ex parte hearing in California

2021In People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043 , noting that section 1054.7 “contains no express prohibition on ex parte hearings,” we concluded there was no violation of state law when the trial court held an ex parte hearing to address discovery obligations, as the court did here.

2017The letters encouraged Phillip "to change his account of the murder, vaguely suggesting it would be financially advantageous for him to do so." ( Thompson , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 1063 , 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 667 , 384 P.3d 693 .) Phillip turned the letters over to his attorneys, who arranged an ex parte hearing with the prosecutor present, informing the court they did not want to turn the letters over to the prosecution, nor designate Lee as a witness to authenticate the letters, until Thompson testified in her own defense and " 'locked herself into a position.' " ( Id. at p. 1092, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d

2000The court in Thompson mentioned the cited circumstance in the course of illustrating the necessity for defense counsel to be present in order to be able to probe the prosecutor's reasons and create an adequate record ( Thompson, supra, 827 F.2d at p. 1260 ), and as noted above, the court in Thompson found reversible error because the trial court erroneously held an ex parte hearing — and not because the prosecution's challenges were themselves improper.

2000The court in Thompson mentioned the cited circumstance in the course of illustrating the necessity for defense counsel to be present in order to be able to probe the prosecutor's reasons and create an adequate record ( Thompson, supra, 827 F.2d at p. 1260 ), and as noted above, the court in Thompson found reversible error because the trial court erroneously held an ex parte hearing — and not because the prosecution's challenges were themselves improper.

2025Vargas does not raise this incident in his appeal, and we decline to address it. 6 The record does not contain transcripts of the opening statements. 7 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). 16 unjustifiably prevented him from seeing their children.

1988Defendant does not argue that the court failed to afford him a full opportunity to explain the basis for his motion at the April 10 hearing, or that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion at that time. (18) Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118 , requires that the court afford a defendant an opportunity to state the reasons why he believes a court-appointed *948 attorney should be discharged. ( People v. Lewis (1978) 20 Cal.3d 496, 497 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 138 , 573 P.2d 40 ].) The court extended that opportunity to defendant in this case on three occasions.

2022(See McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 584 U.S. __ [ 138 S.Ct. 1500, 1505 ] (McCoy) [it is unconstitutional for defense counsel to concede guilt over the defendant’s intransigent and unambiguous objection].) She informed the court that communications had broken down between her and defendant, but she had previously 6 discussed her strategy with defendant many times and he had expressed no objection.

2022(See McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 584 U.S. __ [ 138 S.Ct. 1500, 1505 ] (McCoy) [it is unconstitutional for defense counsel to concede guilt over the defendant’s intransigent and unambiguous objection].) She informed the court that communications had broken down between her and defendant, but she had previously 6 discussed her strategy with defendant many times and he had expressed no objection.

2021(Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2020) ¶¶ 4:427, 9:347; see Stern v. Judson (1912) 163 Cal. 726, 735 [affidavit for an order for the publication of summons is always ex parte].) We conclude that Singh and Rawat’s failure to return signed acknowledgements of receipt of the summons and Singh’s avoidance of the service of process, in particular his refusal to meet with Ontiveros’s private investigator in person and statement to Campbell that he would not cooperate with the service of process, together with Ontiveros’s diligent efforts to serv

2021(Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2020) ¶¶ 4:427, 9:347; see Stern v. Judson (1912) 163 Cal. 726, 735 [affidavit for an order for the publication of summons is always ex parte].) We conclude that Singh and Rawat’s failure to return signed acknowledgements of receipt of the summons and Singh’s avoidance of the service of process, in particular his refusal to meet with Ontiveros’s private investigator in person and statement to Campbell that he would not cooperate with the service of process, together with Ontiveros’s diligent efforts to serv

2021(Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2020) ¶¶ 4:427, 9:347; see Stern v. Judson (1912) 163 Cal. 726, 735 [affidavit for an order for the publication of summons is always ex parte].) We conclude that Singh and Rawat’s failure to return signed acknowledgements of receipt of the summons and Singh’s avoidance of the service of process, in particular his refusal to meet with Ontiveros’s private investigator in person and statement to Campbell that he would not cooperate with the service of process, together with Ontiveros’s diligent efforts to serv

2021(Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2020) ¶¶ 4:427, 9:347; see Stern v. Judson (1912) 163 Cal. 726, 735 [affidavit for an order for the publication of summons is always ex parte].) We conclude that Singh and Rawat’s failure to return signed acknowledgements of receipt of the summons and Singh’s avoidance of the service of process, in particular his refusal to meet with Ontiveros’s private investigator in person and statement to Campbell that he would not cooperate with the service of process, together with Ontiveros’s diligent efforts to serv

2021(Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2020) ¶¶ 4:427, 9:347; see Stern v. Judson (1912) 163 Cal. 726, 735 [affidavit for an order for the publication of summons is always ex parte].) We conclude that Singh and Rawat’s failure to return signed acknowledgements of receipt of the summons and Singh’s avoidance of the service of process, in particular his refusal to meet with Ontiveros’s private investigator in person and statement to Campbell that he would not cooperate with the service of process, together with Ontiveros’s diligent efforts to serv

2021(Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2020) ¶¶ 4:427, 9:347; see Stern v. Judson (1912) 163 Cal. 726, 735 [affidavit for an order for the publication of summons is always ex parte].) We conclude that Singh and Rawat’s failure to return signed acknowledgements of receipt of the summons and Singh’s avoidance of the service of process, in particular his refusal to meet with Ontiveros’s private investigator in person and statement to Campbell that he would not cooperate with the service of process, together with Ontiveros’s diligent efforts to serv

2020(Alliance Bank, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at pp. 5–6.) The court went on to conclude, however, that because the defendant appeared through counsel at the ex parte hearing and opposed the motion on the merits, he waived the defective notice of motion.

2015(Alliance Bank, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 6 .) The court concluded that the defendant, by appearing at the ex parte hearing and opposing it on the merits, had forfeited any contention as to defective notice and had impliedly consented to “any exercise of 3 Defendants did not provide a reporter’s transcript of the March 5, 2013 hearing; consequently, we do not know what arguments the Wu defendants made at that hearing.

2015“The doctrine of res judicata, whether applied as a total bar to further litigation or as collateral estoppel, ‘rests upon the sound policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair adversary hearing on an issue from again drawing it into controversy and subjecting the other party to further expense in its reexamination.’ ” (Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 257 .) Needelman cannot now belatedly attempt to challenge the evidence at the ex parte hearing, which showed that he violated the stipulation.

2015“The doctrine of res judicata, whether applied as a total bar to further litigation or as collateral estoppel, ‘rests upon the sound policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair adversary hearing on an issue from again drawing it into controversy and subjecting the other party to further expense in its reexamination.’ ” (Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 257 .) Needelman cannot now belatedly attempt to challenge the evidence at the ex parte hearing, which showed that he violated the stipulation.

2014(Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 828 .) Our high court rejected this argument, stating, “Plaintiff overlooks a crucial difference between state and federal procedures in default judgments: . . . federal defendants who default are entitled to a minitrial on the sole issue of damages. [Citations.] Unlike the ex parte hearing provided for by section 585 [citation], the hearing in federal court is a full-fledged adversarial contest, [f] It is here that plaintiff’s analogy to federal law . . . breaks down: under section 585 there is no contest whatever once a defendant defaults. [Citation.] We conc

2014(Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 828 .) Our high court rejected this argument, stating, “Plaintiff overlooks a crucial difference between state and federal procedures in default judgments: . . . federal defendants who default are entitled to a minitrial on the sole issue of damages. [Citations.] Unlike the ex parte hearing provided for by section 585 [citation], the hearing in federal court is a full-fledged adversarial contest. [¶] It is here that plaintiff’s analogy to federal law . . . breaks down: under section 585 there is no contest whatever once a defendant defaults. [Citation.] We conc

2014(Datig v. Dove Books, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 964, 977 .) Here, in his ex parte application, Murray described the "urgency for seeking an immediate ex parte order" as Leslie having "insufficient funds to maintain her expenses." However, during the ex parte hearing, Ronald agreed to pay $1,300 per month toward Leslie's care until the support petition trial on October 25, 2013, and the court ordered him to do so.

2002The appellate court reversed the judgment after concluding “(1) it was obtained without notice or any excuse for lack of notice, and (2) there was no factual basis for its entry.” (Datig v. Dove Books, Inc., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 967 .) Eliceche seizes on this first reason and argues it applies here just as well.

2025Defendant appealed and we appointed counsel to represent him. 2 On appeal, defendant’s counsel submitted an opening brief setting forth the case history and requesting this court to independently review the record pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 .

2024The Applicable Law In Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1019 , our Supreme Court held that “California courts have no authority to confer use immunity on witnesses” (id. at p. 1051) and discussed federal case law—in particular United States v. Quinn (3d Cir. 2013) 728 F.3d 243 (en banc) (Quinn) and Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith (3d Cir. 1980) 615 F.2d 964 (Smith)—standing for the proposition that, in certain circumstances, “due process may compel a defense witness to be immunized” by the prosecution.

2024(Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1179 .) At an ex parte hearing, defense counsel explained his tactical reasons for declining to present additional evidence at the penalty phase, and the trial court found that counsel’s decision not to present any mitigating evidence “was made for sound tactical reasons for the benefit of his client—for the benefit of Mr. Cole.” PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In its recommendation for resentencing, the LADA set forth the statutory presumption in favor of recall and resentencing, and asked the trial court to recall defendant’s death sentence and resentence him to a term o

2024The Applicable Law In Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1019 , our Supreme Court held that “California courts have no authority to confer use immunity on witnesses” (id. at p. 1051) and discussed federal case law—in particular United States v. Quinn (3d Cir. 2013) 728 F.3d 243 (en banc) (Quinn) and Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith (3d Cir. 1980) 615 F.2d 964 (Smith)—standing for the proposition that, in certain circumstances, “due process may compel a defense witness to be immunized” by the prosecution.

2024The Applicable Law In Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1019 , our Supreme Court held that “California courts have no authority to confer use immunity on witnesses” (id. at p. 1051) and discussed federal case law—in particular United States v. Quinn (3d Cir. 2013) 728 F.3d 243 (en banc) (Quinn) and Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith (3d Cir. 1980) 615 F.2d 964 (Smith)—standing for the proposition that, in certain circumstances, “due process may compel a defense witness to be immunized” by the prosecution.

2024(See, e.g., Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483 [appellant’s burden to provide reporter’s transcript if she intends to raise an issue that requires consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court].) But even if she had provided a transcript, trial courts generally retain broad discretion to control their courtrooms and to efficiently dispose of matters before them (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1237 ) and plaintiff fails to establish that the court’s decision to continue the hearing, or its conduct in denying the motion, constituted misc

2024Edwards appeals, an appeal that has five arguments: (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by not granting immunity to a defense witness; (2) the trial court erred by holding an ex parte hearing for the prosecutor to discuss his reasons for declining to grant such immunity; (3) a prosecution expert testified to case-specific hearsay in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez); (4) cumulative error; and 1 (5) changes made to the law by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), which became effective during the pendency of this appeal, requires the

2024The Applicable Law In Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1019 , our Supreme Court held that “California courts have no authority to confer use immunity on witnesses” (id. at p. 1051) and discussed federal case law—in particular United States v. Quinn (3d Cir. 2013) 728 F.3d 243 (en banc) (Quinn) and Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith (3d Cir. 1980) 615 F.2d 964 (Smith)—standing for the proposition that, in certain circumstances, “due process may compel a defense witness to be immunized” by the prosecution.

2023(See George M. v. Superior Court (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 755, 760 .) Accordingly, let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the respondent court to vacate the order denying Newell’s motion to set aside the process.” (Ibid.) However in Johnson, the record affirmatively revealed that the mother, unable to locate the father, did not provide any notice to the father of the ex parte hearing or the resulting order.