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15 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.green2 sentences2018The court of appeals concluded that, because the deeds made "no mention" of the "previously excepted" royalty interests, and yet provided general warranties covering all the title purportedly conveyed, the grantors breached their warranties and thus "are estopped from claiming a royalty interest in the subject property under the Duhig doctrine." 494 S.W.3d at 746-47 ; see Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co. , 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 , 880-81 (1940). 2018The court of appeals concluded that, because the deeds made "no mention" of the "previously excepted" royalty interests, and yet provided general warranties covering all the title purportedly conveyed, the grantors breached their warranties and thus "are estopped from claiming a royalty interest in the subject property under the Duhig doctrine." 494 S.W.3d at 746-47 ; see Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co. , 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 , 880-81 (1940). | 5 | 7 |
Benge v. Scharbauergreen2 sentences1957In Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Texas 447 , 259 S.W. 2d 166, 169 , we declined to extend the Duhig rule to transfer to a grantee any part of a 3/8th royalty provided for in a deed while at the same time giving effect to the rule to transfer to the gran tee a part of a 3/8th interest in the mineral fee also reserved in the deed. 1957In Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Texas 447 , 259 S.W. 2d 166, 169 , we declined to extend the Duhig rule to transfer to a grantee any part of a 3/8th royalty provided for in a deed while at the same time giving effect to the rule to transfer to the gran tee a part of a 3/8th interest in the mineral fee also reserved in the deed. | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Forrest v. Hanson
green
2 sentences2011Id. b. 2011Id. b. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Benedict G. Wenske and Elizabeth Wenske v. Steve Ealy and Deborah Ealy
green
2 sentences2021Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 791-800 . 2021Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 791-800 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bristow v. Selman
green
2 sentences2017The Court rejected that argument and expressly agreed with the court of appeals, noting only briefly that the Court was “not concerned with the Duhig rule” in Pick and the Pick rule “should be read in that light.” Id. 2017The Court rejected that argument and expressly agreed with the court of appeals, noting only briefly that the Court was “not concerned with the Duhig rule” in Pick and the Pick rule “should be read in that light.” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Selman v. Bristow
green
2 sentences2015Selman v. Bristow, 402 S. W.2d 520 , 523 {Tex. 1966) The conclusion in Selman is dependent on a Duhig analysis and the petitioner-grantor was charged with the entire burden of the unexcepted royalty reservation while the defendant-grantee was given the benefit of the remaining 3/4ths interest in minerals (which presumably included the mineral estate)./d at 524. 2015Selman v. Bristow, 402 S. W.2d 520 , 523 {Tex. 1966) The conclusion in Selman is dependent on a Duhig analysis and the petitioner-grantor was charged with the entire burden of the unexcepted royalty reservation while the defendant-grantee was given the benefit of the remaining 3/4ths interest in minerals (which presumably included the mineral estate)./d at 524. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
American Republics Corporation v. Houston Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1985(Emphasis added) We have found only one case, American Republics Corporation v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 173 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 338 U.S. 858 , 70 S.Ct. 101 , 94 L.Ed. 526 (1949), which, while applying Texas Law, fully discusses the application of the Duhig rule to a conveyance not containing a “general warranty.” The court noted that the Supreme Court of Texas in Lindsay v. Freeman, supra, had early adopted the doctrine of estoppel by recitals in deeds, and that this adoption has never been departed from. 1985(Emphasis added) We have found only one case, American Republics Corporation v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 173 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 338 U.S. 858 , 70 S.Ct. 101 , 94 L.Ed. 526 (1949), which, while applying Texas Law, fully discusses the application of the Duhig rule to a conveyance not containing a “general warranty.” The court noted that the Supreme Court of Texas in Lindsay v. Freeman, supra, had early adopted the doctrine of estoppel by recitals in deeds, and that this adoption has never been departed from. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Houston Oil Co. v. American Republics Corp.
green
2 sentences1985(Emphasis added) We have found only one case, American Republics Corporation v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 173 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 338 U.S. 858 , 70 S.Ct. 101 , 94 L.Ed. 526 (1949), which, while applying Texas Law, fully discusses the application of the Duhig rule to a conveyance not containing a “general warranty.” The court noted that the Supreme Court of Texas in Lindsay v. Freeman, supra, had early adopted the doctrine of estoppel by recitals in deeds, and that this adoption has never been departed from. 1985(Emphasis added) We have found only one case, American Republics Corporation v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 173 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 338 U.S. 858 , 70 S.Ct. 101 , 94 L.Ed. 526 (1949), which, while applying Texas Law, fully discusses the application of the Duhig rule to a conveyance not containing a “general warranty.” The court noted that the Supreme Court of Texas in Lindsay v. Freeman, supra, had early adopted the doctrine of estoppel by recitals in deeds, and that this adoption has never been departed from. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
McMahon v. Christmann
green
2 sentences1980The Duhig doctrine is further explained in McMahon v. Christman, 157 Tex. 403 , 303 S.W.2d 341 , at page 345 (1957), where the. court stated: The respondents insist here, as they did in their motion for an instructed verdict, that in the final analysis the question in the case is governed by the rule of estop-pel laid down in Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lbr. 1980The Duhig doctrine is further explained in McMahon v. Christman, 157 Tex. 403 , 303 S.W.2d 341 , at page 345 (1957), where the. court stated: The respondents insist here, as they did in their motion for an instructed verdict, that in the final analysis the question in the case is governed by the rule of estop-pel laid down in Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lbr. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Gibson v. Turner
green
2 sentences1957Granting that the Duhig rule was not given controlling effect in Gibson v. Turner, 156 Texas 289 , 294 S.W. 2d 781, 786 , yet, in that case the majority discussed at great length the Duhig case. 1957Granting that the Duhig rule was not given controlling effect in Gibson v. Turner, 156 Texas 289 , 294 S.W. 2d 781, 786 , yet, in that case the majority discussed at great length the Duhig case. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.