general residuary clause (Delaware) · Go Syfert
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general residuary clause in Delaware

6 Delaware opinions name it 2 courts 1921–2016 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Matter of Estate of Hobsongreen
delch · 1982 · cited in 1 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Ch. 1930)). 12 See Hobson’s Estate, 456 A.2d at 802 (“It is well established that the subject matter of lapsed or ineffectual legacies or devises, in the absence of contrary intent, passes under a general residuary clause where the will contains one and does not descend as intestate property to the testator’s next of kin.”).

11
Downs v. Caspersongreen
delch · 1934 · cited in 1 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 1948–1948
2 sentences

1948St.Rep. 529; Page on Wills, supra, §§ 1000, 1002; see also Downs v. Casperson, 20 Del.Ch. 119 , 171 A. 753 ) ; and one of the questions is whether Items VII and IX are particular residuary clauses or whether they merely provide for specific gifts.

1948St.Rep. 529; Page on Wills, supra, §§ 1000, 1002; see also Downs v. Casperson, 20 Del.Ch. 119 , 171 A. 753 ) ; and one of the questions is whether Items VII and IX are particular residuary clauses or whether they merely provide for specific gifts.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Wolcott v. Shaw green
delch · 1930
1 sentence

1982Wolcott v. Shaw, id.

11982–1982
Rambo v. Rumer green
· 1866
1 sentence

1955It is also clearly established in Delaware that when personalty is unavailable for general or pecuniary bequests when a will is executed as well as when the testator dies and the will contains a general residuary clause made up in part of real estate, it is presumed that the testator was aware of the fact that his personalty would be insufficient to satisfy the legacies and that he intended that all of his real estate left as residue be used to the extent necessary to pay such legacies, Rarnbo v. Rumer, 4 Del.Ch. 9 ; University of Delaware v. Equitable Trust Co., 18 Del.Ch. 335 , 160 A. 754 ;

11955–1955
University of Delaware v. Equitable Trust Co. neutral
delch · 1932
2 sentences

1955It is also clearly established in Delaware that when personalty is unavailable for general or pecuniary bequests when a will is executed as well as when the testator dies and the will contains a general residuary clause made up in part of real estate, it is presumed that the testator was aware of the fact that his personalty would be insufficient to satisfy the legacies and that he intended that all of his real estate left as residue be used to the extent necessary to pay such legacies, Rarnbo v. Rumer, 4 Del.Ch. 9 ; University of Delaware v. Equitable Trust Co., 18 Del.Ch. 335 , 160 A. 754 ;

1955It is also clearly established in Delaware that when personalty is unavailable for general or pecuniary bequests when a will is executed as well as when the testator dies and the will contains a general residuary clause made up in part of real estate, it is presumed that the testator was aware of the fact that his personalty would be insufficient to satisfy the legacies and that he intended that all of his real estate left as residue be used to the extent necessary to pay such legacies, Rarnbo v. Rumer, 4 Del.Ch. 9 ; University of Delaware v. Equitable Trust Co., 18 Del.Ch. 335 , 160 A. 754 ;

11955–1955
Security Trust Co. v. Bulcroft green
delch · 1936
2 sentences

1955It is also clearly established in Delaware that when personalty is unavailable for general or pecuniary bequests when a will is executed as well as when the testator dies and the will contains a general residuary clause made up in part of real estate, it is presumed that the testator was aware of the fact that his personalty would be insufficient to satisfy the legacies and that he intended that all of his real estate left as residue be used to the extent necessary to pay such legacies, Rarnbo v. Rumer, 4 Del.Ch. 9 ; University of Delaware v. Equitable Trust Co., 18 Del.Ch. 335 , 160 A. 754 ;

1955It is also clearly established in Delaware that when personalty is unavailable for general or pecuniary bequests when a will is executed as well as when the testator dies and the will contains a general residuary clause made up in part of real estate, it is presumed that the testator was aware of the fact that his personalty would be insufficient to satisfy the legacies and that he intended that all of his real estate left as residue be used to the extent necessary to pay such legacies, Rarnbo v. Rumer, 4 Del.Ch. 9 ; University of Delaware v. Equitable Trust Co., 18 Del.Ch. 335 , 160 A. 754 ;

11955–1955
Moffett v. . Elmendorf green
· 1897
2 sentences

1948Item IX gives to William duPont, Jr. and Marion duPont Scott “all other real estate of which I die seized and all other real estate which I have any power of appointment.” A will may sometimes contain both particular residuary clauses and a general residuary clause (Moffett v. Elmendorf, 152 N.Y. 475 , 46 N.E. 845 , 57 Am.

1948Item IX gives to William duPont, Jr. and Marion duPont Scott “all other real estate of which I die seized and all other real estate which I have any power of appointment.” A will may sometimes contain both particular residuary clauses and a general residuary clause (Moffett v. Elmendorf, 152 N.Y. 475 , 46 N.E. 845 , 57 Am.

11948–1948
Bruno v. President of the Farmers Bank green
delch · 1946
1 sentence

1948Bruno v. Farmers Bank, 29 Del.

11948–1948
Brown v. Brown green
sc · 1912
1 sentence

1931Dec. 753 , the Court said “We take the rule to be that a general residuary clause passes all the estate of the testator not otherwise disposed of, unless it is manifestly contradictory to the declared purpose of the testator, as found in other parts of the will.” And in Brown v. Brown, 91 S. C. 101, 74 S. E. 135, 136 , it is stated “the increase of the residuary estate which may result from the obliteration is not a new testamentary disposition, but a mere incidental consequence resulting from the exercise of the power conferred on the testator by the statute.” For the reasons stated, it is th

11931–1931
Larkins v. Lindsay neutral
pa · 1903
1 sentence

1921This clause, however, phrased as it is, cannot, under the authority of Lane v. Lane’s Adm’r., 4 Pennewill, 368 , 55 Atl. 184 , 64 L.

11921–1921

Where else courts name it

NY 39 (1870–1964) PA 14 (1934–2020) OH 14 (1862–1980) TX 13 (1930–2024) IL 12 (1899–1989) MA 12 (1927–2017) CA 11 (1910–2012) CT 11 (1912–1992) VA 9 (1890–1989) SC 7 (1946–1996) NC 7 (1882–2012) DE 6 (1921–2016) MI 4 (1947–2026) NJ 4 (1943–1974) AR 3 (1912–1994) TN 3 (1938–2026) RI 3 (1895–1967) NV 2 (2022–2022) MD 2 (1980–2007) ME 2 (1865–1968) CO 2 (1927–1951) OR 2 (1937–1973) MO 2 (1909–1954) WY 2 (1977–2005) IN 2 (1934–1956) WI 2 (1932–1942) NE 2 (1956–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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