), we conclude that these approaches are inappropriate.

1996The political question doctrine “is designed to restrain the Judiciary from inappropriate interference in the business of the other branches of Government.” United States v Munoz-Flores, 495 US 385, 394 ; 110 S Ct 1964 ; 109 L Ed 2d *267 384 (1990) (emphasis supplied).

1996The political question doctrine “is designed to restrain the Judiciary from inappropriate interference in the business of the other branches of Government.” United States v Munoz-Flores, 495 US 385, 394 ; 110 S Ct 1964 ; 109 L Ed 2d *267 384 (1990) (emphasis supplied).

1996Schwartz v City of Flint, 426 Mich 295, 310-314 ; 395 NW2d 678 (1986).

1996Schwartz v City of Flint, 426 Mich 295, 310-314 ; 395 NW2d 678 (1986).

1976Williams v Rhodes, 393 US 23, 28 ; 89 S Ct 5 ; 21 L Ed 2d 24 (1968).

1976Williams v Rhodes, 393 US 23, 28 ; 89 S Ct 5 ; 21 L Ed 2d 24 (1968).

1960But a formidable reason for inaction has been cited to us, namely, a series of Federal cases commencing with Colegrove v. Green (1946), 328 US 549 ( 66 S Ct 1198 , 90 L ed 1432), and culminating in Baker v. Carr (MD Tenn, 1959), 175 F Supp 649 .

1960But a formidable reason for inaction has been cited to us, namely, a series of Federal cases commencing with Colegrove v. Green (1946), 328 US 549 ( 66 S Ct 1198 , 90 L ed 1432), and culminating in Baker v. Carr (MD Tenn, 1959), 175 F Supp 649 .

1960But a formidable reason for inaction has been cited to us, namely, a series of Federal cases commencing with Colegrove v. Green (1946), 328 US 549 ( 66 S Ct 1198 , 90 L ed 1432), and culminating in Baker v. Carr (MD Tenn, 1959), 175 F Supp 649 .

1960But a formidable reason for inaction has been cited to us, namely, a series of Federal cases commencing with Colegrove v. Green (1946), 328 US 549 ( 66 S Ct 1198 , 90 L ed 1432), and culminating in Baker v. Carr (MD Tenn, 1959), 175 F Supp 649 .