political question doctrine in Colorado

2021But we also have a duty “to interpret the constitution and say what the law is.” Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201, 206 (Colo. 1991) (quoting Colo. Gen.

2021In Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 363 (Colo. 2009), our most recent political question case, we noted that “[w]e have never applied the political question doctrine to avoid deciding a constitutional question.”1 We described Baker as having articulated “the federal political question criteria” and held that 1 This court has found the following issues justiciable: whether Colorado’s school finance system was constitutionally adequate, Lobato, 218 P.3d at 374 ; whether state legislators had violated a constitutional prohibition against committing themselves to voting for or against legislation at

2021In Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 363 (Colo. 2009), our most recent political question case, we noted that “[w]e have never applied the political question doctrine to avoid deciding a constitutional question.”1 We described Baker as having articulated “the federal political question criteria” and held that 1 This court has found the following issues justiciable: whether Colorado’s school finance system was constitutionally adequate, Lobato, 218 P.3d at 374 ; whether state legislators had violated a constitutional prohibition against committing themselves to voting for or against legislation at

2021In Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 363 (Colo. 2009), our most recent political question case, we noted that “[w]e have never applied the political question doctrine to avoid deciding a constitutional question.”1 We described Baker as having articulated “the federal political question criteria” and held that 1 This court has found the following issues justiciable: whether Colorado’s school finance system was constitutionally adequate, Lobato, 218 P.3d at 374 ; whether state legislators had violated a constitutional prohibition against committing themselves to voting for or against legislation at

2021Markwell , ¶ 20 (interpretation of the Reading Clau se is a legal issue subject to de novo review); Barber v. Ritt er , 196 P.3d 238, 245 (Colo. 2008) (“Whether a plaintiff has standin g to sue is a question of law that 6 we review de novo.”); see Schroder v. Bush , 263 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001) (the application of the political question doctrine is a legal question that the appellat e court reviews de novo).

2021Markwell , ¶ 20 (interpretation of the Reading Clause is a legal issue subject to de novo review); Barber v. Ritter , 196 P.3d 238, 245 (Colo. 2008) ("Whether a plaintiff has standing to sue is a question of law that we review de novo."); see Schroder v. Bush , 263 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001) (the application of the political question doctrine is a legal question that the appellate court reviews de novo).

2021Markwell , ¶ 20 (interpretation of the Reading Clau se is a legal issue subject to de novo review); Barber v. Ritt er , 196 P.3d 238, 245 (Colo. 2008) (“Whether a plaintiff has standin g to sue is a question of law that 6 we review de novo.”); see Schroder v. Bush , 263 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001) (the application of the political question doctrine is a legal question that the appellat e court reviews de novo).

2021Markwell , ¶ 20 (interpretation of the Reading Clause is a legal issue subject to de novo review); Barber v. Ritter , 196 P.3d 238, 245 (Colo. 2008) ("Whether a plaintiff has standing to sue is a question of law that we review de novo."); see Schroder v. Bush , 263 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001) (the application of the political question doctrine is a legal question that the appellate court reviews de novo).

2023The political question doctrine is a narrow exception to this rule, and a court may not avoid its responsibility to decide a case merely because it may have “political implications.” Id. at 195–96 (quoting Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983)). ¶110 A controversy involves a nonjusticiable political question when, as relevant here, “there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.’” Id. at 195 (quoting Nixon v. United States

2012Is the Governor's Decision Subject to Judicial Review? 111 Initially, we address a contention that was raised only by the Hospital Association: namely, that the Governor's decision to opt out of the Medicare requirement is a "decision committed to the political branches and is not subject to judicial review." We disagree. $12 "The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); see Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 368-71 (Col0o.2009) (applying the political question doctrine in

2023The political question doctrine is a narrow exception to this rule, and a court may not avoid its responsibility to decide a case merely because it may have “political implications.” Id. at 195–96 (quoting Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983)). ¶110 A controversy involves a nonjusticiable political question when, as relevant here, “there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.’” Id. at 195 (quoting Nixon v. United States

2012"A controversy is nonjusticiable-ie., involves a political question-where there is 'a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. ...'" Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 , 113 S.Ct. 732 , 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 , 82 S.Ct. 691 ); see Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 9-10 , 93 S.Ct. 2440 , 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973) (discussing justiciability). 113 In Colorado, "[the judiciary's avoidance of deciding political questions finds its

2021Thus, while the majority correctly concludes that we are not precluded from reviewing this case under the political question doctrine, see id. at ¶ 31 , it strips that review of much of its significance by "abstain [ing] from specifying" what the constitution demands, id. at ¶ 32 . ¶52 To be sure, this court must declare whether the constitution has been violated in a given case.

2021Thus, while the majority correctly concludes that we are not precluded from reviewing this case under the political question doctrine, see id. at ¶ 31 , it strips that review of much of its significance by "abstain [ing] from specifying" what the constitution demands, id. at ¶ 32 . ¶52 To be sure, this court must declare whether the constitution has been violated in a given case.

2021In Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 363 (Colo. 2009), our most recent political question case, we noted that “[w]e have never applied the political question doctrine to avoid deciding a constitutional question.”1 We described Baker as having articulated “the federal political question criteria” and held that 1 This court has found the following issues justiciable: whether Colorado’s school finance system was constitutionally adequate, Lobato, 218 P.3d at 374 ; whether state legislators had violated a constitutional prohibition against committing themselves to voting for or against legislation at

2009Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Colo.1985); see also Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201, 205-06 (Colo.1991). [1] Adopting the federal rationale within the framework of laws governing this state, we have observed: The judiciary's avoidance of deciding political questions finds its roots in the Colorado Constitution's provisions separating the powers of state government, see e.g., Colo. Const. art III, and recognizes that certain issues are best left for resolution by the other branches of government, or `to be fought out on the hustings and determined by the people at the polls.

2009In 2003, we renewed our position that the political question doctrine applies in this state, declaring that "courts must refrain from reviewing controversies concerning policy choices and value determinations that are constitutionally committed for resolution to the legislative or executive branch. . . ." Busse v. City of Golden, 73 P.3d 660, 664 (Colo.2003) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 , 82 S.Ct. 691 and rephrasing the first Baker factor).

2009In 2008, we renewed our position that the political question doctrine applies in this state, declaring that "courts must refrain from reviewing controversies concerning policy choices and value determinations that are constitutionally committed for resolution to the legislative or executive branch...." Busse v. City of Golden, 73 P.3d 660, 664 (Colo.2003) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 , 82 S.Ct. 691 and rephrasing the first Baker factor).

2023The political question doctrine is a narrow exception to this rule, and a court may not avoid its responsibility to decide a case merely because it may have “political implications.” Id. at 195–96 (quoting Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983)). ¶110 A controversy involves a nonjusticiable political question when, as relevant here, “there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.’” Id. at 195 (quoting Nixon v. United States

2023The political question doctrine is a narrow exception to this rule, and a court may not avoid its responsibility to decide a case merely because it may have “political implications.” Id. at 195–96 (quoting Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983)). ¶110 A controversy involves a nonjusticiable political question when, as relevant here, “there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.’” Id. at 195 (quoting Nixon v. United States

2021The Lobato dissent accurately recognized the case as “either an abandonment of the political question doctrine writ large or a more limited refusal to apply Baker to decide political questions.” Id. at 377 n.2 (Rice, J., dissenting). ¶78 Admittedly, Lobato involved the unusual circumstance of an affirmative right, but our critique of Baker didn’t turn on that fact.

2021See id. at 369–71.

2012"A controversy is nonjusticiable-ie., involves a political question-where there is 'a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. ...'" Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 , 113 S.Ct. 732 , 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 , 82 S.Ct. 691 ); see Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 9-10 , 93 S.Ct. 2440 , 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973) (discussing justiciability). 113 In Colorado, "[the judiciary's avoidance of deciding political questions finds its

2012"A controversy is nonjusticiable-ie., involves a political question-where there is 'a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. ...'" Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 , 113 S.Ct. 732 , 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 , 82 S.Ct. 691 ); see Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 9-10 , 93 S.Ct. 2440 , 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973) (discussing justiciability). 113 In Colorado, "[the judiciary's avoidance of deciding political questions finds its

2009See Lobato, 216 P.3d at 37-39 .

2009We interpret this court's decision in Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo.1982), to hold that it is the responsibility of the judiciary to determine whether the state's public school financing system is rationally related to the constitutional mandate that the General Assembly provide a "thorough and uniform" system of public education.

2009See Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1025 (Colo.1982).

2003Alexander v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 166 Colo. 118, 123 , 444 P.2d 397, 399-400 (1968); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir.1987)(notice requirement satisfied when both parties submit materials beyond pleadings in support of or opposing a motion to dismiss). 10 Thus, we remand this case to the trial court to resolve plaintiffs' claims originally dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because of the political question doctrine, either on summary judgment or at trial.

2003Alexander v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 166 Colo. 118, 123 , 444 P.2d 397, 399-400 (1968); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir.1987)(notice requirement satisfied when both parties submit materials beyond pleadings in support of or opposing a motion to dismiss). 10 Thus, we remand this case to the trial court to resolve plaintiffs' claims originally dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because of the political question doctrine, either on summary judgment or at trial.

2003Alexander v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 166 Colo. 118, 123 , 444 P.2d 397, 399-400 (1968); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir.1987)(notice requirement satisfied when both parties submit materials beyond pleadings in support of or opposing a motion to dismiss). 10 Thus, we remand this case to the trial court to resolve plaintiffs' claims originally dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because of the political question doctrine, either on summary judgment or at trial.