rights doctrine in California

2018Co. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 17 , 27-29, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 359 .) Guerrero argues that, in determining the preclusive effect of the judgment in the Federal Action, the trial court erroneously applied the California doctrine of primary rights.

2018Co. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 17 , 27-29, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 359 .) Guerrero argues that, in determining the preclusive effect of the judgment in the Federal Action, the trial court erroneously applied the California doctrine of primary rights.

2023(Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 804 (Boeken).)” (Guerrero, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1099 , fn. omitted.) Adopting the same approach the trial court took, the parties analyze the claim preclusion issue presented in this case under the primary rights doctrine.

2019Instead, a "primary right" is defined by "the plaintiff's right to be free from the particular injury suffered." ( Crowley , at p. 682, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 386 , 881 P.2d 1083 .) As a general matter, "the same primary right" is at stake "[w]hen two actions involving the same parties seek compensation for the same harm." ( Boeken , at p. 798, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 806 , 230 P.3d 342 .) Splitting a PAGA claim into two claims-a claim for underpaid wages and a claim for the $50/$100 per-pay-period penalties PAGA incorporates from section 558-runs afoul of the primary rights doctrine because it *672 impermiss

2025The difference between a “claim” (in federal law) and a “cause of action” (in California law) is not just a matter of semantics. “ ‘[W]hile federal law defines a “claim” for purposes of claim preclusion using a transactional test [citation], California law uses the older pleading term “cause of action” and defines it according to the common law doctrine of primary rights.’ ” (LaCour v. Marshalls of California, LLC (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1172 , 1190; see Guerrero v. 7 Carpenter is a case in which the high court rejected the State of Oklahoma’s attempt to evade a federal property tax exemption on

2025The difference between a “claim” (in federal law) and a “cause of action” (in California law) is not just a matter of semantics. “ ‘[W]hile federal law defines a “claim” for purposes of claim preclusion using a transactional test [citation], California law uses the older pleading term “cause of action” and defines it according to the common law doctrine of primary rights.’ ” (LaCour v. Marshalls of California, LLC (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1172 , 1190; see Guerrero v. 7 Carpenter is a case in which the high court rejected the state of Oklahoma’s attempt to evade a federal property exemption on tri

2017Rather, injuries may encompass the same primary rights"]; Grudt, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 584 , 86 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 468 P.2d 825 , quoting Weinstock , supra , 224 Cal.App.2d at p. 234 , 36 Cal.Rptr. 537 [primary right was "the same ... although its statement now appears in terms of fraud"]; McCoy v. Gustafson (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 56 , 105, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 37 [under the primary rights doctrine, "the essence of a cause of action is the invasion of a plaintiff's primary right, not the number of acts and omissions that constitute the invasion"].) The majority complains authority is lacking where rel

2017Rather, injuries may encompass the same primary rights"]; Grudt, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 584 , 86 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 468 P.2d 825 , quoting Weinstock , supra , 224 Cal.App.2d at p. 234 , 36 Cal.Rptr. 537 [primary right was "the same ... although its statement now appears in terms of fraud"]; McCoy v. Gustafson (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 56 , 105, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 37 [under the primary rights doctrine, "the essence of a cause of action is the invasion of a plaintiff's primary right, not the number of acts and omissions that constitute the invasion"].) The majority complains authority is lacking where rel

2017(See Amaral, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200 , 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 [an amendment seeking new damages based on new legal theory relates back to original complaint]; Lamont v. Wolfe (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 375 , 378, 190 Cal.Rptr. 874 [wrongful *187 death claim, which did not exist at time of filing of complaint because decedent was alive, related back; "it is the sameness of the facts rather than the rights or obligations arising from those facts that is determinative"].) I would also conclude the original complaint and the SAC also involve the same instrumentality: Thomas's violation of the sto

2017(See Amaral, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200 , 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 [an amendment seeking new damages based on new legal theory relates back to original complaint]; Lamont v. Wolfe (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 375 , 378, 190 Cal.Rptr. 874 [wrongful *187 death claim, which did not exist at time of filing of complaint because decedent was alive, related back; "it is the sameness of the facts rather than the rights or obligations arising from those facts that is determinative"].) I would also conclude the original complaint and the SAC also involve the same instrumentality: Thomas's violation of the sto

2017(See Amaral, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200 , 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 [an amendment seeking new damages based on new legal theory relates back to original complaint]; Lamont v. Wolfe (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 375 , 378, 190 Cal.Rptr. 874 [wrongful *187 death claim, which did not exist at time of filing of complaint because decedent was alive, related back; "it is the sameness of the facts rather than the rights or obligations arising from those facts that is determinative"].) I would also conclude the original complaint and the SAC also involve the same instrumentality: Thomas's violation of the sto

2017(See Amaral, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200 , 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 [an amendment seeking new damages based on new legal theory relates back to original complaint]; Lamont v. Wolfe (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 375 , 378, 190 Cal.Rptr. 874 [wrongful *187 death claim, which did not exist at time of filing of complaint because decedent was alive, related back; "it is the sameness of the facts rather than the rights or obligations arising from those facts that is determinative"].) I would also conclude the original complaint and the SAC also involve the same instrumentality: Thomas's violation of the sto

2017Rather, injuries may encompass the same primary rights"]; Grudt, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 584 , 86 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 468 P.2d 825 , quoting Weinstock , supra , 224 Cal.App.2d at p. 234 , 36 Cal.Rptr. 537 [primary right was "the same ... although its statement now appears in terms of fraud"]; McCoy v. Gustafson (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 56 , 105, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 37 [under the primary rights doctrine, "the essence of a cause of action is the invasion of a plaintiff's primary right, not the number of acts and omissions that constitute the invasion"].) The majority complains authority is lacking where rel

2017Rather, injuries may encompass the same primary rights"]; Grudt, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 584 , 86 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 468 P.2d 825 , quoting Weinstock , supra , 224 Cal.App.2d at p. 234 , 36 Cal.Rptr. 537 [primary right was "the same ... although its statement now appears in terms of fraud"]; McCoy v. Gustafson (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 56 , 105, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 37 [under the primary rights doctrine, "the essence of a cause of action is the invasion of a plaintiff's primary right, not the number of acts and omissions that constitute the invasion"].) The majority complains authority is lacking where rel

2018(See Packer , supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169-170, 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 649 [declining to decide continued vitality of Kempley holding]; see also People v. Superior Court (Mouchaourab) (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 403 , 429, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 829 ["In light of the development of an indicted defendant's rights to challenge the indictment and Supreme Court authority ..., the two early cases relied on by the People have limited vitality today"].) "The holding of the majority in Johnson was based on statutory grounds, namely the court's interpretation of section 939.7.

2018(See Packer , supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169-170, 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 649 [declining to decide continued vitality of Kempley holding]; see also People v. Superior Court (Mouchaourab) (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 403 , 429, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 829 ["In light of the development of an indicted defendant's rights to challenge the indictment and Supreme Court authority ..., the two early cases relied on by the People have limited vitality today"].) "The holding of the majority in Johnson was based on statutory grounds, namely the court's interpretation of section 939.7.

2025As the California Supreme Court has explained, “civil penalties recovered on the state’s behalf are intended to remediate present violations and deter future ones, not to redress employees’ injuries.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 986 .) This is why, prior to the high 8 The California Supreme Court has confined the doctrine of primary rights to a “ ‘fairly narrow field of application’ ” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 395 ) and has acknowledged longstanding criticism of its sometimes uncertain scope (id. at p. 395; see 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2025) Pleading,

2025As the California Supreme Court has explained, “civil penalties recovered on the state’s behalf are intended to remediate present violations and deter future ones, not to redress employees’ injuries.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 986 .) This is why, prior to the high 8 The California Supreme Court has confined the doctrine of primary rights to a “ ‘fairly narrow field of application’ ” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 395 ) and has acknowledged longstanding criticism of its sometimes uncertain scope (id. at p. 395; see 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2025) Pleading,

2021A defendant can invoke the primary rights doctrine “by either of two means: (1) if the first suit is still pending when the second is filed, the defendant in the second suit may plead that fact in abatement [citations]; or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment 13 on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 682 .) KBR proceeded here under the first method, seeking abatement of Lee’s class action while her individual action was s

2019Instead, a "primary right" is defined by "the plaintiff's right to be free from the particular injury suffered." ( Crowley , at p. 682, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 386 , 881 P.2d 1083 .) As a general matter, "the same primary right" is at stake "[w]hen two actions involving the same parties seek compensation for the same harm." ( Boeken , at p. 798, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 806 , 230 P.3d 342 .) Splitting a PAGA claim into two claims-a claim for underpaid wages and a claim for the $50/$100 per-pay-period penalties PAGA incorporates from section 558-runs afoul of the primary rights doctrine because it *672 impermiss

2016As stated in Smith v. Superior Court (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 285, 291 , ‘[t]he rationale [of Gonzales] should apply . . . to preclude operation of other Code of Civil Procedure sections . . ., such as section 1008’ since section 1008 is not so incorporated.

2016As stated in Smith v. Superior Court (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 285, 291 , ‘[t]he rationale [of Gonzales] should apply . . . to preclude operation of other Code of Civil Procedure sections . . ., such as section 1008’ since section 1008 is not so incorporated.

2016The court in Castello rejected this argument, and because its reasoning is directly applicable to this case, we quote it extensively: “In general, to decide the proper rule of criminal procedure by reliance upon rules of civil procedure ‘would be to ignore the underlying rights of the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 522 .) Gonzales v. Superior Court (1935) 3 Cal.2d 260 , 263–264, concluded that only those parts of the Code of Civil Procedure which are expressly made applicable to penal actions apply to criminal cases.

2016The court in Castello rejected this argument, and because its reasoning is directly applicable to this case, we quote it extensively: “In general, to decide the proper rule of criminal procedure by reliance upon rules of civil procedure ‘would be to ignore the underlying rights of the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 522 .) Gonzales v. Superior Court (1935) 3 Cal.2d 260 , 263–264, concluded that only those parts of the Code of Civil Procedure which are expressly made applicable to penal actions apply to criminal cases.

2016The court in Castello rejected this argument, and because its reasoning is directly applicable to this case, we quote it extensively: “In general, to decide the proper rule of criminal procedure by reliance upon rules of civil procedure ‘would be to ignore the underlying rights of the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 522 .) Gonzales v. Superior Court (1935) 3 Cal.2d 260 , 263–264, concluded that only those parts of the Code of Civil Procedure which are expressly made applicable to penal actions apply to criminal cases.

2016The court in Castello rejected this argument, and because its reasoning is directly applicable to this case, we quote it extensively: “In general, to decide the proper rule of criminal procedure by reliance upon rules of civil procedure ‘would be to ignore the underlying rights of the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 522 .) Gonzales v. Superior Court (1935) 3 Cal.2d 260 , 263–264, concluded that only those parts of the Code of Civil Procedure which are expressly made applicable to penal actions apply to criminal cases.

2016(Martin v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 752, 761 ; Gamble v. General Foods Corporation (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 893, 898-899 (Gamble); Louie v. BFS Retail and Commercial Operations, LLC (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1544 , 1553 [“where a prior federal judgment was based on federal question jurisdiction, the preclusive effect of the prior judgment of a federal court is determined by federal law”].) Contrary to respondent’s argument,4 however, when the question is whether the same issues were involved in the prior federal case as in the present state case, California courts use the primary rights test.

2010(See Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie (1981) 452 U.S. 394, 398 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 103 , 101 S.Ct. 2424 ] [res judicata bars claims that were or could have been raised]; Louie v. BFS Retail & Commercial Operations, LLC (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1553-1559 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 441 ] [applying state and federal cases where result would be same under either jurisdiction’s res judicata principles].)

2016(Martin v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 752, 761 ; Gamble v. General Foods Corporation (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 893, 898-899 (Gamble); Louie v. BFS Retail and Commercial Operations, LLC (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1544 , 1553 [“where a prior federal judgment was based on federal question jurisdiction, the preclusive effect of the prior judgment of a federal court is determined by federal law”].) Contrary to respondent’s argument,4 however, when the question is whether the same issues were involved in the prior federal case as in the present state case, California courts use the primary rights test.

1997The Court of Appeal held: “This case is clearly distinguishable from Agarwal , wherein the plaintiff’s title VII federal claim was to remedy the economic loss in wages, while the state action was for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. [Citation.]” (Gamble v. General Foods Corp., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 901 .) Under a primary rights analysis, the doctrine of res judicata applied (claim preclusion), rather than collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), because the federal and state actions arose from the violation of the same primary right.

2025(Ibid; see also People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267 (Mendoza Tello).) Wilson argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the prosecution violated his constitutional rights by withholding evidence from the defense, and that “the evidence the prosecution failed to disclose suggested other suspects had a motive to kill [Otis] and showed the possibility that the defendant was not involved in this homicide.”4 As Wilson notes, his trial despite his forfeiture under the substantial rights doctrine.

2025Interpreting the procedural rule does not involve an exercise of medical expertise or judgment.” (Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 750, 754 [the court would not defer to the hospital’s interpretation of its bylaws when the issue was the meaning of the terms “applicant” and “final adverse decision” in a provision stating “[a]n applicant who has received a final adverse decision regarding appointment shall not be eligible to reapply to the medical staff for a period of 36 months” (italics omitted)].) Indeed, the question before us involves interpreting legal term

2025(See 5th & LA v. Western Waterproofing Co., Inc. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 781 , 789 (5th & LA) [“both lawsuits are about the same primary right: the owner’s right to be free of harm from the 14 company’s materials or labor”]; Hi-Desert Medical Center v. Douglas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 717, 733 (Hi-Desert) [both “actions . . . were based upon the same primary right[: the] alleged deprivation of a higher level of Medi-Cal reimbursements to noncontract hospitals”].) That issue was litigated and resolved in the original dismissal order, and there has been neither a “new breach” by the County nor any n