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11 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1912–1992 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hartford Trust Co. v. Wolcottgreen2 sentences1922“The fact that the will contains a general residuary clause shows an intent to avoid partial intestacy.” Hartford Trust Co. v. Wolcott, 85 Conn. 134, 139, 81 Atl. 1057 . 1922“The fact that the will contains a general residuary clause shows an intent to avoid partial intestacy.” Hartford Trust Co. v. Wolcott, 85 Conn. 134, 139, 81 Atl. 1057 . | 1 | 2 |
DiSesa v. Hickeygreen1 sentence1990See DiSesa v. Hickey, 160 Conn. 250 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hartford-Aetna National Bank v. Weaver
green
2 sentences1992“The fact that the will itself contained a general residuary clause, shows in itself an intent to avoid partial intestacy.” Hartford-Aetna National Bank v. Weaver, 106 Conn. 137, 142 , 137 A. 388 (1927). 1992“The fact that the will itself contained a general residuary clause, shows in itself an intent to avoid partial intestacy.” Hartford-Aetna National Bank v. Weaver, 106 Conn. 137, 142 , 137 A. 388 (1927). | 2 | 1936–1992 |
Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Board v. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co.
green
2 sentences1971Ministers Benefit Board v. Meriden Trust Co., 139 Conn. 435, 447 , 94 A.2d 917 . 1971Ministers Benefit Board v. Meriden Trust Co., 139 Conn. 435, 447 , 94 A.2d 917 . | 2 | 1962–1971 |
Brinsmade v. Beach
green
2 sentences1953Brinsmade v. Beach, 98 Conn. 322, 330 , 119 A. 233 . 1953Brinsmade v. Beach, 98 Conn. 322, 330 , 119 A. 233 . | 2 | 1936–1953 |
Howood House, Inc. v. Trustees of Donations & Bequests for Church Purposes, Inc.
green
1 sentence1990Id. at 188 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Towns v. Weston
neutral
1 sentence1943The authorities criticizing the rule point out that the existence of a general residuary clause shows that the testator did not intend that any of his property should be intestate, and that the rule directly contravenes that intent; that it in effect destroys a clear intent by a mere presumption of intent; and that it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile it with the other generally accepted rule that legacies which lapse or fail fall into the residue — for that in itself augments the interests of those to whom the residue is given. *272 In a number of jurisdictions the same rule has been rega | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Waln's Estate
green
2 sentences1943The authorities criticizing the rule point out that the existence of a general residuary clause shows that the testator did not intend that any of his property should be intestate, and that the rule directly contravenes that intent; that it in effect destroys a clear intent by a mere presumption of intent; and that it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile it with the other generally accepted rule that legacies which lapse or fail fall into the residue — for that in itself augments the interests of those to whom the residue is given. *272 In a number of jurisdictions the same rule has been rega 1943The authorities criticizing the rule point out that the existence of a general residuary clause shows that the testator did not intend that any of his property should be intestate, and that the rule directly contravenes that intent; that it in effect destroys a clear intent by a mere presumption of intent; and that it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile it with the other generally accepted rule that legacies which lapse or fail fall into the residue — for that in itself augments the interests of those to whom the residue is given. *272 In a number of jurisdictions the same rule has been rega | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Magnuson v. Magnuson
neutral
2 sentences1943The authorities criticizing the rule point out that the existence of a general residuary clause shows that the testator did not intend that any of his property should be intestate, and that the rule directly contravenes that intent; that it in effect destroys a clear intent by a mere presumption of intent; and that it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile it with the other generally accepted rule that legacies which lapse or fail fall into the residue — for that in itself augments the interests of those to whom the residue is given. *272 In a number of jurisdictions the same rule has been rega 1943The authorities criticizing the rule point out that the existence of a general residuary clause shows that the testator did not intend that any of his property should be intestate, and that the rule directly contravenes that intent; that it in effect destroys a clear intent by a mere presumption of intent; and that it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile it with the other generally accepted rule that legacies which lapse or fail fall into the residue — for that in itself augments the interests of those to whom the residue is given. *272 In a number of jurisdictions the same rule has been rega | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Newell v. Beecher
green
1 sentence1936Hartford-Aetna National Bank v. Weaver, 106 Conn. 137, 142 , 137 Atl. 388 ; Brinsmade v. Beach, supra, p. 330 ; Newell v. Beecher, 98 Conn. 263, 270 , 119 Atl. 233 . | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Bartlett v. Sears
green
2 sentences1912The general rule is that the residuary legatee under a general residuary clause takes all the personal property not otherwise disposed of by the will, unless it clearly appears from the will that this was not the testator’s intention.Lapsed legacies and void legacies are included in what “is not otherwise disposed of.” Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn. 242, 255 , 5 Atl. 687 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 47 , 70 Atl. 33 . 1912The general rule is that the residuary legatee under a general residuary clause takes all the personal property not otherwise disposed of by the will, unless it clearly appears from the will that this was not the testator’s intention.Lapsed legacies and void legacies are included in what “is not otherwise disposed of.” Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn. 242, 255 , 5 Atl. 687 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 47 , 70 Atl. 33 . | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Warner v. Willard
neutral
2 sentences1912Warner v. Willard, 54 Conn. 470, 472 , 9 Atl. 136 . 1912Warner v. Willard, 54 Conn. 470, 472 , 9 Atl. 136 . | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Bristol v. Bristol
green
2 sentences1912The general rule is that the residuary legatee under a general residuary clause takes all the personal property not otherwise disposed of by the will, unless it clearly appears from the will that this was not the testator’s intention.Lapsed legacies and void legacies are included in what “is not otherwise disposed of.” Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn. 242, 255 , 5 Atl. 687 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 47 , 70 Atl. 33 . 1912The general rule is that the residuary legatee under a general residuary clause takes all the personal property not otherwise disposed of by the will, unless it clearly appears from the will that this was not the testator’s intention.Lapsed legacies and void legacies are included in what “is not otherwise disposed of.” Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn. 242, 255 , 5 Atl. 687 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 47 , 70 Atl. 33 . | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.