political question doctrine in California

2018III, § 2.) Standing is one of several doctrines, including mootness, ripeness, and the political question doctrine, which have developed into the definition of the "case or controversy" requirement under federal law. ( Clinton v. City of New York (1998) 524 U.S. 417 , 429-430, 118 S.Ct. 2091 , 141 L.Ed.2d 393 ["Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual 'Cases' and 'Controversies,' and ... the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process"].) Absent a case or controversy, the f

2018III, § 2.) Standing is one of several doctrines, including mootness, ripeness, and the political question doctrine, which have developed into the definition of the "case or controversy" requirement under federal law. ( Clinton v. City of New York (1998) 524 U.S. 417 , 429-430, 118 S.Ct. 2091 , 141 L.Ed.2d 393 ["Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual 'Cases' and 'Controversies,' and ... the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process"].) Absent a case or controversy, the f

2012This is an issue not presented in this case and we express no view as to its resolution.” (Powell, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 521, fn. 42 [ 23 L.Ed.2d at p. 516, fn. 42 ].) Powell is inapposite because the United States Supreme Court interpreted provisions of the United States Constitution, not the California Constitution, and the case involved grounds for disqualification that were outside the provisions of the Constitution.

2012This is an issue not presented in this case and we express no view as to its resolution.” (Powell, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 521, fn. 42 [ 23 L.Ed.2d at p. 516, fn. 42 ].) Powell is inapposite because the United States Supreme Court interpreted provisions of the United States Constitution, not the California Constitution, and the case involved grounds for disqualification that were outside the provisions of the Constitution.

1998Thus it has been said: "The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the [legislative and executive branches]." ( Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc. (1986) 478 U.S. 221, 230 [ 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2866 , 92 L.Ed.2d 166, 178 ].) Nevertheless, it is well established that it is a judicial function to interpret the law, including the Constitution, and, when appropriately presented in a case or controversy, to declare when an act of the Legislature or

1998Thus it has been said: "The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the [legislative and executive branches]." ( Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc. (1986) 478 U.S. 221, 230 [ 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2866 , 92 L.Ed.2d 166, 178 ].) Nevertheless, it is well established that it is a judicial function to interpret the law, including the Constitution, and, when appropriately presented in a case or controversy, to declare when an act of the Legislature or

2018III, § 2.) Standing is one of several doctrines, including mootness, ripeness, and the political question doctrine, which have developed into the definition of the "case or controversy" requirement under federal law. ( Clinton v. City of New York (1998) 524 U.S. 417 , 429-430, 118 S.Ct. 2091 , 141 L.Ed.2d 393 ["Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual 'Cases' and 'Controversies,' and ... the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process"].) Absent a case or controversy, the f

2018III, § 2.) Standing is one of several doctrines, including mootness, ripeness, and the political question doctrine, which have developed into the definition of the "case or controversy" requirement under federal law. ( Clinton v. City of New York (1998) 524 U.S. 417 , 429-430, 118 S.Ct. 2091 , 141 L.Ed.2d 393 ["Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual 'Cases' and 'Controversies,' and ... the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process"].) Absent a case or controversy, the f

2018III, § 2.) Standing is one of several doctrines, including mootness, ripeness, and the political question doctrine, which have developed into the definition of the "case or controversy" requirement under federal law. ( Clinton v. City of New York (1998) 524 U.S. 417 , 429-430, 118 S.Ct. 2091 , 141 L.Ed.2d 393 ["Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual 'Cases' and 'Controversies,' and ... the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process"].) Absent a case or controversy, the f

2018III, § 2.) Standing is one of several doctrines, including mootness, ripeness, and the political question doctrine, which have developed into the definition of the "case or controversy" requirement under federal law. ( Clinton v. City of New York (1998) 524 U.S. 417 , 429-430, 118 S.Ct. 2091 , 141 L.Ed.2d 393 ["Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual 'Cases' and 'Controversies,' and ... the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process"].) Absent a case or controversy, the f

2001(New York v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. 144, 184 [ 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2432-2433 , 120 L.Ed.2d 120 ].) However, in Amador, supra, 22 Cal.3d at page 227 , we squarely rejected the claim that article XIII A would “result in a change from a ‘republican’ form of government (i.e., lawmaking by elected representatives) to a ‘democratic’ governmental plan (i.e., lawmaking directly by the people).” “Contrary to petitioners’ assertion . . . we are convinced that article XIII A . . . does not change our basic governmental plan.

2001(New York v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. 144, 184 [ 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2432-2433 , 120 L.Ed.2d 120 ].) However, in Amador, supra, 22 Cal.3d at page 227 , we squarely rejected the claim that article XIII A would “result in a change from a ‘republican’ form of government (i.e., lawmaking by elected representatives) to a ‘democratic’ governmental plan (i.e., lawmaking directly by the people).” “Contrary to petitioners’ assertion . . . we are convinced that article XIII A . . . does not change our basic governmental plan.

1998If correct upon any theory of law applicable to the case, the judgment will be sustained regardless of the considerations that moved the lower court to its conclusion." ( Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 568 [ 253 Cal. Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ].

1998If correct upon any theory of law applicable to the case, the judgment will be sustained regardless of the considerations that moved the lower court to its conclusion." ( Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 568 [ 253 Cal. Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ].

1998It is the policy behind such frequently identified and applied judicial standards as: the primacy of legislative intent in statutory interpretation (see Cossack v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 726, 732-733 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 460 , 523 P.2d 260 ]; California Sch.

1998It is the policy behind such frequently identified and applied judicial standards as: the primacy of legislative intent in statutory interpretation (see Cossack v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 726, 732-733 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 460 , 523 P.2d 260 ]; California Sch.

1998Thus it has been said: "The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the [legislative and executive branches]." ( Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc. (1986) 478 U.S. 221, 230 [ 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2866 , 92 L.Ed.2d 166, 178 ].) Nevertheless, it is well established that it is a judicial function to interpret the law, including the Constitution, and, when appropriately presented in a case or controversy, to declare when an act of the Legislature or

1998Thus it has been said: "The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the [legislative and executive branches]." ( Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc. (1986) 478 U.S. 221, 230 [ 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2866 , 92 L.Ed.2d 166, 178 ].) Nevertheless, it is well established that it is a judicial function to interpret the law, including the Constitution, and, when appropriately presented in a case or controversy, to declare when an act of the Legislature or

1984Four concurring justices went further, asserting that "The [amending] process itself is `political' in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point." ( 307 U.S. 433, 459 [ 83 L.Ed. 1385, 1399 ], conc. opn. of Black, J.) The political question doctrine has undergone considerable change since Coleman v. Miller .

1984Four concurring justices went further, asserting that "The [amending] process itself is `political' in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point." ( 307 U.S. 433, 459 [ 83 L.Ed. 1385, 1399 ], conc. opn. of Black, J.) The political question doctrine has undergone considerable change since Coleman v. Miller .