13 New York opinions name it 5 courts 1883–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
New York Ex Rel. Vacco v. Mid Hudson Medical Group, P.C.green1 sentence2007Group, P.C., 877 F Supp 143, 146 [SD NY 1995] [citation omitted] [allowing Attorney General to bring common-law action to enforce the rights of hearing impaired patients where governing statutes did not provide standing for state attorneys general]). | 1 | 1 |
Gallegos v. Coloradogreen1 sentence1969(Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U. S. 49, 54; Miranda v. Arizona, supra.) Accordingly, the court grants the defense motion to suppress the written confession since there was no waiver voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly made here by the respondent and under the Miranda case (supra), there was no effective waiver of the respondent’s rights under his privilege against self incrimination. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1998He advised her of all the rights and warnings required by Miranda v Arizona ( 384 US 436 [1966]), obtained her verbal response that she understood what she was being told and had her initial a sheet of paper which set forth in writing the warnings and rights. 1981Respondent contends: (1) that the petitioner has not shown compliance with the Miranda prerequisites to admissibility in that the police officers failed to evaluate and to establish respondent’s capacity to understand before advising him pursuant to Miranda v Arizona ( 384 US 436 , supra), (2) that under New York law, a juvenile’s right to counsel is more extensive than that of an adult and hence there could be no waiver of that right under the instant circumstances, and (3) that there was no voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver because respondent lacked the ability to comprehend the conc | 3 | 1969–1998 |
Spears v. . Mayor, Etc., City of N.Y.
green
2 sentences1889Practically the owner had nothing to transfer, save, as was said in Spears v. Mayor, etc., 87 N. Y. 359 , the ‘ right to compensation,’ which was ‘ a mere chose in action,’—a right to the market value of his land on the 5th day of April, 1873, neither more nor less. 1883Practically the owner had nothing to transfer save, as was said in Spears v. The Mayor ( 87 N. Y., 359 ), the “ right to compensation ” which was “ a mere chose in action ” a right to the market value of his land on the 5th day of April, 1873, neither more nor less. | 2 | 1883–1889 |
Orphan v. Carol Management Corp.
green
1 sentence1993On the basis of the identity of issues in the New York and New Jersey actions and substantial identity of the parties (see, Morgulas v Yudell Realty, 161 AD2d 211, 213 ), the fact that the New Jersey action, in which discovery had already proceeded, had been commenced six months prior to the New York action, and that plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the New Jersey action on the basis of forum non conveniens had been denied by the New Jersey court, we find no abuse of discretion (see, Chrysler Capital Corp. v Citibank, 186 AD2d 393, 394 ) in the court’s dismissal on the basis of a prior action pen | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Citibank, N. A.
neutral
1 sentence1993On the basis of the identity of issues in the New York and New Jersey actions and substantial identity of the parties (see, Morgulas v Yudell Realty, 161 AD2d 211, 213 ), the fact that the New Jersey action, in which discovery had already proceeded, had been commenced six months prior to the New York action, and that plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the New Jersey action on the basis of forum non conveniens had been denied by the New Jersey court, we find no abuse of discretion (see, Chrysler Capital Corp. v Citibank, 186 AD2d 393, 394 ) in the court’s dismissal on the basis of a prior action pen | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Schonfeld
green
1 sentence1992Although the People argued that the limitation period was merely directory, the court held that the plain language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that its provisions are mandatory and accordingly, where the People have not taken timely steps to perfect their rights under "a bail forfeiture order, their ability to enforce that order may itself be forfeited.” (People v Schonfeld, supra, at 326 .) Similarly rejected was the People’s argument that, although they did not take the proper steps within the 60-day period specified in the statute, they nevertheless should be permitt | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Hopt v. People of Territory of Utah
green
1 sentence1988Hopt v Utah ( 110 US 574 ) and Thompson v Missouri ( 171 US 380 ), relied on by the majority, also employed the substantial rights analysis, but determined that the evidentiary changes at issue there were not ex post facto because they did not deprive the defense of any substantial rights. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Kring v. Missouri
red
1 sentence1988Kring v Missouri ( 107 US 221 , supra) held that a change in an evidentiary rule which eliminates a complete defense to a criminal charge deprives the defendant of a substantial right and is ex post facto if retroactively applied. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Thompson v. Missouri
green
1 sentence1988Hopt v Utah ( 110 US 574 ) and Thompson v Missouri ( 171 US 380 ), relied on by the majority, also employed the substantial rights analysis, but determined that the evidentiary changes at issue there were not ex post facto because they did not deprive the defense of any substantial rights. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. . Sprague
green
1 sentence1951Pro., § 542; and see People v. Sprague, 217 N. Y. 373, 379 .) In the circumstances of record in this case, we regard as innocuous to the defendant’s rights the error which prompts a majority of the court to favor reversal of the judgment of conviction and a new trial. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Commercial Trust Co. of NJ v. Miller
green
1 sentence1946The fact that hostilities have ceased does not affect the statutory powers of the custodian or the constitutional validity of the statutes which grant those powers (Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S. 51 , supra; In re Miller, 281 F. 764 , appeal dismissed sub nom. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
In re Miller
green
1 sentence1946The fact that hostilities have ceased does not affect the statutory powers of the custodian or the constitutional validity of the statutes which grant those powers (Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S. 51 , supra; In re Miller, 281 F. 764 , appeal dismissed sub nom. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
In re the Probate of the Last Will & Testament of Nelson
neutral
1 sentence1929In Matter of Nelson ( 89 Misc. 25 ) the court, in dismissing objections filed by a person whose only interest was that of legatee, said (at p. 29): “ This court is concerned only in hearing and determining the rights of those who claim to have an interest in property where there has been a violation of some right. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
House v. . Lockwood
green
1 sentence1902If, however, these findings are to be considered as made upon immaterial issues (House v. Lockwood, 137 N. Y. 259 ); or if they are not to be deemed controlling on account of the stipulation as to a conclusion of law concerning the effect of the record which is before us, and if the respondents are precluded from asserting the rights which they claim by virtue of these findings, still, we think other facts disclosed by this record indicate quite clearly that the assessors were grossly negligent or acted in bad faith. | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.