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14 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1894–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crawford v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2022Thus, we presume the trial court overruled defense counsel’s hearsay objection. 9 We also note that Shade did not include a Confrontation Clause claim relating to Ferreiro’s testimony in his motion for new trial or the pro se addendum to the motion. 19 Court held that the Confrontation Clause demands that all testimonial evidence be excluded unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross- examination.” March, 216 S.W.3d at 665 (emphasis in original) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)). 2022“Crawford did not offer a precise definition of ‘testimonial statements,’” but “[i]t discussed how testimonial statements are made by witnesses who ‘bear testimony’ and that ‘testimony’ is defined as ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’” Id. at 666 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 68 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Marchgreen1 sentence2022Thus, we presume the trial court overruled defense counsel’s hearsay objection. 9 We also note that Shade did not include a Confrontation Clause claim relating to Ferreiro’s testimony in his motion for new trial or the pro se addendum to the motion. 19 Court held that the Confrontation Clause demands that all testimonial evidence be excluded unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross- examination.” March, 216 S.W.3d at 665 (emphasis in original) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mooregreen1 sentence2005State v. Moore, 88 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Parkergreen1 sentence1995In State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo. banc 1992), decided prior to defendant’s trial, the Missouri Supreme Court ob served that a motion to quash the jury panel does not redress “the discrimination endured by the excluded venirepersons ... since they remain wrongfully excluded from jury service.” Thus, the proper remedy is to quash the strikes and permit those venirepersons discriminatorily stricken to sit on the jury if they otherwise would. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Leonardgreen1 sentence1981Section 546.260, RSMo 1978, provides that a criminal defendant who elects to testify at his trial, “shall be liable to cross-examination, as to any matter referred to in his examination in chief .... ” Although the statute has been interpreted so that the state is allowed broad latitude to cross-examine, in detail, as to all matters within the “fair purview” of the direct ex amination, see, e. g., State v. Leonard, 606 S.W.2d 403, 410-11 (Mo.App.1980), the statute still imposes some limit on cross-examination. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wraggsgreen1 sentence1981In numerous Missouri cases, no error has been found where the trial court overruled a challenge for cause to a venireman who initially expressed a tendency to believe a police officer over other witnesses, but who upon further questioning indicated an ability to evaluate all testimony by the same standard and accord both sides a fair trial, e.g., Dickerson, supra at 192-93 ; State v. Pitchford, 556 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Mo.App.1977); State v. Wraggs, 512 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Mo.App.1974). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pitchfordgreen1 sentence1981In numerous Missouri cases, no error has been found where the trial court overruled a challenge for cause to a venireman who initially expressed a tendency to believe a police officer over other witnesses, but who upon further questioning indicated an ability to evaluate all testimony by the same standard and accord both sides a fair trial, e.g., Dickerson, supra at 192-93 ; State v. Pitchford, 556 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Mo.App.1977); State v. Wraggs, 512 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Mo.App.1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ealy
green
2 sentences1992Ealy, 624 S.W.2d at 493 . 1983In Ealy the court stated: “In numerous Missouri cases, no error has been found where the trial court overruled a challenge for cause to a venireman who initially expressed a tendency to believe a police officer over other witnesses, but who upon further questioning indicated an ability to evaluate all testimony by the same standard and accord both sides a fair trial ...” 624 S.W.2d at 493 . | 2 | 1983–1992 |
State v. Neff
green
2 sentences2007In Neff, 978 S.W.2d at 342 , following an objection by defense counsel, the State remarked to the trial court, in the presence of the jury, that the defendant “didn’t take the stand.... ” The trial court overruled defense counsel’s request for a mistrial and admonished the jury to disregard the State’s comment. 2007Id. at 344 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Payne v. Tennessee
green
2 sentences2000In that case, the state conceded that the victim’s family members’ testimony concerning the appropriate sentence was inadmissible under Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). 2000In that case, the state conceded that the victim’s family members’ testimony concerning the appropriate sentence was inadmissible under Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2000Appellant argues that when the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection to this testimony, the court “made clear that it would consider improper and inflammatory evidence in deciding whether to sentence [appellant] to die.” Appellant’s position is foreclosed by State v. Taylor, 944 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. banc 1997). 2000Appellant argues that when the trial court overruled defense counsel's objection to this testimony, the court "made clear that it would consider improper and inflammatory evidence in deciding whether to sentence [appellant] to die." Appellant's position is foreclosed by State v. Taylor, 944 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. banc 1997). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Dickerson
green
1 sentence1981In numerous Missouri cases, no error has been found where the trial court overruled a challenge for cause to a venireman who initially expressed a tendency to believe a police officer over other witnesses, but who upon further questioning indicated an ability to evaluate all testimony by the same standard and accord both sides a fair trial, e.g., Dickerson, supra at 192-93 ; State v. Pitchford, 556 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Mo.App.1977); State v. Wraggs, 512 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Mo.App.1974). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Cuckovich
green
1 sentence1975This also presents a situation where the trial court has wide discretion, State v. Cuckovich, 485 S.W.2d 16 (Mo.banc 1972), and our review discloses no abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
State v. Berstein
green
1 sentence1974The court in Berstein, supra, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial because the prosecution prevented defense counsel from interviewing a witness who was being held in jail and thereafter the trial court overruled the defense motion to interview the witness. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Stinde v. Blesch
green
1 sentence1912“No Sir.” The objection to the question above set out- ought to have been sustained for'the question did call for a conclusion. [Stinde v. Blesch, 42 Mo. App. 578 .] Four instructions on part of defendant were given, all of which are objected to. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
State v. Schnettler
green
1 sentence1904The case of State v. Brown, 181 Mo. 192 ; State v. Schnettler, 181 Mo. 173 , and State v. Collins, 181 Mo. 235 , in so far as the information in this case is concerned, are decisive of this, and the information is invalid. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
State v. Lewis
green
1 sentence1904The case of State v. Brown, 181 Mo. 192 ; State v. Schnettler, 181 Mo. 173 , and State v. Collins, 181 Mo. 235 , in so far as the information in this case is concerned, are decisive of this, and the information is invalid. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
State v. Brown
green
1 sentence1904The case of State v. Brown, 181 Mo. 192 ; State v. Schnettler, 181 Mo. 173 , and State v. Collins, 181 Mo. 235 , in so far as the information in this case is concerned, are decisive of this, and the information is invalid. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Lacey v. Giboney
neutral
1 sentence1894The court overruled the exception on the principle that, “so long as the sale is so far incomplete that the purchaser may look to the seller for further action, so as to perfect the sale, the seller has sufficient interest to maintain an action for possession.” Pace v. Pierce 49 Mo. 393 ; Lacy v. Giboney, 36 Mo. 320 . | 1 | 1894–1894 |
Pace v. Pierce
neutral
1 sentence1894The court overruled the exception on the principle that, “so long as the sale is so far incomplete that the purchaser may look to the seller for further action, so as to perfect the sale, the seller has sufficient interest to maintain an action for possession.” Pace v. Pierce 49 Mo. 393 ; Lacy v. Giboney, 36 Mo. 320 . | 1 | 1894–1894 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.