ex parte hearing in New York

2015The evidence at an ex parte hearing established an overriding interest that warranted closure of the courtroom during the testimony of five of the People’s civilian witnesses (see Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39 [1984]), and the ex parte proceedings did not violate defendant’s rights (see People v Frost, 100 NY2d 129, 137 [2003]).

2003Supreme Court conducted an ex parte hearing on each occasion to determine whether the courtroom should be closed (see People v Hinton, 31 NY2d 71 [1972], cert denied 410 US 911 [1973]).

2003Relying on People v Goggins ( 34 NY2d 163, 168 [1974], *136 cert denied 419 US 1012 [1974]), defendant argues that an ex parte hearing regarding the identity of a witness is permissible only at pretrial hearings when a defendant’s guilt or innocence is not at issue.

2003Supreme Court conducted an ex parte hearing on each occasion to determine whether the courtroom should be closed (see People v Hinton, 31 NY2d 71 [1972], cert denied 410 US 911 [1973]).

2002As a general rule, a defendant is entitled to be personally present at all material stages of his trial (see, e.g., Kentucky v Stincer, 482 US 730 ; People v Morales, 80 NY2d 450 ).

2002As a general rule, a defendant is entitled to be personally present at all material stages of his trial (see, e.g., Kentucky v Stincer, 482 US 730 ; People v Morales, 80 NY2d 450 ).

2000Other courts require disclosure of the informant’s identity at an ex parte hearing but do not specifically mandate that the informant be produced (see, e.g., United States v Reeves, 210 F3d 1041, 1044 [9th Cir], cert denied — US —, 121 S Ct 499 [Nov. 13, 2000]; United States v Abramson, 553 F2d 1164, 1168 [8th Cir], cert denied 433 US 911 ).

2000This was not a stage of the trial at which defendant had the right to be personally present (People v Ramirez, 192 AD2d 382 , lv denied 81 NY2d 1078 ; People v Davis, 166 AD 2d 280 , lv denied 77 NY2d 837 ; see also, People v Ming Li, 91 NY2d 913 ).

2000This was not a stage of the trial at which defendant had the right to be personally present (People v Ramirez, 192 AD2d 382 , lv denied 81 NY2d 1078 ; People v Davis, 166 AD 2d 280 , lv denied 77 NY2d 837 ; see also, People v Ming Li, 91 NY2d 913 ).

2000Other courts require disclosure of the informant’s identity at an ex parte hearing but do not specifically mandate that the informant be produced (see, e.g., United States v Reeves, 210 F3d 1041, 1044 [9th Cir], cert denied — US —, 121 S Ct 499 [Nov. 13, 2000]; United States v Abramson, 553 F2d 1164, 1168 [8th Cir], cert denied 433 US 911 ).

1991We find that in this case the Hearing Officer was not required to recuse herself as a matter of law, and that she did not improvidently exercise her discretion in declining to do so (see, People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405-406 ; People v Tartaglia, 35 NY2d 918, 919-920 ).

1991We find that in this case the Hearing Officer was not required to recuse herself as a matter of law, and that she did not improvidently exercise her discretion in declining to do so (see, People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405-406 ; People v Tartaglia, 35 NY2d 918, 919-920 ).

1980Defendant argues strenuously that under People v Rosario ( 9 NY2d 286 ) and Brady v Maryland ( 373 US 83 ) the threat should have been revealed so that it could have been used to impeach Gourdet’s credibility.

1980Defendant argues strenuously that under People v Rosario ( 9 NY2d 286 ) and Brady v Maryland ( 373 US 83 ) the threat should have been revealed so that it could have been used to impeach Gourdet’s credibility.

1971In A Quantity of Books v. Kansas (supra, p. 213 ) Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for himself and three other members of the court, joined with three other Justices in reversing the Supreme Court of Kansas, which had upheld the seizure, after an ex parte hearing, of a stock of allegedly obscene paperback novels.

1971He* held the ex parte hearing to be inadequate, saying: ‘1 For if seizure of books precedes an adversary determination of their obscenity, there is danger of abridgement of the right of the public in a free society to unobstructed circulation of nonobscene books.” In Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn ( 416 F. 2d 410 [1969]), a case involving the petitioner herein, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the adversary hearing requirement prescribed in A Quantity of Books was applicable to the seizure of motion picture films as well as books, theorizing that, by reason

1971He* held the ex parte hearing to be inadequate, saying: ‘1 For if seizure of books precedes an adversary determination of their obscenity, there is danger of abridgement of the right of the public in a free society to unobstructed circulation of nonobscene books.” In Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn ( 416 F. 2d 410 [1969]), a case involving the petitioner herein, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the adversary hearing requirement prescribed in A Quantity of Books was applicable to the seizure of motion picture films as well as books, theorizing that, by reason

1961(Matter of Horowitz v. Kaplan, 248 N. Y. 547 , Berizzi Co. v. Krausz, 239 N. Y. 315 ; Matter of 290 Park Ave. [Fergus Motors], 275 App. Div. 565 .) The respondent’s contention, that the award was the sole determination of the umpire and became binding on the parties since his selection was made by the two differing arbitrators (who then became nothing more than advocates and agents of the respective parties) is without merit.

1961(Matter of Horowitz v. Kaplan, 248 N. Y. 547 , Berizzi Co. v. Krausz, 239 N. Y. 315 ; Matter of 290 Park Ave. [Fergus Motors], 275 App. Div. 565 .) The respondent’s contention, that the award was the sole determination of the umpire and became binding on the parties since his selection was made by the two differing arbitrators (who then became nothing more than advocates and agents of the respective parties) is without merit.

1906It has been well said by Judge Cooley : “ The court of chancery has no more power than any other to condemn a man unheard, and to dispossess him of property prima facie his, and hand over its enjoyment to another on an ex parte claim to it.” (Arnold v. Bright, 41 Mich. 207 .) So in an action for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate the court doubtless may restrain the defendant pending *464 the action from conveying, incumbering or in any way disposing of the subject of the suit, but an ex parte order that the defendant forthwith convey the premises to the plainti