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14 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Weissingergreen2 sentences2021See Youngblood, 488 U.S. 57 -58; Greenwold II, 189 Wis. 2d at 67 ; Weissinger, 355 Wis. 2d 546 , ¶15 n.6. 14 No. 2020AP892-CR ¶32 Nelson’s postconviction motion alleges only that Harmsen “knew Mr. Nelson would be arrested,” that Nelson’s arrest “would likely lead to litigation,” and that a recording of Nelson’s arrest by Harmsen’s squad car camera would “likely [be] … useful.” However, Nelson does not allege any facts or meaningfully argue that, when Officer Harmsen deactivated his squad car camera, the exculpatory value of a video made by his squad car camera was known or could be known to Of 2021See Youngblood, 488 U.S. 57 -58; Greenwold II, 189 Wis. 2d at 67 ; Weissinger, 355 Wis. 2d 546 , ¶15 n.6. 14 No. 2020AP892-CR ¶32 Nelson’s postconviction motion alleges only that Harmsen “knew Mr. Nelson would be arrested,” that Nelson’s arrest “would likely lead to litigation,” and that a recording of Nelson’s arrest by Harmsen’s squad car camera would “likely [be] … useful.” However, Nelson does not allege any facts or meaningfully argue that, when Officer Harmsen deactivated his squad car camera, the exculpatory value of a video made by his squad car camera was known or could be known to Of | 4 | 5 |
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausaugreen2 sentences2015Of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶94, 99, 100 , 264 Wis. 2d 60 , 665 N.W.2d 257 . 4 State v. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73, ¶29 , 355 Wis. 2d 546 , 851 N.W.2d 780 (Brown, C.J., concurring). 5 See id., ¶30, n.1 (Brown, C.J., concurring). 6 Weissinger, 355 Wis. 2d 546, ¶31 (Reilly, J., dissenting). 5 No. 2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR.ssa ¶98 I share these judges' unease with the federal standard set forth in Youngblood (and adopted by Wisconsin case law).7 ¶99 The Youngblood and Greenwold II decisions do not give meaningful protection to a defendant. 2015Of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶94, 99, 100 , 264 Wis. 2d 60 , 665 N.W.2d 257 . 4 State v. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73, ¶29 , 355 Wis. 2d 546 , 851 N.W.2d 780 (Brown, C.J., concurring). 5 See id., ¶30, n.1 (Brown, C.J., concurring). 6 Weissinger, 355 Wis. 2d 546, ¶31 (Reilly, J., dissenting). 5 No. 2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR.ssa ¶98 I share these judges' unease with the federal standard set forth in Youngblood (and adopted by Wisconsin case law).7 ¶99 The Youngblood and Greenwold II decisions do not give meaningful protection to a defendant. | 4 | 4 |
State v. Greenwoldgreen2 sentences2014The Wisconsin Court of Appeals adopted the Youngblood standard in Greenwold I, 181 Wis. 2d at 881 , and we are bound by that precedent, Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90 , 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (only supreme court can modify court of appeals precedent). 2014The Wisconsin Court of Appeals adopted the Youngblood standard in Greenwold I, 181 Wis. 2d at 881 , and we are bound by that precedent, Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90 , 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (only supreme court can modify court of appeals precedent). | 2 | 5 |
State v. McManusgreen2 sentences2015Id. 21 No. 2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR ¶46 Therefore, under longstanding Wisconsin precedent, it is clear that the routine destruction of a driver's blood or breath sample, without more, does not deprive a defendant of due process. 2015Id. 21 No. 2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR ¶46 Therefore, under longstanding Wisconsin precedent, it is clear that the routine destruction of a driver's blood or breath sample, without more, does not deprive a defendant of due process. | 1 | 5 |
Arizona v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences2024Even if the Youngblood test would apply in this context, a defendant who cannot show that the evidence sought is “apparently exculpatory” must show that “the police … act[ed] in bad faith by failing to preserve evidence that is potentially exculpatory.” Id. 2024Even if the Youngblood test would apply in this context, a defendant who cannot show that the evidence sought is “apparently exculpatory” must show that “the police … act[ed] in bad faith by failing to preserve evidence that is potentially exculpatory.” Id. | 1 | 4 |
In RE MARRIAGE OF COOK v. Cookgreen2 sentences2014The Wisconsin Court of Appeals adopted the Youngblood standard in Greenwold I, 181 Wis. 2d at 881 , and we are bound by that precedent, Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90 , 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (only supreme court can modify court of appeals precedent). 2014The Wisconsin Court of Appeals adopted the Youngblood standard in Greenwold I, 181 Wis. 2d at 881 , and we are bound by that precedent, Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90 , 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (only supreme court can modify court of appeals precedent). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2024For these reasons, we agree with the State that Riekkoff is materially distinguishable and does not compel a conclusion that Mayotte’s plea was involuntary. ¶20 Furthermore, while Mayotte contends that he did not understand the guilty plea waiver rule at the time he entered his plea, “[n]ot every misunderstanding of the law by a defendant negates the knowing and voluntary nature of a plea.” State v. Brown, 2004 WI App 179, ¶11 , 276 Wis. 2d 559 , 687 N.W.2d 543 . 2024For these reasons, we agree with the State that Riekkoff is materially distinguishable and does not compel a conclusion that Mayotte’s plea was involuntary. ¶20 Furthermore, while Mayotte contends that he did not understand the guilty plea waiver rule at the time he entered his plea, “[n]ot every misunderstanding of the law by a defendant negates the knowing and voluntary nature of a plea.” State v. Brown, 2004 WI App 179, ¶11 , 276 Wis. 2d 559 , 687 N.W.2d 543 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tarrantgreen2 sentences2024See State v. Tarrant, 2009 WI App 121, ¶6 , 321 Wis. 2d 69 , 772 N.W.2d 750 . 2024See State v. Tarrant, 2009 WI App 121, ¶6 , 321 Wis. 2d 69 , 772 N.W.2d 750 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Huggettgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., State v. Huggett, 2010 WI App 69, ¶25 , 324 Wis. 2d 786 , 783 N.W.2d 675 . 19 No. 2018AP1741-CR Amundson, 69 Wis. 2d 554, 579-80 , 230 N.W.2d 775 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344 .11 In the instant case, each of these factors supports the circuit court’s discretionary decision that suppression, rather than dismissal, was the appropriate remedy for the due process violation. ¶49 First, the degree of negligence or bad faith weighs against dismissal. 2019See, e.g., State v. Huggett, 2010 WI App 69, ¶25 , 324 Wis. 2d 786 , 783 N.W.2d 675 . 19 No. 2018AP1741-CR Amundson, 69 Wis. 2d 554, 579-80 , 230 N.W.2d 775 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344 .11 In the instant case, each of these factors supports the circuit court’s discretionary decision that suppression, rather than dismissal, was the appropriate remedy for the due process violation. ¶49 First, the degree of negligence or bad faith weighs against dismissal. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Amundsongreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., State v. Huggett, 2010 WI App 69, ¶25 , 324 Wis. 2d 786 , 783 N.W.2d 675 . 19 No. 2018AP1741-CR Amundson, 69 Wis. 2d 554, 579-80 , 230 N.W.2d 775 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344 .11 In the instant case, each of these factors supports the circuit court’s discretionary decision that suppression, rather than dismissal, was the appropriate remedy for the due process violation. ¶49 First, the degree of negligence or bad faith weighs against dismissal. 2019See, e.g., State v. Huggett, 2010 WI App 69, ¶25 , 324 Wis. 2d 786 , 783 N.W.2d 675 . 19 No. 2018AP1741-CR Amundson, 69 Wis. 2d 554, 579-80 , 230 N.W.2d 775 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344 .11 In the instant case, each of these factors supports the circuit court’s discretionary decision that suppression, rather than dismissal, was the appropriate remedy for the due process violation. ¶49 First, the degree of negligence or bad faith weighs against dismissal. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gary Lee Wayerskigreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., State v. Huggett, 2010 WI App 69, ¶25 , 324 Wis. 2d 786 , 783 N.W.2d 675 . 19 No. 2018AP1741-CR Amundson, 69 Wis. 2d 554, 579-80 , 230 N.W.2d 775 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344 .11 In the instant case, each of these factors supports the circuit court’s discretionary decision that suppression, rather than dismissal, was the appropriate remedy for the due process violation. ¶49 First, the degree of negligence or bad faith weighs against dismissal. 2019See, e.g., State v. Huggett, 2010 WI App 69, ¶25 , 324 Wis. 2d 786 , 783 N.W.2d 675 . 19 No. 2018AP1741-CR Amundson, 69 Wis. 2d 554, 579-80 , 230 N.W.2d 775 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344 .11 In the instant case, each of these factors supports the circuit court’s discretionary decision that suppression, rather than dismissal, was the appropriate remedy for the due process violation. ¶49 First, the degree of negligence or bad faith weighs against dismissal. | 1 | 1 |
Illinois v. Fishergreen2 sentences2014Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 548 (2004) (per curiam). 2014Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 548 (2004) (per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ehlen
green
2 sentences2015Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d at 452 . 25 No. 2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR ¶53 Because, under our precedent, the Wisconsin Constitution provides no greater due process protections than the United States Constitution regarding evidence preservation and destruction, we now proceed to the application of the Youngblood test. 2015Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d at 452 . 25 No. 2013AP1737-CR & 2013AP218-CR ¶53 Because, under our precedent, the Wisconsin Constitution provides no greater due process protections than the United States Constitution regarding evidence preservation and destruction, we now proceed to the application of the Youngblood test. | 5 | 2014–2015 |
State v. Greenwold
green
2 sentences2014State v. Greenwold, 189 Wis. 2d 59, 67 , 525 N.W.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1994) (Greenwold II) (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58 ); see also State v. Greenwold, 181 Wis. 2d 881, 885 , 512 N.W.2d 237 (Ct. App. 1994) (Greenwold I) (adopting Youngblood standard and noting refinement of Trombetta rule). 2014State v. Greenwold, 189 Wis. 2d 59, 67 , 525 N.W.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1994) (Greenwold II) (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58 ); see also State v. Greenwold, 181 Wis. 2d 881, 885 , 512 N.W.2d 237 (Ct. App. 1994) (Greenwold I) (adopting Youngblood standard and noting refinement of Trombetta rule). | 3 | 2010–2021 |
State v. MacHner
green
2 sentences2024In response, the State 2 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 5 No. 2022AP1695-CR asserts that “[i]n the interest of finality and judicial economy,” this court should “overlook” the guilty plea waiver rule and address Mayotte’s Youngblood claim on the merits. 2024In response, the State 2 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 5 No. 2022AP1695-CR asserts that “[i]n the interest of finality and judicial economy,” this court should “overlook” the guilty plea waiver rule and address Mayotte’s Youngblood claim on the merits. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Riekkoff
green
1 sentence2024Id. ¶18 Based on Riekkoff, Mayotte argues that he is entitled to plea withdrawal because he entered his plea with the understanding that he could 7 No. 2022AP1695-CR appeal the circuit court’s denial of his Youngblood motion following his conviction. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Kelty
green
1 sentence2024Id. ¶13 Mayotte claims that he should be permitted to withdraw his Alford plea to the burglary charge because he was not aware at the time he entered his plea that the guilty plea waiver rule would prevent him from challenging the circuit court’s denial of his Youngblood motion on appeal. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. FPC Securities Corp.
green
2 sentences2024Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 109 , 279 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1979). 9 No. 2022AP1695-CR contends that this testimony “constituted evidence” that trial counsel misinformed him about the guilty plea waiver rule and his ability to appeal the denial of the Youngblood motion. ¶23 The record belies this claim. 2024Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 109 , 279 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1979). 9 No. 2022AP1695-CR contends that this testimony “constituted evidence” that trial counsel misinformed him about the guilty plea waiver rule and his ability to appeal the denial of the Youngblood motion. ¶23 The record belies this claim. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Parker
neutral
1 sentence2021Parker, 256 Wis. 2d 154, ¶4 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Pankow
green
2 sentences2019Accordingly, Chong “was not without alternative means to demonstrate [his] innocence,” and he therefore “retained the right to raise the same issues and create the same doubt that could have been raised and created by use of the destroyed evidence.” See State v. Pankow, 144 Wis. 2d 23, 44 , 422 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1988). ¶44 As for the second prong of the Youngblood analysis, the circuit court concluded the December 2013 interviews were potentially exculpatory, and it further found that the police had acted in bad faith by destroying the interview recordings. 2019Accordingly, Chong “was not without alternative means to demonstrate [his] innocence,” and he therefore “retained the right to raise the same issues and create the same doubt that could have been raised and created by use of the destroyed evidence.” See State v. Pankow, 144 Wis. 2d 23, 44 , 422 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1988). ¶44 As for the second prong of the Youngblood analysis, the circuit court concluded the December 2013 interviews were potentially exculpatory, and it further found that the police had acted in bad faith by destroying the interview recordings. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Michael R. Luedtke
green
2 sentences2019Evidence is apparently exculpatory when: (1) it possesses an exculpatory value that was apparent to those 8 The State argues that the “due process test” set forth in State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶53 , 362 Wis. 2d 1 , 863 N.W.2d 592 , is “based on a misinterpretation of the relevant [United States] Supreme Court precedent,” including Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 2019Evidence is apparently exculpatory when: (1) it possesses an exculpatory value that was apparent to those 8 The State argues that the “due process test” set forth in State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶53 , 362 Wis. 2d 1 , 863 N.W.2d 592 , is “based on a misinterpretation of the relevant [United States] Supreme Court precedent,” including Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Disch
green
2 sentences2014Although decided before the Youngblood analysis was set forth by the Supreme Court, in State v. Disch, 119 Wis. 2d 461, 478-79 , 351 N.W.2d 492 (1984), and State v. Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d 451, 456 , 351 N.W.2d 503 (1984), the supreme court rejected the defendants' arguments that their due process rights were violated when the original blood samples were no longer available for retesting. 6 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23 ¶ 16. 2014Although decided before the Youngblood analysis was set forth by the Supreme Court, in State v. Disch, 119 Wis. 2d 461, 478-79 , 351 N.W.2d 492 (1984), and State v. Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d 451, 456 , 351 N.W.2d 503 (1984), the supreme court rejected the defendants' arguments that their due process rights were violated when the original blood samples were no longer available for retesting. 6 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23 ¶ 16. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.