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6 Kentucky opinions name it 1 courts 2018–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Warth v. Seldinred2 sentences2023III, §2. 41 Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 193 . 42 Id. 43 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–99 (internal citations omitted). 15 standing, acting on their own motion, to ensure that only justiciable causes proceed in court[.]”44 In Sexton, this Court held that Section 112(5) of the Kentucky Constitution which vests “original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not vested in some other court” in Kentucky’s circuit courts was a sufficient parallel to the “cases and controversies” language of the U.S. Constitution to adopt the federal constitutional standing doctrine espoused in Lujan.45 Consequently, unless stan 2018“In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”24 Federal constitutional standing has three requirements: the plaintiff must allege that 1) he or she has suffered or imminently will suffer an injury; 2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and 3) a favorable federal court decision is likely to redress the injury.25 In addition to these federal constitutional requirements, two major federal prudential standing principles exist: (1) a party generally may assert only his or | 3 | 4 |
Vieth v. Jubelirergreen1 sentence2026The political question doctrine, which is primarily grounded in the separation of powers doctrine, states that “the judicial department should not interfere in the exercise by another department of a discretion that is committed by a textually demonstrable provision of the Constitution to the other department, or seek to resolve an issue for which it lacks judicially discoverable and manageable standards[.]” Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 860 (Ky. 2005) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 2 | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. McCormackgreen1 sentence2026The political question doctrine, which is primarily grounded in the separation of powers doctrine, states that “the judicial department should not interfere in the exercise by another department of a discretion that is committed by a textually demonstrable provision of the Constitution to the other department, or seek to resolve an issue for which it lacks judicially discoverable and manageable standards[.]” Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 860 (Ky. 2005) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 2 | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Carrgreen1 sentence2026The political question doctrine, which is primarily grounded in the separation of powers doctrine, states that “the judicial department should not interfere in the exercise by another department of a discretion that is committed by a textually demonstrable provision of the Constitution to the other department, or seek to resolve an issue for which it lacks judicially discoverable and manageable standards[.]” Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 860 (Ky. 2005) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 2 | 1 | 1 |
Fletcher v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2026The political question doctrine, which is primarily grounded in the separation of powers doctrine, states that “the judicial department should not interfere in the exercise by another department of a discretion that is committed by a textually demonstrable provision of the Constitution to the other department, or seek to resolve an issue for which it lacks judicially discoverable and manageable standards[.]” Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 860 (Ky. 2005) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 2 | 1 | 1 |
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cunogreen1 sentence2023See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 , 352–53 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Bevin v. Commonwealth ex rel. Besheargreen1 sentence2023Beshear, 563 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Ky. 2018) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sextongreen2 sentences2023The U.S. Supreme Court has accordingly interpreted the U.S. Constitution as providing a “series of limits on the federal judicial power.”39 One such limit is Article III of the U.S. Constitution’s directive that federal courts may only consider “cases and controversies.”40 The U.S. Supreme Court has identified five major justiciability doctrines to ensure that only cases and controversies are considered by the federal judiciary.41 Those doctrines are: the prohibition against rendering advisory opinions, ripeness, mootness, the political question doctrine, and—most significant for our purposes— 2023III, §2. 41 Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 193 . 42 Id. 43 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–99 (internal citations omitted). 15 standing, acting on their own motion, to ensure that only justiciable causes proceed in court[.]”44 In Sexton, this Court held that Section 112(5) of the Kentucky Constitution which vests “original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not vested in some other court” in Kentucky’s circuit courts was a sufficient parallel to the “cases and controversies” language of the U.S. Constitution to adopt the federal constitutional standing doctrine espoused in Lujan.45 Consequently, unless stan | 1 | 1 |
Rucho v. Common Causegreen2 sentences2023Moreover, the scope of judicial review in these decisions is fundamentally limited to compliance with 50 the requirements of Sections 6 and 33 of the Kentucky Constitution. 9 Given this backdrop coupled with the lack of coherent, judicially manageable standards for the resolution of partisan gerrymandering claims beyond the explicit mandates of Sections 6 and 33, I view the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484 (2019), as highly persuasive and would adopt its analysis on the political question doctrine. 2023In Rucho, the Supreme Court explained that when a “question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no judicially enforceable rights[,]” “the claim is said to present a ‘political question’ and to be nonjusticiable—outside the courts’ competence and therefore beyond the courts’ jurisdiction.” Id. at 2494 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2023Miller, 18 S.W. at 524 (“If, through error of opinion, the convention exceeded its power, and the people are dissatisfied, they have ample remedy, without the judiciary being asked to over-step the proper limits of its power. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.