Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
13 California opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Anderson v. Celebrezzegreen2 sentences1993(Burdick v. Takushi (1992) 504 U.S. _ ,_[ 119 L.Ed.2d 245, 252 , 112 S.Ct. 2059 ].) The court applied a more flexible standard to a challenge against an election law by weighing the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against “ ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’ ” (Id., at p. _ [ 119 L.Ed.2d at p. 253 ] 1993(Burdick v. Takushi (1992) 504 U.S. _ ,_[ 119 L.Ed.2d 245, 252 , 112 S.Ct. 2059 ].) The court applied a more flexible standard to a challenge against an election law by weighing the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against “ ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’ ” (Id., at p. _ [ 119 L.Ed.2d at p. 253 ] | 3 | 5 |
Burdick v. Takushigreen2 sentences2023Each provision of a code, ‘whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects — at least to some degree — the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends.’ [Citation.]” (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 433 .) “A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise 2023Each provision of a code, ‘whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects — at least to some degree — the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends.’ [Citation.]” (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 433 .) “A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise | 1 | 6 |
People v. Super. Ct. (Johnson)green2 sentences2025Accordingly, the burden imposed by the requirement ‘is not 12 high.’ ” (ALADS, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 42 ; accord, Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 720 .) To show “good cause,” the movant must demonstrate (1) “ ‘the materiality’ of the information sought ‘to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation,’ ” and (2) “ ‘a “reasonable belief” that the agency has the type of information sought.’ ” (ALADS, at pp. 41-42; accord, Johnson, at p. 720.) If the movant “shows that the request is relevant to the pending charges, and explains how, the materiality requirement will be met.” (Johnson, 2025Accordingly, the burden imposed by the requirement ‘is not 12 high.’ ” (ALADS, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 42 ; accord, Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 720 .) To show “good cause,” the movant must demonstrate (1) “ ‘the materiality’ of the information sought ‘to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation,’ ” and (2) “ ‘a “reasonable belief” that the agency has the type of information sought.’ ” (ALADS, at pp. 41-42; accord, Johnson, at p. 720.) If the movant “shows that the request is relevant to the pending charges, and explains how, the materiality requirement will be met.” (Johnson, | 1 | 2 |
Warrick v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2025(Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1021 (Warrick).) To show good cause for a classic Pitchess motion, the defendant must propose a defense or defenses to the pending charge and describe with some specificity “ ‘ “how the discovery being sought would support such a defense or how it would impeach the officer’s version of events.” ’ ” (Johnson, at p. 721; accord, Warrick, at p. 1021.) These requirements ensure the defendant’s request is “limited to instances of officer misconduct related to the misconduct asserted by the defendant” and that it “excludes requests for officer infor | 1 | 1 |
People v. Moocgreen1 sentence2019Accordingly, the burden imposed by the requirement “is not high.” (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 720 ; see City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 84 [requirement is designed to ensure “the production for inspection of all potentially relevant documents”].) When a court determines that a movant has made a showing sufficient to justify in camera inspection, “the custodian of records should bring to court all documents ‘potentially relevant’ to the . . . motion.” (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226 .) “[I]f the custodian has any doubt whether a particular document is relevant, [the custodi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2014“The elements of the gang participation offense in section 186.22(a) are: First, active participation in a criminal street gang, in the sense of participation that is more than nominal or passive; second, knowledge that the gang’s members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity; and third, the willful promotion, furtherance, or assistance in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.” (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1130 (Rodriguez).) The phrase “willful promotion, furtherance, or assistance” has been equated with aiding and abetting.3 (People | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
SAM Party of N.Y. v. Kosinski
green
2 sentences2023Thus, . . . when those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’ [Citation.] But when a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth 11 Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions. [Citations.]” (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 434 .) 3 “This latter, lesser scrutiny is not ‘pure rational basis review.’ [Citation.] Rather, ‘the court must actually 2021(Edelstein, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 174 .) We must “ ‘weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights . . .” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.” ’ ” (Steen, supra, 732 F.3d at p. 388 .) State rules that impose “ ‘severe burdens on the plaintiffs’ rights,’ [ ] must be ‘narrowly tailored and 11 advance a compelling state interest.’ [Citation.] ‘Lesser burdens, however, trigger less ex | 3 | 2021–2023 |
Rawls v. Zamora
green
2 sentences2023Thus, . . . when those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’ [Citation.] But when a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth 11 Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions. [Citations.]” (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 434 .)3 “This latter, lesser scrutiny is not ‘pure rational basis review.’ [Citation.] Rather, ‘the court must actually 2023Thus, . . . when those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’ [Citation.] But when a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth 11 Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions. [Citations.]” (Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 434 .) 3 “This latter, lesser scrutiny is not ‘pure rational basis review.’ [Citation.] Rather, ‘the court must actually | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Ass'n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty.
green
1 sentence2025Accordingly, the burden imposed by the requirement ‘is not 12 high.’ ” (ALADS, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 42 ; accord, Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 720 .) To show “good cause,” the movant must demonstrate (1) “ ‘the materiality’ of the information sought ‘to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation,’ ” and (2) “ ‘a “reasonable belief” that the agency has the type of information sought.’ ” (ALADS, at pp. 41-42; accord, Johnson, at p. 720.) If the movant “shows that the request is relevant to the pending charges, and explains how, the materiality requirement will be met.” (Johnson, | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Edelstein v. City & County of San Francisco
green
1 sentence2021(Edelstein, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 174 .) We must “ ‘weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights . . .” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.” ’ ” (Steen, supra, 732 F.3d at p. 388 .) State rules that impose “ ‘severe burdens on the plaintiffs’ rights,’ [ ] must be ‘narrowly tailored and 11 advance a compelling state interest.’ [Citation.] ‘Lesser burdens, however, trigger less ex | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Voting for America, Inc. v. John Steen
green
1 sentence2021(Edelstein, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 174 .) We must “ ‘weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights . . .” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.” ’ ” (Steen, supra, 732 F.3d at p. 388 .) State rules that impose “ ‘severe burdens on the plaintiffs’ rights,’ [ ] must be ‘narrowly tailored and 11 advance a compelling state interest.’ [Citation.] ‘Lesser burdens, however, trigger less ex | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Castenada
green
1 sentence2014“The elements of the gang participation offense in section 186.22(a) are: First, active participation in a criminal street gang, in the sense of participation that is more than nominal or passive; second, knowledge that the gang’s members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity; and third, the willful promotion, furtherance, or assistance in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.” (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1130 (Rodriguez).) The phrase “willful promotion, furtherance, or assistance” has been equated with aiding and abetting.3 (People | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Bolin
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331 .) As we explain, Rivera cannot overcome the burden imposed by this standard. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Jerry Rubin v. City of Santa Monica Maria M. Stewart, City Clerk Does 1-5, Inclusive, Bill Jones, Secretary of State
green
1 sentence2003Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’ [Citation.] But when a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.” ( Burdick, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 433-434 [ 112 S.Ct. at p. 2063 ].) We emphasize that it is only when the restrictions are real and substantial, that t | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Escobedo v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1978(See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ].) Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, the judgment appealed from should be reversed if the error committed creates a conviction in the mind of this court that it is reasonably probable a different result would have been reached if it had not been committed. 1978(See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ].) Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, the judgment appealed from should be reversed if the error committed creates a conviction in the mind of this court that it is reasonably probable a different result would have been reached if it had not been committed. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1978(See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ].) Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, the judgment appealed from should be reversed if the error committed creates a conviction in the mind of this court that it is reasonably probable a different result would have been reached if it had not been committed. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; cf. Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1978(See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ].) Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, the judgment appealed from should be reversed if the error committed creates a conviction in the mind of this court that it is reasonably probable a different result would have been reached if it had not been committed. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; cf. Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1978(See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ].) Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, the judgment appealed from should be reversed if the error committed creates a conviction in the mind of this court that it is reasonably probable a different result would have been reached if it had not been committed. 1978(See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ].) Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, the judgment appealed from should be reversed if the error committed creates a conviction in the mind of this court that it is reasonably probable a different result would have been reached if it had not been committed. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences1978(See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ].) Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, the judgment appealed from should be reversed if the error committed creates a conviction in the mind of this court that it is reasonably probable a different result would have been reached if it had not been committed. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; cf. Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1978(See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ].) Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, the judgment appealed from should be reversed if the error committed creates a conviction in the mind of this court that it is reasonably probable a different result would have been reached if it had not been committed. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; cf. Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.