overruled defense in California

2024Melendez acknowledges the prosecutor could comment on his alleged flight from the scene, but contends the prosecutor’s reference to 3 Melendez referenced defense counsel’s objections to the peremptory challenge under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 and the Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Pen.

2013Applicable Legal Principles (Batson/Wheeler) "Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based on group bias, such as race or ethnicity." (People v. 7 The probation officer's report states Alphonso is "White." 13 Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 582 (Davis), citing Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 97 & Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.) A rebuttable presumption exists that a prosecutor has exercised his or her peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner, and the burden is on the objecting defendant to demonstrate imperm

2024Melendez acknowledges the prosecutor could comment on his alleged flight from the scene, but contends the prosecutor’s reference to 3 Melendez referenced defense counsel’s objections to the peremptory challenge under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 and the Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Pen.

2013Applicable Legal Principles (Batson/Wheeler) "Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based on group bias, such as race or ethnicity." (People v. 7 The probation officer's report states Alphonso is "White." 13 Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 582 (Davis), citing Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 97 & Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.) A rebuttable presumption exists that a prosecutor has exercised his or her peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner, and the burden is on the objecting defendant to demonstrate imperm

2022(Id. at p. 847.) “Nothing in this record indicates that an objection would have been futile.” (People v. Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 674 .) In any event, as with Reyes’s first appellate claim of error, Officer Puryear’s rebuttal testimony must be reviewed in context.

2021(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667 .) When the court overruled defense counsel’s objection, it noted the prosecutor had “commented on the evidence, not the law.” (Italics added.) Even assuming the jury interpreted the prosecutor’s comment as stating a legal definition, the court directed the jury to follow the jury instructions, not the “attorneys’ comments on the law.” 3 Sommer’s reliance on People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800 , overruled on another ground in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13 , is misplaced.

2021(People v. Fernandez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540, 564 .) We evaluate prejudice under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 when federal rights are implicated, and under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 when only state law issues are involved.

2015Because the prosecutor’s two questions were not sufficiently focused on the period exclusively before defendant unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent (post-arrest, pre-Miranda and post- Miranda), the admission of the testimony constitutes error in violation of defendant’s federal constitutional Fifth Amendment right to remain silent (see Salinas v. Texas (2013) 570 U.S. __ , ___ [ 186 L.Ed.2d 376 , 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 ] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.); Tom II, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 1225, 1235-1236) and his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial (see Doyle v. Ohio (197

2016(People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 582 .) The behaviors of gang members are properly the subject of expert opinion when these are counterintuitively beyond common experience.

2016(People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 582 .) The behaviors of gang members are properly the subject of expert opinion when these are counterintuitively beyond common experience.

2026Are you literally going to live your life the same?” The court overruled defense counsel’s objection. “[A] prosecutor enjoys wide latitude during closing argument to comment on the evidence or draw reasonable inferences from it; misconduct arises when the prosecution uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the trier of fact or infects the trial with unfairness sufficient to render the subsequent conviction a denial of due process.” (Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 79.) Forceful argument is not misconduct. “ ‘A prosecutor may vigorously argue his case, marshalling the facts and argu

2026Are you literally going to live your life the same?” The court overruled defense counsel’s objection. “[A] prosecutor enjoys wide latitude during closing argument to comment on the evidence or draw reasonable inferences from it; misconduct arises when the prosecution uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the trier of fact or infects the trial with unfairness sufficient to render the subsequent conviction a denial of due process.” (Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 79.) Forceful argument is not misconduct. “ ‘A prosecutor may vigorously argue his case, marshalling the facts and argu

2025The trial court overruled defense counsel’s hearsay objection on this point, and Hernandez fails to explain why that ruling was erroneous. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608–609 (Jameson).) Hernandez has not met his burden here.

2025In People v. Cowan (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1152 , the prosecutor told “the jury that the presumption of innocence is in place ‘only when the charges are read’ and that the ‘presumption is gone’ thereafter.” (Id. at p. 1159.) Here, in contrast, the prosecutor made no such statements, and in fact reminded the jury that the burden of proof was “on [him].” In People v. Woods (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106 , the prosecutor argued to the jury that “defense counsel was ‘obligated’ to put on evidence,” (id. at p. 113) and the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection that “she was ‘not obligated to d

2025In People v. Cowan (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1152 , the prosecutor told “the jury that the presumption of innocence is in place ‘only when the charges are read’ and that the ‘presumption is gone’ thereafter.” (Id. at p. 1159.) Here, in contrast, the prosecutor made no such statements, and in fact reminded the jury that the burden of proof was “on [him].” In People v. Woods (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106 , the prosecutor argued to the jury that “defense counsel was ‘obligated’ to put on evidence,” (id. at p. 113) and the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection that “she was ‘not obligated to d

2024GRIFFIN/DOYLE ERROR During closing arguments, when explaining and addressing the flight instruction, the prosecutor stated that Melendez failed to “stick around and talk to the cops.” The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection to this comment under Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609 and Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. 610 .

2024GRIFFIN/DOYLE ERROR During closing arguments, when explaining and addressing the flight instruction, the prosecutor stated that Melendez failed to “stick around and talk to the cops.” The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection to this comment under Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609 and Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. 610 .

2024Under the Watson9 standard, erroneous admission of evidence constitutes reversible error “only if a reasonable probability exists that the jury would have reached a 9 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson). 20. different result had this evidence been excluded.” (People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 251 .) A. Ankenman As to Ankenman, appellant contends he gave an improper opinion by, responding to the prosecutor’s question regarding a still from the gas station security footage, “Do you recall identifying one of these individuals to Detective Mayo as the person that you believe

2023Law “The permissible scope of discretion in formulating terms of juvenile probation is … greater than that allowed for adults.” (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910 .) “ ‘ “A juvenile court enjoys broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation for the purpose of rehabilitation and may even impose a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper so long as it is tailored to specifically meet the needs of the juvenile.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The reasonableness and propriety of the imposed condition is measured not just by the circumstances of the current of

2022(See Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1002 ; Marquez, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 575-576.) In addition, although the court overruled defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s first “muddy the facts” comment by noting that the comment was merely argument, the court subsequently reminded the jury that it had been instructed with CALCRIM No. 222 and that nothing the attorneys said during closing argument was evidence.

2022(See Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1002 ; Marquez, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 575-576.) In addition, although the court overruled defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s first “muddy the facts” comment by noting that the comment was merely argument, the court subsequently reminded the jury that it had been instructed with CALCRIM No. 222 and that nothing the attorneys said during closing argument was evidence.

2022(See People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1077 [prosecutor may comment on state of the evidence]; People v. Jasso (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1354 , 1370– 1371 [same].) The prosecutor also discussed, during closing, defendant’s jailhouse calls.

2022It’s a very important part of being able to monitor drug usage and particularly marijuana usage.’ ” (Ibid.) On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled the electronics search condition was not reasonably related to future criminality because “the burden it impose[d] on [the juvenile defendant’s] privacy [was] substantially disproportionate to the countervailing interests of furthering his rehabilitation and protecting society.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1119 .) The Court determined the “sweeping” condition imposed a “very heavy burden on [the] privacy” interests of the juvenile defendant, req

2021(Wood, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 807 .) The testimony was given after the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objections under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.

2021Relying upon People v. McCoy (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 974 at page 981 (McCoy), the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection and denied his request for Sanchez to be present during the readback of testimony.

2021(People v. Fernandez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540, 564 .) We evaluate prejudice under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 when federal rights are implicated, and under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 when only state law issues are involved.