ex parte hearing in Ohio

2024However, the transcript of the full hearing, not the ex parte hearing, is required for both trial court and appellate review. {¶14} “When portions of the transcript necessary for resolution of assigned errors are omitted from the record, the reviewing court has nothing to pass upon and thus, as to those assigned errors, the court has no choice but to presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings, and affirm.” Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 , 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980). {¶15} Further, we have recognized “[c]ivil due process requires only notice and an opportunity to be

2024However, the transcript of the full hearing, not the ex parte hearing, is required for both trial court and appellate review. {¶14} “When portions of the transcript necessary for resolution of assigned errors are omitted from the record, the reviewing court has nothing to pass upon and thus, as to those assigned errors, the court has no choice but to presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings, and affirm.” Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 , 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980). {¶15} Further, we have recognized “[c]ivil due process requires only notice and an opportunity to be

2017In Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. (1974), 419 U.S. 281 , 288, at fn. 4 [ 95 S.Ct. 438 , 42 L.Ed.2d 447 ], the Supreme Court stated: "* * * A party is entitled, of course, to know the issues on which [the] decision will turn and to be apprised of the factual material on which the agency relies for decision so that he may rebut it.

2017In Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. (1974), 419 U.S. 281 , 288, at fn. 4 [ 95 S.Ct. 438 , 42 L.Ed.2d 447 ], the Supreme Court stated: "* * * A party is entitled, of course, to know the issues on which [the] decision will turn and to be apprised of the factual material on which the agency relies for decision so that he may rebut it.

2016Richland No. 2011–CA–0021, 2011-Ohio-6782, ¶ 39 , citing State v. Peeples (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 34 , 640 N.E.2d 208 .

2016Richland No. 2011–CA–0021, 2011-Ohio-6782, ¶ 39 , citing State v. Peeples (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 34 , 640 N.E.2d 208 .

2007Ohio Valley Radiology Assoc. v. Ohio Valley Hospital Assn. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 118 , 122 .

1999Assn. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 118 , 123 , has held that an ex parte hearing is appropriate when one party fails to appear at trial, stating: "We therefore hold that when a party who has filed a responsive pleading to a pleading seeking affirmative relief fails to appear for trial, no default within the meaning of Civ.R. 55(A) occurs, and the trial court is not required to give seven days' notice to the absent party before allowing the party seeking relief to proceed with an ex parte trial." Appellant argues that the magistrate should not have conducted an ex parte hearing as his counsel " s secr

2006R.C. 2903.214 (D)(2)(a)(i) through (iv). {¶ 10} We have interpreted R.C. 2903.214 "to mean that the legislature intended that the full hearing occur within ten days of the ex parte hearing or as soon thereafter as is reasonable." State v. Blaine , Highland App. No. 03CA9, 2004-Ohio-1241 , ¶ 21, appeal not allowed, 103 Ohio St.3d 1404 , 2004-Ohio-3980 .

2005Although we do not find that there was an unreasonably long time period between the ex parte hearing and the commencement of the full hearing, we do find that the trial court's actions in conducting the hearing over two months, in failing to rule on the motion for a civil stalking protection order until six months after the conclusion of the hearing, and then not journalizing the final ruling until thirteen months after Berry requested the civil stalking protection order, constituted an abuse of discretion. {¶ 19} In State v. Blaine (March 12, 2004), Highland County App. No. 03CA9, 2004-Ohio-1

2004Thus, "R.C. 3113.31 authorizes a court in an ex parte hearing to issue a temporary protection order when the court finds there to be an `[i]mmediate and present danger of domestic violence to the family or household member.'" Id., quoting R.C. 3113.31 (D).

1999Initially, the court may conduct an ex parte hearing to issue a temporary protection order if the court finds an “ ‘[i]mmediate and present danger of domestic violence to the family or household member.’ ” Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d at 37 , 679 N.E.2d at 675 , quoting R.C. 3113.31(D).

2024“If the court issues an ex parte DVCPO, due process requires that the court schedule a ‘full hearing’ within seven or ten days, depending on the restrictions contained in the order, and it must give the respondent ‘notice of, and an opportunity to be heard at, the full hearing.’” Id., citing Adamski v. Adamski, 2022-Ohio-32 , ¶ 32, quoting R.C. 3113.31(D)(2)(a), and ¶ 43. {¶ 11} “At the full hearing, the court must allow the respondent to argue and to present direct and rebuttal evidence.” Id., citing Deacon v. Landers, 68 Ohio App.3d 26, 29-30 (4th Dist. 1990) (“[T]he opportunity to be heard

2023Id. at 6-11 . {¶19} While the circumstances here are slightly different than in divorce proceedings, the record demonstrates that the magistrate held the ex parte hearing while Molly was alive, heard testimony relating to the alleged grounds for the protection order, and announced on the record: “I’m going to deny the request for an ex parte order.” It had not yet journalized this finding at the time of Molly’s death.

2023Father relies on R.C. 3113.31(E)(1)(d) and McCue, 187 Ohio App.3d 1 , 2010-Ohio-1298 , 930 N.E.2d 855 .

2023Father relies on R.C. 3113.31(E)(1)(d) and McCue, 187 Ohio App.3d 1 , 2010-Ohio-1298 , 930 N.E.2d 855 .

2023Montgomery No. 26096, 2014-Ohio-4505 . {¶35} Appellant contends the magistrate improperly assisted appellee by asking questions and shaping the case in her favor after hearing appellee’s testimony at the ex parte hearing.

2022Id.

2022Hamilton No. C-210278, 2022-Ohio-13, ¶ 12 , citing 2016 Staff Note, Civ.R. 65.1(G). {¶ 11} The record reflects that Clements did not request an ex parte hearing and, therefore, the case was set for a full hearing before the magistrate.

2022No. 07AP-758, 2008-Ohio-4694, ¶ 13 . {¶ 39} Pursuant to R.C. 3113.31, when a petitioner seeks a civil protection order and requests an ex parte hearing, the trial court is required to hold a hearing on the same day and, if good cause is shown, may enter an ex parte temporary order.

2017Wayne No. 15AP0026, 2016-Ohio-4682, ¶ 19 , quoting State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464 , 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 2 . {¶9} J.P. and L.P. argue that they were unable to present this argument to the trial court because they could not attend the ex parte hearing and they were not allowed to present a defense during the full hearing.

2017Wayne No. 15AP0026, 2016-Ohio-4682, ¶ 19 , quoting State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464 , 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 2 . {¶9} J.P. and L.P. argue that they were unable to present this argument to the trial court because they could not attend the ex parte hearing and they were not allowed to present a defense during the full hearing.

2017Wayne No. 15AP0026, 2016-Ohio-4682, ¶ 19 , quoting State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464 , 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 2 . {¶9} J.P. and L.P. argue that they were unable to present this argument to the trial court because they could not attend the ex parte hearing and they were not allowed to present a defense during the full hearing.

2016The judge further notes that the newspaper articles included in Mr. Young’s affidavit have no connection to the underlying case. {¶ 4} For the reasons explained below, no basis has been established to order the disqualification of Judge Swenski. {¶ 5} As an initial matter, “[a]n affidavit of disqualification must be filed as soon as possible after the incident giving rise to the claim of bias and prejudice occurred,” and failure to do so may result in waiver of the objection, especially when “the facts underlying the objection have been known to the party for some time.” In re Disqualification

2016The judge further notes that the newspaper articles included in Mr. Young’s affidavit have no connection to the underlying case. {¶ 4} For the reasons explained below, no basis has been established to order the disqualification of Judge Swenski. {¶ 5} As an initial matter, “[a]n affidavit of disqualification must be filed as soon as possible after the incident giving rise to the claim of bias and prejudice occurred,” and failure to do so may result in waiver of the objection, especially when “the facts underlying the objection have been known to the party for some time.” In re Disqualification

2016Whether Judge Swenski’s decision was legally correct is an issue for appeal—not for an affidavit of disqualification. “[A] judge’s adverse rulings, even erroneous ones, are not evidence of bias or prejudice.” In re Disqualification of Fuerst, 134 Ohio St.3d 1267 , 2012-Ohio-6344 , 984 N.E.2d 1079, ¶ 14 .

2016Whether Judge Swenski’s decision was legally correct is an issue for appeal—not for an affidavit of disqualification. “[A] judge’s adverse rulings, even erroneous ones, are not evidence of bias or prejudice.” In re Disqualification of Fuerst, 134 Ohio St.3d 1267 , 2012-Ohio-6344 , 984 N.E.2d 1079, ¶ 14 .

2016The full hearing must be held on the scheduled date unless the court grants a continuance of the full hearing “to a reasonable time determined by the court.” Id.

2015In support of its decision, the majority asserts: “the evidence of appellant pinning appellee against the wall while punching the wall next to her head, taken together with appellee’s testimony that appellant forced appellee to have sex with him were sufficient to give rise to a fear of imminent serious physical harm on the day appellee filed her petition.” {¶ 34} The majority cites Gannon, 2008-Ohio-4484 , for the proposition that the acts which instill fear of imminent harm need not happen on the same day the petition is filed, but that the fear is “present on the day alleged, irrespective o