political question doctrine in Arizona

2024Each of these arguments fails. ¶32 “The political question doctrine provides that a dispute is a nonjusticiable political question if there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.’” Puente v. Ariz. State Legislature, 254 Ariz. 265 , 268 ¶ 7 (2022) (quoting Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 216 Ariz. 190 , 192 ¶ 11 (2007)).

2022“The ‘second critical prong of the political question test: whether there exist judicially discoverable and manageable standards,’ overlaps with and informs the first prong.” Id. (quoting Kromko, 216 Ariz. at 193, ¶ 14 ). ¶13 Without question, no constitutional provision sets forth a standard for evaluating the adequacy or propriety of the rules of procedure either house has adopted.

2022See State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287 , 289 ¶ 6 (2007). ¶7 The political question doctrine provides that a dispute is a nonjusticiable political question if there is “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 216 Ariz. 190 , 192 ¶ 11 (2007) (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)).

2022See id. at 192–93 ¶ 12; see also Ariz. Const. art. 3. ¶8 Although the political question inquiry is sometimes framed in the disjunctive, Kromko, 216 Ariz. at 192 ¶ 11, the elements are interdependent.

2022Courts are responsible for resolving challenges to another branch’s constitutional authority “[even when] the issues have political implications.” Id. (quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“The doctrine of which we treat is one of ‘political questions,’ not one of ‘political cases.’ The courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.”); Ariz. Sch.

2012Zivotofsky v. Clinton, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1421, 1428 , 182 L.Ed.2d 423 (2012) (noting that “courts cannot avoid their responsibility” to resolve “litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches ... merely because the issues have political implications” (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 17 Under separation-of-powers principles, a non-justiciable political question is presented when “there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards fo

2018When the judiciary fails to interpret and enforce constitutional rights and limits, it shrinks from its central duty and drains the Constitution of its intended meaning. ¶ 31 The prudential requirement of the political question doctrine traces its origins to New Deal jurisprudence but "was given its canonical modern formulation" in Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).

2018When the judiciary fails to interpret and enforce constitutional rights and limits, it shrinks from its central duty and drains the Constitution of its intended meaning. ¶ 31 The prudential requirement of the political question doctrine traces its origins to New Deal jurisprudence but "was given its canonical modern formulation" in Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).

2022Brewer, 229 Ariz. at 351 ¶ 16 (“That a lawsuit involves ‘constitutional issues with significant political overtones,’ however, ‘does not automatically invoke the political question doctrine.’” (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 , 942–43 (1983))).

2012That a lawsuit involves “constitutional issues with significant political overtones,” however, “does not automatically invoke the political question doctrine.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942-43 , 103 S.Ct. 2764 , 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983); see also Zivotofsky ex rel.

2022See State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287 , 289 ¶ 6 (2007). ¶7 The political question doctrine provides that a dispute is a nonjusticiable political question if there is “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 216 Ariz. 190 , 192 ¶ 11 (2007) (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)).

2022While a determination on the merits necessarily requires “the exercise of judicial review,” a dismissal predicated on the political question doctrine reflects “the abstention from judicial review.’” Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992)). 3 PUENTE, et al. v. ASL Opinion of the Court ¶8 Deciding whether a matter has been entrusted by the constitution to a particular branch of government requires constitutional interpretation, a task assigned to the judiciary.

2018See Stillman, supra at 1299 (stating that the plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer , 541 U.S. 267 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 , 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004), was "unique" in that "it relied on the lack of judicially discernible and manageable standards as an independently sufficient rationale" under the political question doctrine "without any genuine argument that the issue was textually committed to a coordinate federal branch"); see also Nixon , 506 U.S. at 228-30 , 113 S.Ct. 732 (holding that the question was non-justiciable because it was textually delegated to another branch and reasoning that "the us

2018See Stillman, supra at 1299 (stating that the plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer , 541 U.S. 267 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 , 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004), was "unique" in that "it relied on the lack of judicially discernible and manageable standards as an independently sufficient rationale" under the political question doctrine "without any genuine argument that the issue was textually committed to a coordinate federal branch"); see also Nixon , 506 U.S. at 228-30 , 113 S.Ct. 732 (holding that the question was non-justiciable because it was textually delegated to another branch and reasoning that "the us

2007As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in Nixon , [T]he concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political department is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch. 506 U.S. at 228-29 , 113 S.Ct. 732 ; see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 , 59 S.Ct. 972 , 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939) (referring to “the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination” as a

2007As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in Nixon , [T]he concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political department is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch. 506 U.S. at 228-29 , 113 S.Ct. 732 ; see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 , 59 S.Ct. 972 , 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939) (referring to “the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination” as a