rights waiver in Oklahoma

1978Nor, any evidence showing the ability of his mother or legal custodian to properly advise him." Similarly, in Layton v. State, Okl.Cr., 551 P.2d 270 (1976), this Court reversed a conviction because of an accumulation of errors, one of which was that, "The record does not reflect that defendant was given the opportunity for private discussion with her mother concerning the ramifications of executing the rights waiver." See also, People in Interest of L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1 , 513 P.2d 1069 (1973), quoted by this Court in J.T.P. v. State, supra. See also, Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492 , 372 A

1978Nor, any evidence showing the ability of his mother or legal custodian to properly advise him.” Similarly, in Layton v. State, Okl.Cr., 551 P.2d 270 (1976), this Court reversed a conviction because of an accumulation of errors, one of which was that, “The record does not reflect that defendant was given the opportunity for private discussion with her mother concerning the ramifications of executing the rights waiver.” See also, People in Interest of L.

1978Nor, any evidence showing the ability of his mother or legal custodian to properly advise him." Similarly, in Layton v. State, Okl.Cr., 551 P.2d 270 (1976), this Court reversed a conviction because of an accumulation of errors, one of which was that, "The record does not reflect that defendant was given the opportunity for private discussion with her mother concerning the ramifications of executing the rights waiver." See also, People in Interest of L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1 , 513 P.2d 1069 (1973), quoted by this Court in J.T.P. v. State, supra. See also, Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492 , 372 A

1978Nor, any evidence showing the ability of his mother or legal custodian to properly advise him." Similarly, in Layton v. State, Okl.Cr., 551 P.2d 270 (1976), this Court reversed a conviction because of an accumulation of errors, one of which was that, "The record does not reflect that defendant was given the opportunity for private discussion with her mother concerning the ramifications of executing the rights waiver." See also, People in Interest of L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1 , 513 P.2d 1069 (1973), quoted by this Court in J.T.P. v. State, supra. See also, Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492 , 372 A

1975When the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, i.e. see McHenry v. United States, 10 Cir., 308 F.2d 700 , it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning." (at page 308) The law among the circuits and state courts is contradictory on this question. [3] Today we reverse our holding enunciated in Reese v. State, Okl.Cr., 462 P.2d 331 (1969) and Schorr v. State, Okl.Cr., 499 P.2d 450 (1972), insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion, and adopt the reasoning in Wright v. North Caroli

1975When the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, i. e. see McHenry v. United States, 10 Cir., 308 F.2d 700 , it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning.” (at page 308) The law among the circuits and state courts is contradictory on this question. 3 Today we reverse our holding enunciated in Reese v. State, Okl.Cr., 462 P.2d 331 (1969) and Schorr v. State, Okl.Cr., 499 P.2d 450 (1972), insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion, and adopt the reasoning in Wright v. North Carolin

1997This case is clearly distinguishable, since Le told Bemo and Cook he understood his Miranda rights and the search waivers were clearly explained (see Proposition II). [10] 22 O.S.1991, § 1175.4(A). [11] 730 P.2d 7, 8-9 (Okl.Cr.1986). [12] Castro v. State, 871 P.2d 433 (Okl.Cr.1994) (defendant waived hearing by entering guilty plea).

1996Prior to the admission of Appellant’s statement into evidence, a hearing was held in accordance with the mandates of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), so that the trial judge could determine whether the statement had been voluntarily given.

1996Prior to the admission of Appellant’s statement into evidence, a hearing was held in accordance with the mandates of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), so that the trial judge could determine whether the statement had been voluntarily given.

1990However, the Supreme Court made very clear that this is not dispositive. "[T]he Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484 , 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85 .

1990However, the Supreme Court made very clear that this is not dispositive. "[T]he Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484 , 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85 .

1987Appellants now argue that Mansfield’s refusal to talk with the Collins-ville police barred the subsequent questioning and confession in that it clearly violates Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

1987Appellants now argue that Mansfield’s refusal to talk with the Collins-ville police barred the subsequent questioning and confession in that it clearly violates Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

1983In Moles v. State, 520 P.2d 822 (Okl.Cr.1974), this Court adopted the rule that “self-induced intoxication, short of mania, or such an impairment of the will and mind as to make the person confessing unconscious of the meaning of his words, will not render a confession inadmissible, but goes only to the weight to be accorded to it.” The testimony at the suppression hearing by the police officers was that appellant was advised of his Miranda rights on two separate occasions, indicated he understood those rights and signed a rights waiver.

1978Nor, any evidence showing the ability of his mother or legal custodian to properly advise him." Similarly, in Layton v. State, Okl.Cr., 551 P.2d 270 (1976), this Court reversed a conviction because of an accumulation of errors, one of which was that, "The record does not reflect that defendant was given the opportunity for private discussion with her mother concerning the ramifications of executing the rights waiver." See also, People in Interest of L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1 , 513 P.2d 1069 (1973), quoted by this Court in J.T.P. v. State, supra. See also, Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492 , 372 A

1978Nor, any evidence showing the ability of his mother or legal custodian to properly advise him." Similarly, in Layton v. State, Okl.Cr., 551 P.2d 270 (1976), this Court reversed a conviction because of an accumulation of errors, one of which was that, "The record does not reflect that defendant was given the opportunity for private discussion with her mother concerning the ramifications of executing the rights waiver." See also, People in Interest of L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1 , 513 P.2d 1069 (1973), quoted by this Court in J.T.P. v. State, supra. See also, Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492 , 372 A

1976Defendant maintains that prior to his oral confession he signed a particular statement, the contents of which are reflected in the record, which in part stated: “[W]e have no way of giving you a lawyer but one will be appointed for you if you wish one if and when you go to court . . . .” (Tr. 67) The defendant urges this language is patently insufficient and is an incomplete statement of the warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, supra. We first observe the constitutional sufficiency of a rights waiver containing the above quoted warning was before this Court recently in Rowbotham v. State,

1975When the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, i.e. see McHenry v. United States, 10 Cir., 308 F.2d 700 , it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning." (at page 308) The law among the circuits and state courts is contradictory on this question. [3] Today we reverse our holding enunciated in Reese v. State, Okl.Cr., 462 P.2d 331 (1969) and Schorr v. State, Okl.Cr., 499 P.2d 450 (1972), insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion, and adopt the reasoning in Wright v. North Caroli

1975When the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, i. e. see McHenry v. United States, 10 Cir., 308 F.2d 700 , it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning.” (at page 308) The law among the circuits and state courts is contradictory on this question. 3 Today we reverse our holding enunciated in Reese v. State, Okl.Cr., 462 P.2d 331 (1969) and Schorr v. State, Okl.Cr., 499 P.2d 450 (1972), insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion, and adopt the reasoning in Wright v. North Carolin

1975When the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, i.e. see McHenry v. United States, 10 Cir., 308 F.2d 700 , it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning." (at page 308) The law among the circuits and state courts is contradictory on this question. [3] Today we reverse our holding enunciated in Reese v. State, Okl.Cr., 462 P.2d 331 (1969) and Schorr v. State, Okl.Cr., 499 P.2d 450 (1972), insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion, and adopt the reasoning in Wright v. North Caroli

1975When the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, i. e. see McHenry v. United States, 10 Cir., 308 F.2d 700 , it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning.” (at page 308) The law among the circuits and state courts is contradictory on this question. 3 Today we reverse our holding enunciated in Reese v. State, Okl.Cr., 462 P.2d 331 (1969) and Schorr v. State, Okl.Cr., 499 P.2d 450 (1972), insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion, and adopt the reasoning in Wright v. North Carolin

1975When the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, i.e. see McHenry v. United States, 10 Cir., 308 F.2d 700 , it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning." (at page 308) The law among the circuits and state courts is contradictory on this question. [3] Today we reverse our holding enunciated in Reese v. State, Okl.Cr., 462 P.2d 331 (1969) and Schorr v. State, Okl.Cr., 499 P.2d 450 (1972), insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion, and adopt the reasoning in Wright v. North Caroli

1975When the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, i. e. see McHenry v. United States, 10 Cir., 308 F.2d 700 , it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning.” (at page 308) The law among the circuits and state courts is contradictory on this question. 3 Today we reverse our holding enunciated in Reese v. State, Okl.Cr., 462 P.2d 331 (1969) and Schorr v. State, Okl.Cr., 499 P.2d 450 (1972), insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion, and adopt the reasoning in Wright v. North Carolin

1974This Court dealt with a similar argument in Bell v. State, Okl.Cr., 512 P.2d 226 (1973), in which the defendant, prior to arrest, was given his Miranda rights and at that time executed a written waiver of his rights.

1928In the ease of Argentoes v. Fidelity Building & Loan Ass’n, 127 Okla, 183, 260 Pac. 55 , it was held that this correction may be made after the time in which an appeal may be perfected has expired, at any time before the case is finally disposed of by this court, which provisions and rules afford ample opportunity to preserve the rights of a hearing upon appeal, where by mistake or omission they have failed to present a proper record to this court for review.