overruled defense in New York

2014Moreover, when the trial court overruled defense counsel’s timely objection, it legitimized the prosecutor’s improper argument (see People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 111 [1976]; People v Bannerman, 110 AD2d 706 [1985]).

2014Moreover, when the trial court overruled defense counsel’s timely objection, it legitimized the prosecutor’s improper argument (see People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 111 [1976]; People v Bannerman, 110 AD2d 706 [1985]).

2002However, since it was undisputed that the complainant did not observe the defendant set the fire, her statement to her aunt that he had set fire to the apartment did not qualify as an excited utterance (see People v Caviness, 38 NY2d 227, 232 ; People v Stewart, 265 AD2d 586 ; People v Matos, 107 AD2d 823 ).

2002However, since it was undisputed that the complainant did not observe the defendant set the fire, her statement to her aunt that he had set fire to the apartment did not qualify as an excited utterance (see People v Caviness, 38 NY2d 227, 232 ; People v Stewart, 265 AD2d 586 ; People v Matos, 107 AD2d 823 ).

2002However, since it was undisputed that the complainant did not observe the defendant set the fire, her statement to her aunt that he had set fire to the apartment did not qualify as an excited utterance (see People v Caviness, 38 NY2d 227, 232 ; People v Stewart, 265 AD2d 586 ; People v Matos, 107 AD2d 823 ).

2002We have recognized that admitting evidence of a smile as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt is error (People v Basora, 75 NY2d 992, 994 ).

1997Inasmuch as the record does not suggest that the defendant’s presence at the sidebar questioning would have been of no benefit, his exclusion from this material stage of the trial necessitates that he receive a new trial (see, People v Maher, supra; People v Roman, supra; People v Vasquez, 218 AD2d 766 ; People v McMichael, 216 AD2d 588 ).

1997Inasmuch as the record does not suggest that the defendant’s presence at the sidebar questioning would have been of no benefit, his exclusion from this material stage of the trial necessitates that he receive a new trial (see, People v Maher, supra; People v Roman, supra; People v Vasquez, 218 AD2d 766 ; People v McMichael, 216 AD2d 588 ).

1997Inasmuch as the record does not suggest that the defendant’s presence at the sidebar questioning would have been of no benefit, his exclusion from this material stage of the trial necessitates that he receive a new trial (see, People v Maher, supra; People v Roman, supra; People v Vasquez, 218 AD2d 766 ; People v McMichael, 216 AD2d 588 ).

1997Inasmuch as the record does not suggest that the defendant’s presence at the sidebar questioning would have been of no benefit, his exclusion from this material stage of the trial necessitates that he receive a new trial (see, People v Maher, supra; People v Roman, supra; People v Vasquez, 218 AD2d 766 ; People v McMichael, 216 AD2d 588 ).

1985In addition, on several occasions the prosecutrix attempted to indicate that defendant had been extensively involved in crimes other than the ones for which he was on trial (see, e.g., People v Richards, 78 AD2d 664 ).

1985This error was exacerbated when the court overruled defense counsel’s objection, thereby legitimizing the argument (see, e.g., People v Ash wal, 39 NY2d 105 ; People v Rivers, 96 AD2d 874 ).

1984CPL 60.20 (subd 2) provides in pertinent part, that: “A child less than twelve years old may. not testify under oath unless the court is satisfied that he understands the nature of an oath.” Although a trial court is granted a wide degree of latitude in determining whether to accept the sworn testimony of a child less than 12 years old, it is crucial to note that “under CPL 60.20 (subd 2), a rebuttable presumption exists that an infant less than 12 years old is not competent to be sworn” and that “it must * * * be clear that he knows, understands and appreciates the nature of an oath before th

1980(See, e.g., People v Schaaff, 71 AD2d 630; People v Dennis, 62 AD2d 1022 .) Unlike People v Castillo ( 16 AD2d 235 , affd 12 NY2d 732 ), nothing in defense counsel’s summation here invited this sort of comment from the prosecutor.

1980(See, e.g., People v Schaaff, 71 AD2d 630; People v Dennis, 62 AD2d 1022 .) Unlike People v Castillo ( 16 AD2d 235 , affd 12 NY2d 732 ), nothing in defense counsel’s summation here invited this sort of comment from the prosecutor.

1980(See, e.g., People v Schaaff, 71 AD2d 630; People v Dennis, 62 AD2d 1022 .) Unlike People v Castillo ( 16 AD2d 235 , affd 12 NY2d 732 ), nothing in defense counsel’s summation here invited this sort of comment from the prosecutor.

1980(See, e.g., People v Schaaff, 71 AD2d 630; People v Dennis, 62 AD2d 1022 .) Unlike People v Castillo ( 16 AD2d 235 , affd 12 NY2d 732 ), nothing in defense counsel’s summation here invited this sort of comment from the prosecutor.

1902Matter of Grandin ( 61 Hun, 219 ); Matter of Jones ( 51 App. Div. 420 ); Matter of Beyea ( 10 Misc.

1902Matter of Grandin ( 61 Hun, 219 ); Matter of Jones ( 51 App. Div. 420 ); Matter of Beyea ( 10 Misc.

1902Matter of Grandin ( 61 Hun, 219 ); Matter of Jones ( 51 App. Div. 420 ); Matter of Beyea ( 10 Misc.

1844In Vans v. Higginson, 10 Mass. 29 , it was insisted that the plaintiff was not barred because he was at no time within the state, while the defendant was there after the return of the latter, but the court overruled the claim.