general residuary clause in Pennsylvania

1957Indeed, one purpose of a general residuary clause is to dispose of such things as may have been forgotten or overlooked, or may be unknown: Ireland v. Foust, 56 N.C. 498 ... ‘A general residuary devise carries every real interest, whether known or unknown, immediate or remote, unless it is manifestly excluded . . .’” Ingham’s Estate , upon which appellees rely, supports, we repeat, our construction of Mrs. Conlin’s will instead of the appellees’.

1934Indeed, one purpose of a general residuary clause is to dispose of such things as may have been forgotten or overlooked, or may be unknown: Ireland v. Foust, 56 N. C. 498 .

1973A general residuary clause under Pennsylvania law constitutes an exercise of a power of appointment: Jaekel Est., 424 Pa. 433 .

1971Stated otherwise, a general residuary clause carries every interest of the testator, known or unknown, immediate or remote (but not mere expectancies: Braman Estate, 435 Pa. 573 (1969)), unless manifestly excluded by other provisions of the wall: Ingham’s Estate, 315 Pa. 293, 297 (1934).

1971We also hold that this 1963 will can be given no more lasting effect than the letters which were written by the donor and later invalidated in Ingels Estate, 372 Pa. 171 .

1971Pennsylvania recognizes that a valid will may revoke a Totten trust where the testamentary intent is adequately expressed, Scanlon’s Estate, 313 Pa. 424 , but a general clause in a later will disposing of the entire estate is insufficient, Pozzuto’s Estate, 124 Pa. Superior Ct. 93 , and we hold that the general residuary clause in this probated will cannot affect a Totten trust which is of later creation.

1971Pennsylvania recognizes that a valid will may revoke a Totten trust where the testamentary intent is adequately expressed, Scanlon’s Estate, 313 Pa. 424 , but a general clause in a later will disposing of the entire estate is insufficient, Pozzuto’s Estate, 124 Pa. Superior Ct. 93 , and we hold that the general residuary clause in this probated will cannot affect a Totten trust which is of later creation.

1969The court below, although recognizing that the decision was not binding in the instant situation, referred to the following language of Mr. Justice McBride in Bigony Estate, 397 Pa. 102, 105 , 152 A. 2d 901 (1959) : “Unquestionably, if the will contained only the general residuary clause without the restrictive words ‘consisting of,’ all of the testatrix’s property, including property or funds of any kind received after or before her death under the Intestate Act from the estate of her husband [sic] would pass under this clause.” (Emphasis added) Our Court interpreted the language of the Bigon

1969The court below, although recognizing that the decision was not binding in the instant situation, referred to the following language of Mr. Justice McBride in Bigony Estate, 397 Pa. 102, 105 , 152 A. 2d 901 (1959) : “Unquestionably, if the will contained only the general residuary clause without the restrictive words ‘consisting of,’ all of the testatrix’s property, including property or funds of any kind received after or before her death under the Intestate Act from the estate of her husband [sic] would pass under this clause.” (Emphasis added) Our Court interpreted the language of the Bigon

1967Windolph Trust, 374 Pa., supra; Rogers’s Estate, 218 Pa. 431 , 67 Atl. 762 ; Wickersham v. Savage, 58 Pa. 365 ; Price’s Estate, 27 Pa. Dist. 561; Slifer v. Beates, 9 S. & R. 166, 181; 29 P.L.E. §9, page 527.

1967Windolph Trust, 374 Pa., supra; Rogers’s Estate, 218 Pa. 431 , 67 Atl. 762 ; Wickersham v. Savage, 58 Pa. 365 ; Price’s Estate, 27 Pa. Dist. 561; Slifer v. Beates, 9 S. & R. 166, 181; 29 P.L.E. §9, page 527.

1967Windolph Trust, 374 Pa., supra; Rogers’s Estate, 218 Pa. 431 , 67 Atl. 762 ; Wickersham v. Savage, 58 Pa. 365 ; Price’s Estate, 27 Pa. Dist. 561; Slifer v. Beates, 9 S. & R. 166, 181; 29 P.L.E. §9, page 527.

1959In Howe’s Appeal, 126 Pa. 233 , the words in a will “all my property, consisting of bonds and mortgages, ground rents, stocks, and personal effects in the State of Pennsylvania . . .” were held not to pass real estate and the court found that the testator died intestate as to his real estate.

1952Jarman on Wills, 7th Ed., thus states the law (page 786); “The fact that an appointment has been actually made will .not show an intention to exclude the appointed property from a general residuary gift, when the appointment fails by lapse, or through uncertainty, or otherwise, or is revoked.” ■ In Chase National Bank v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 434 , 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 541 (1943), the Court specifically held “that the residuary clause carried with it the appointive property previously attempted to be disposed of, but which was invalidly appointed.” *441 In McLean v. McLean,

1952Jarman on Wills, 7th Ed., thus states the law (page 786); “The fact that an appointment has been actually made will .not show an intention to exclude the appointed property from a general residuary gift, when the appointment fails by lapse, or through uncertainty, or otherwise, or is revoked.” ■ In Chase National Bank v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 434 , 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 541 (1943), the Court specifically held “that the residuary clause carried with it the appointive property previously attempted to be disposed of, but which was invalidly appointed.” *441 In McLean v. McLean,

1952Jarman on Wills, 7th Ed., thus states the law (page 786); “The fact that an appointment has been actually made will .not show an intention to exclude the appointed property from a general residuary gift, when the appointment fails by lapse, or through uncertainty, or otherwise, or is revoked.” ■ In Chase National Bank v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 434 , 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 541 (1943), the Court specifically held “that the residuary clause carried with it the appointive property previously attempted to be disposed of, but which was invalidly appointed.” *441 In McLean v. McLean,

1952Jarman on Wills, 7th Ed., thus states the law (page 786); “The fact that an appointment has been actually made will .not show an intention to exclude the appointed property from a general residuary gift, when the appointment fails by lapse, or through uncertainty, or otherwise, or is revoked.” ■ In Chase National Bank v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 434 , 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 541 (1943), the Court specifically held “that the residuary clause carried with it the appointive property previously attempted to be disposed of, but which was invalidly appointed.” *441 In McLean v. McLean,

1952Jarman on Wills, 7th Ed., thus states the law (page 786); “The fact that an appointment has been actually made will .not show an intention to exclude the appointed property from a general residuary gift, when the appointment fails by lapse, or through uncertainty, or otherwise, or is revoked.” ■ In Chase National Bank v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 434 , 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 541 (1943), the Court specifically held “that the residuary clause carried with it the appointive property previously attempted to be disposed of, but which was invalidly appointed.” *441 In McLean v. McLean,

1952Jarman on Wills, 7th Ed., thus states the law (page 786); “The fact that an appointment has been actually made will .not show an intention to exclude the appointed property from a general residuary gift, when the appointment fails by lapse, or through uncertainty, or otherwise, or is revoked.” ■ In Chase National Bank v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 434 , 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 541 (1943), the Court specifically held “that the residuary clause carried with it the appointive property previously attempted to be disposed of, but which was invalidly appointed.” *441 In McLean v. McLean,