Youngblood standard in Texas

2021See id.; Rodriguez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 18, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (treating a Brady claim about a lost surveillance video as a Youngblood claim); see also Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S. Ct. at 337–38 (holding that the police’s failure to preserve potentially useful evidence was not a denial of due process of law absent the defendant’s showing of bad faith on the part of the police).

2021See id.; Rodriguez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 18, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (treating a Brady claim about a lost surveillance video as a Youngblood claim); see also Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S. Ct. at 337–38 (holding that the police’s failure to preserve potentially useful evidence was not a denial of due process of law absent the defendant’s showing of bad faith on the part of the police).

2024See State v. Fellows, 471 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2015, pet. ref’d); Rodriguez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 18, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (treating a Brady claim about a lost video as a Youngblood claim); see also Greco v. State, No. 02-19-00383-CR, 2021 WL 3557041 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same); Hosey v. State, No. 13-17-00121-CR, 2018 WL 1755822 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 12, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

2024See State v. Fellows, 471 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2015, pet. ref’d); Rodriguez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 18, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (treating a Brady claim about a lost video as a Youngblood claim); see also Greco v. State, No. 02-19-00383-CR, 2021 WL 3557041 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same); Hosey v. State, No. 13-17-00121-CR, 2018 WL 1755822 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 12, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

2018See Pena I, 166 S.W.3d at 285 n.1 (Gray, C.J., dissenting); Pena III, 226 S.W.3d at 670 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).

2018See Pena I, 166 S.W.3d at 285 n.1 (Gray, C.J., dissenting); Pena III, 226 S.W.3d at 670 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).

2015Where lost or destroyed evidence is merely “potentially useful,” due process is not violated “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); see also Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547-48 (2004) (reaffirming the Youngblood standard).

2015Where lost or destroyed evidence is merely “potentially useful,” due process is not violated “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); see also Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547-48 (2004) (reaffirming the Youngblood standard).

2009See Mahaffey v. State, 937 *421 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (“[T]o establish that the failure to preserve the videotape constitutes a violation of due process or due course of law rights, appellant must demonstrate the police erased the videotape in bad faith.”); State v. Rudd, 871 S.W.2d 530, 532-33 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no pet.) (relying on “Youngblood standard to determine violations of article I, section 19 of the Texas constitution when the State does not preserve potentially useful evidence”).

2009See Mahaffey v. State , 937 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) ("[T]o establish that the failure to preserve the videotape constitutes a violation of due process or due course of law rights, appellant must demonstrate the police erased the videotape in bad faith."); State v. Rudd , 871 S.W.2d 530, 532-33 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, no pet.) (relying on " Youngblood standard to determine violations of article I, section 19 of the Texas constitution when the State does not preserve potentially useful evidence").

2009In Pena v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a due course of law violation may be found on the basis of the State’s negligent failure to preserve potentially useful evidence. 226 S.W.3d 634, 651 (Tex.App.-Waco 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 285 S.W.3d 459, 465 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (holding due course of law complaint was not properly preserved for appellate review).

2009In Pena v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a due course of law violation may be found on the basis of the State’s negligent failure to preserve potentially useful evidence. 226 S.W.3d 634, 651 (Tex.App.-Waco 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 285 S.W.3d 459, 465 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (holding due course of law complaint was not properly preserved for appellate review).

2008See, e.g., McGee v. State , 210 S.W.3d 702, 704 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, no pet.); Jackson v. State , 50 S.W.3d 579, 588-89 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd).

2008See, e.g., McGee v. State , 210 S.W.3d 702, 704 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, no pet.); Jackson v. State , 50 S.W.3d 579, 588-89 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd).

2024See State v. Fellows, 471 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2015, pet. ref’d); Rodriguez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 18, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (treating a Brady claim about a lost video as a Youngblood claim); see also Greco v. State, No. 02-19-00383-CR, 2021 WL 3557041 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same); Hosey v. State, No. 13-17-00121-CR, 2018 WL 1755822 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 12, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

2024See State v. Fellows, 471 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2015, pet. ref’d); Rodriguez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 18, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (treating a Brady claim about a lost video as a Youngblood claim); see also Greco v. State, No. 02-19-00383-CR, 2021 WL 3557041 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same); Hosey v. State, No. 13-17-00121-CR, 2018 WL 1755822 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 12, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

2010A Brady violation requires a showing that the undisclosed evidence was both material and favorable to the accused, see United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 684 (1985), while a Youngblood violation requires a showing of "bad faith" on the part of the State.

2010A Brady violation requires a showing that the undisclosed evidence was both material and favorable to the accused, see United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 684 (1985), while a Youngblood violation requires a showing of "bad faith" on the part of the State.

2009See Mahaffey v. State , 937 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) ("[T]o establish that the failure to preserve the videotape constitutes a violation of due process or due course of law rights, appellant must demonstrate the police erased the videotape in bad faith."); State v. Rudd , 871 S.W.2d 530, 532-33 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, no pet.) (relying on " Youngblood standard to determine violations of article I, section 19 of the Texas constitution when the State does not preserve potentially useful evidence").

2009See Mahaffey v. State, 937 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (“[T]o establish that the failure to preserve the videotape constitutes a violation of due process or due course of law rights, appellant must demonstrate the police erased the videotape in bad faith.”); State v. Rudd, 871 S.W.2d 530, 532-33 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.) (relying on “Youngblood standard to determine violations of article I, section 19 of the Texas constitution when the State does not preserve potentially useful evidence”).

2008See, e.g., McGee v. State , 210 S.W.3d 702, 704 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, no pet.); Jackson v. State , 50 S.W.3d 579, 588-89 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd).

2008See, e.g., McGee v. State , 210 S.W.3d 702, 704 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, no pet.); Jackson v. State , 50 S.W.3d 579, 588-89 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd).

2005Salazar further urges, however, that “courts have been moving away from [the Youngblood standard], finding that their own state constitutions provide stronger due process protections than those of the United States Constitution.” One of our sister courts of appeals, the Waco Court of Appeals, did in fact so hold in Pena v. State, 166 S.W.3d 274 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. granted).

2005Salazar further urges, however, that “courts have been moving away from [the Youngblood standard], finding that their own state constitutions provide stronger due process protections than those of the United States Constitution.” One of our sister courts of appeals, the Waco Court of Appeals, did in fact so hold in Pena v. State, 166 S.W.3d 274 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. granted).

2019App. 1999); see Moody v. State, 551 S.W.3d 167 , 170–71 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (“[A]lthough he has phrased his complaint as a Brady complaint, it is more properly 16 considered as a complaint under Youngblood of the destruction of ‘potentially useful evidence.’”); Williams v. State, No. 02-09-00175-CR, 2011 WL 1833136 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 12, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (treating Brady claim regarding destroyed evidence as Youngblood claim).

2019See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57–58; see also Rodriguez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 18, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (treating Brady claim about lost surveillance video as Youngblood claim); Gutierrez v. State, 419 S.W.3d 547, 552 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (noting distinction between “material exculpatory evidence” and “potentially useful evidence”).

2018Appellant speculates that “had the remainder of the jail surveillance video . . . not been erased by the Goliad County jail’s recording system . . . appellant’s trial lawyer may have been able to show his jury the circumstances leading to the incident.” Although appellant presents his complaint under Brady, it is more properly considered as a complaint of the destruction of “potentially useful evidence.” See id. at 57; see Rodriguez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 18, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (treating Brady claim about lost surveillance video as a Youngblood claim); Burdick v.

2018Appellant speculates that “had the remainder of the jail surveillance video . . . not been erased by the Goliad County jail’s recording system . . . appellant’s trial lawyer may have been able to show his jury the circumstances leading to the incident.” Although appellant presents his complaint under Brady, it is more properly considered as a complaint of the destruction of “potentially useful evidence.” See id. at 57; see Rodriguez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 18, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (treating Brady claim about lost surveillance video as a Youngblood claim); Burdick v.

2013Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d at 229, 231-35 (noting long history of the bad faith requirement).

2013Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d at 229, 231-35 (noting long history of the bad faith requirement).

2010If the proceeding was “rendered neither unreliable nor fundamentally unfair” by counsel’s deficient performance, then the prejudice question can be answered in the negative to prevent the defendant from obtaining a “windfall.”180 As we explained in connection with his Youngblood claim, applicant would not have been 177 466 U.S. at 694 . 178 Id. 179 Id. at 693 . 180 Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 366 (1993).

2010Under these circumstances, we find it appropriate to address the merits of applicant’s Youngblood claim without first addressing the question of procedural default. 76 Ex parte Pena, 71 S.W.3d 336, 337-38 (Tex. Crim.

2010Under these circumstances, we find it appropriate to address the merits of applicant’s Youngblood claim without first addressing the question of procedural default. 76 Ex parte Pena, 71 S.W.3d 336, 337-38 (Tex. Crim.

2008Among these cases, most relax the bad-faith requirement—the hardest element to establish5—if the defendant can prove that the loss of the 5 See State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tenn. 1999) (finding that proving bad faith is extremely difficult). 14 evidence is so critical to the defense as to make the trial fundamentally unfair.6 Regardless, comparable evidence was available, and appellant has not shown that the lost evidence was exculpatory.

2008Among these cases, most relax the bad-faith requirement—the hardest element to establish5—if the defendant can prove that the loss of the 5 See State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tenn. 1999) (finding that proving bad faith is extremely difficult). 14 evidence is so critical to the defense as to make the trial fundamentally unfair.6 Regardless, comparable evidence was available, and appellant has not shown that the lost evidence was exculpatory.

2006Id. at 282.

2006Id. at 282.

2005“The Youngblood decision could have the unfortunate effect of encouraging the destruction of evidence to the extent that evidence destroyed becomes merely potentially useful since its contents would be unprovable.” Thome v. Dept, of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1331, n. 9 (Alaska 1989⅜.- Another reason touted by the states rejecting Youngblood is that the requirement of bad faith operates as a litmus test mandating no due process violation even when serious questions exist concerning the fundamental fairness of the trial.

2005“The Youngblood decision could have the unfortunate effect of encouraging the destruction of evidence to the extent that evidence destroyed becomes merely potentially useful since its contents would be unprovable.” Thome v. Dept, of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1331, n. 9 (Alaska 1989⅜.- Another reason touted by the states rejecting Youngblood is that the requirement of bad faith operates as a litmus test mandating no due process violation even when serious questions exist concerning the fundamental fairness of the trial.

1972The late filing of these motions is not in itself fatal to the rights of the parties filing them, for, as stated in Hann v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co. of Tenn., 312 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio 1958, no writ) : “The rules do not provide for a time limit on the filing and passing upon of a motion non obstante veredicto, therefore, such motion may be filed even after the court has rendered judgment on the verdict, and may be acted upon any time before the motion or amended motion for a new trial has been overruled, either by the court or by operation of law.” (Italics ours.) *59