basis for finding violation in California

2019Caldwell held that the trial court stated an inadequate justification for the sanctions. ( Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers , supra , 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 977 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 126 .) Caldwell also held "due process requires that any order giving rise to the imposition of sanctions state with particularity the basis for finding a violation of the rule." ( Id. at p. 978, 272 Cal.Rptr. 126 .) Here, unlike Caldwell , the trial court's order did not simply say "good cause appearing." Instead, the order made the factual basis for finding a violation abundantly clear.

2019Caldwell held that the trial court stated an inadequate justification for the sanctions. ( Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers , supra , 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 977 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 126 .) Caldwell also held "due process requires that any order giving rise to the imposition of sanctions state with particularity the basis for finding a violation of the rule." ( Id. at p. 978, 272 Cal.Rptr. 126 .) Here, unlike Caldwell , the trial court's order did not simply say "good cause appearing." Instead, the order made the factual basis for finding a violation abundantly clear.

2018(See People v. Romo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 189, 197 .)” ( Johnston, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 258-259.) In any event, the difference in treatment between petty thieves and receivers of stolen property is easily rationalized.

2018(See People v. Romo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 189 , 197 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 111 , 534 P.2d 1015 ].)" ( Johnston , supra , 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 258-259.) *1064 In any event, the difference in treatment between petty thieves and receivers of stolen property is easily rationalized.

2014The Atherton court characterizes the Authority’s compliance with CEQA as voluntary due to its longstanding practice of CEQA compliance and its acceptance of funds from a bond measure that contemplated such compliance, and concludes, “ ‘ “[V]oluntary agreements must be seen as reflecting the carrier’s own determination and admission that the agreements would not unreasonably interfere with interstate commerce.” [Citation.] ’ ” (Atherton, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 339 .) Yet, elsewhere in the opinion, the court recognizes that when a state action imposes a permitting or preclearance requireme

2014The Atherton court characterizes the Authority’s compliance with CEQA as voluntary due to its longstanding practice of CEQA compliance and its acceptance of funds from a bond measure that contemplated such compliance, and concludes, “ ‘ “[V]oluntary agreements must be seen as reflecting the carrier’s own determination and admission that the agreements would not unreasonably interfere with interstate commerce.” [Citation.] ’ ” (Atherton, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 339 .) Yet, elsewhere in the opinion, the court recognizes that when a state action imposes a permitting or preclearance requireme

2014It is these factors—state ownership of the HST, Proposition 1A, and years of the Authority’s compliance with CEQA—that provide the basis for finding an exception to preemption under the market participation doctrine.” ( Atherton, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 333-334.) Although Atherton presents a situation factually and procedurally similar to the one before us, we respectfully disagree with the court’s analysis, which overlooks the genesis and purpose of the market participation doctrine and does not adequately answer the question of how a third party’s challenge to an EIR under CEQA can rea

2014It is these factors—state ownership of the HST, Proposition 1A, and years of the Authority’s compliance with CEQA—that provide the basis for finding an exception to preemption under the market participation doctrine.” ( Atherton, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 333-334.) Although Atherton presents a situation factually and procedurally similar to the one before us, we respectfully disagree with the court’s analysis, which overlooks the genesis and purpose of the market participation doctrine and does not adequately answer the question of how a third party’s challenge to an EIR under CEQA can rea

2017(Custis, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 496 ; Allen, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 433-434; Garcia, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 964-965.) 4 Appellant’s speculation about the reason for this court’s denial of his 1999 habeas corpus petition does not provide a basis for finding the violation of due process he asserts.

2016As the Supreme Court held in Victor v. Nebraska, federal due process does not require express definition of the reasonable doubt standard for the jury. ( 511 U.S. at p. 5 .) Moreover, other reported federal case law holds the timing of jury instructions alone does not provide a basis for finding error.

2016For example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals declared it “will not assume that jurors, contrary to their oath, ignored part of the judge’s initial instruction simply because it came early in the trial.” (U.S. v. Hernandez (3d Cir. 1999) 176 F.3d 719 , 734 & fn. 8 [four-day trial].) In United States v. Davila-Nater (5th Cir. 1973) 474 F.2d 270 , the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an assertion of error based on the trial court’s failure to reiterate a jury instruction on the reasonable doubt standard given at the beginning of trial.

2016For example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals declared it “will not assume that jurors, contrary to their oath, ignored part of the judge’s initial instruction simply because it came early in the trial.” (U.S. v. Hernandez (3d Cir. 1999) 176 F.3d 719 , 734 & fn. 8 [four-day trial].) In United States v. Davila-Nater (5th Cir. 1973) 474 F.2d 270 , the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an assertion of error based on the trial court’s failure to reiterate a jury instruction on the reasonable doubt standard given at the beginning of trial.

1990(Cf. Fegles v. Kraft, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 812, 816 .) Indeed, the Government Code section empowering the courts to “make rules for its own government and the government of its officers” requires that the rules be “not inconsistent with law.” (Gov.