severance doctrine in Washington

2022After we consider the severance factors, we also weigh the residual “potential for prejudice” “against the need for judicial economy.”6 Russell, 125 Wn.2d at 63 .

2021The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that consideration of the first factor did not favor severance. (2) Clarity of Defenses as to Each Count The purpose of the second factor in the severance inquiry is to prevent “[t]he likelihood that joinder will cause a jury to be confused as to the accused’s defenses.” Russell, 125 Wn.2d at 64 .

2026Instead, he argues that the Ninth Circuit took “a different approach” to the severance waiver issue in United States v. Sullivan, 522 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2008), and urges us to follow that approach.

2026Instead, he argues that the Ninth Circuit took “a different approach” to the severance waiver issue in United States v. Sullivan, 522 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2008), and urges us to follow that approach.

2005Co., 108 Wn.2d 338, 341 , 738 P.2d 251 (1987). ¶21 Viking also asserts that because the covenant does not contain a severance clause, the drafter’s intentions regarding severance cannot be known.

2005Co., 108 Wn.2d 338, 341 , 738 P.2d 251 (1987). ¶21 Viking also asserts that because the covenant does not contain a severance clause, the drafter’s intentions regarding severance cannot be known.

2024“We consider challenges to jury instructions in the context of the jury instructions as a whole.” State v. Johnson, 180 Wn.2d 295, 306 , 325 P.3d 135 (2014).

2024“We consider challenges to jury instructions in the context of the jury instructions as a whole.” State v. Johnson, 180 Wn.2d 295, 306 , 325 P.3d 135 (2014).

2024State v. Warren, 55 Wn. App. 645, 655 , 779 P.2d 1159 (1989).

2024State v. Warren, 55 Wn. App. 645, 655 , 779 P.2d 1159 (1989).

2022“Foremost among these concerns is the conservation of judicial resources and public funds.” Bythrow, 114 Wn.2d at 723 .

2018Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 556-57 . 14 Accordingly, we need not address McKee's argument that probable cause did not support issuing the warrant for dealing in depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct in violation of ROW 9.68A.050. 17

2015Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d at 885 - 86.

2013Mountain Park, 125 Wn.2d at 344 . 4 No. 30745-0-III Baker v. Sunday The Bakers attempt to distinguish Mountain Park on the basis that all of the covenants have been abandoned, including, presumably, the severance clause.

1998App. 703, 710-11 , 812 P.2d 119 (1991). 12 State v. Rice, 48 Wn.

1998We conclude that this issue is subsumed within Jones’s assertion at trial that severance should be granted because of the prejudice which would result from a joint trial. 9 State v. Dent sets forth powerful incrimination as the appropriate severance standard. 123 Wn.2d at 486 . 10 ER 401. 11 State v. Suttle, 61 Wn.

1998App. 703, 710-11 , 812 P.2d 119 (1991). 12 State v. Rice, 48 Wn.

1998We conclude that this issue is subsumed within Jones’s assertion at trial that severance should be granted because of the prejudice which would result from a joint trial. 9 State v. Dent sets forth powerful incrimination as the appropriate severance standard. 123 Wn.2d at 486 . 10 ER 401. 11 State v. Suttle, 61 Wn.

1992We emphasize that the State has not raised a "good faith" issue, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 82 L.

1992We emphasize that the State has not raised a "good faith" issue, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 82 L.

1992The substantial editing required here to reach the point at *561 which the State urges us to test the particularity of this warrant is flatly inconsistent with the mandate from Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 , 13 L.

1992The substantial editing required here to reach the point at *561 which the State urges us to test the particularity of this warrant is flatly inconsistent with the mandate from Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 , 13 L.

1990To justify severing invalid sections of the warrant, the majority relies heavily on Aday v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 789 , 362 P.2d 47 , 13 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1961), but ignores the court's warning against excessés in the severance doctrine: [T]he danger [is] that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified.

1990To justify severing invalid sections of the warrant, the majority relies heavily on Aday v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 789 , 362 P.2d 47 , 13 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1961), but ignores the court's warning against excessés in the severance doctrine: [T]he danger [is] that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified.