burden imposed rule in Texas

2020The State’s Regulatory Interests Concluding the character and magnitude of the asserted injury is reasonable 19 and non-discriminatory, we turn to “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 .

2020The State’s Regulatory Interests Concluding the character and magnitude of the asserted injury is reasonable 19 and non-discriminatory, we turn to “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 .

2020Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).

2020Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).

2020Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002)). 12 for the burden imposed by its rule” (taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights”).

2020Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002)). 12 for the burden imposed by its rule” (taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights”).

2020Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).

2020A court applying this framework “first consider[s] the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to [voting] rights,” and then balances the purported injury against the “interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 10 Under this “flexible standard,” a “severe” impediment to the right to vote must survive strict scrutiny, an exacting standard that places the burden of proof on the government to demonstrate that its restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.

2020The Texas Supreme Court has applied the federal Anderson-Burdick balancing test to evaluate whether an 17 election regulation impinges a fundamental right, considering “‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury’” to the plaintiffs’ fundamental right against “‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” State v. Hodges, 92 S.W.3d 489, 496 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 ).