cases cited doctrine (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

cases cited doctrine in California

13 California opinions name it 2 courts 1920–2021 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Lance W.green
cal · 1985 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991(In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) Neither the cases cited nor the principle enunciated aids them since here the period of tenancy was for a month and the tenants had made at least partial payment on the rent.

1991(In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) Neither the cases cited nor the principle enunciated aids them since here the period of tenancy was for a month and the tenants had made at least partial payment on the rent.

11
People v. Carusogreen
calctapp · 1959 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972
2 sentences

1972(People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636 [ 345 P.2d 282 ].) In People v. Kirk (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 687 , at page 692 [ 220 P.2d 976 ], the court stated: “A trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence contradicting it, and this rule applies to an affidavit.” (See People v. Parker (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 396 ]; People v. Perry (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 841 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; People v. Knight (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 312 [ 234 P.2d 992 ].) An exam

1972(People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636 [ 345 P.2d 282 ].) In People v. Kirk (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 687 , at page 692 [ 220 P.2d 976 ], the court stated: “A trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence contradicting it, and this rule applies to an affidavit.” (See People v. Parker (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 396 ]; People v. Perry (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 841 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; People v. Knight (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 312 [ 234 P.2d 992 ].) An exam

11
Guerra v. Handlery Hotels, Inc.green
cal · 1959 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1960–1960
2 sentences

1960(See Guerra v. Handlery Hotels, Inc., supra, 53 Cal.2d 266, 272 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 330 , 347 P.2d 674 ].) Defendants offered and the court gave BAJI 201-A 8 and 201-C. 9 Plaintiff asserts it was error to give 201-A in its *311 entirety and 201-0 for the reason that the language of the combined instructions embodied the provisions of section 562 of the Vehicle Code pertaining to a pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point other than within a marked crosswalk.

1960(See Guerra v. Handlery Hotels, Inc., supra, 53 Cal.2d 266, 272 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 330 , 347 P.2d 674 ].) Defendants offered and the court gave BAJI 201-A 8 and 201-C. 9 Plaintiff asserts it was error to give 201-A in its *311 entirety and 201-0 for the reason that the language of the combined instructions embodied the provisions of section 562 of the Vehicle Code pertaining to a pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point other than within a marked crosswalk.

11
Moore v. Beltgreen
cal · 1949 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1950–1950
2 sentences

1950The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is, therefore, entirely inapplicable and no malpractice has been proved.” And in Moore v. Belt (1949), 34 Cal.2d 525, 530-531 [ 212 P.2d 509 ], after citing some fourteen cases on the proposition, it was stated that “In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

1950The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is, therefore, entirely inapplicable and no malpractice has been proved.” And in Moore v. Belt (1949), 34 Cal.2d 525, 530-531 [ 212 P.2d 509 ], after citing some fourteen cases on the proposition, it was stated that “In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

11
Sinz v. Owensgreen
cal · 1949 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1949–1949
2 sentences

1949(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 ]; Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal.2d 216, 221 [ 88 P.2d 695 ] and cases cited; Church v. Bloch, 80 Cal.App.2d 542, 548-549 [ 182 P.2d 241 ]; Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal.App. 404, 408 [ 3 P.2d 1023 ]; Donahoo v. Lovas, 105 Cal.App. 705, 709 [ 288 P. 698 ].) In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

1949(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 ]; Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal.2d 216, 221 [ 88 P.2d 695 ] and cases cited; Church v. Bloch, 80 Cal.App.2d 542, 548-549 [ 182 P.2d 241 ]; Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal.App. 404, 408 [ 3 P.2d 1023 ]; Donahoo v. Lovas, 105 Cal.App. 705, 709 [ 288 P. 698 ].) In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

11
Church v. Blochgreen
calctapp · 1947 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1949–1949
2 sentences

1949(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 ]; Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal.2d 216, 221 [ 88 P.2d 695 ] and cases cited; Church v. Bloch, 80 Cal.App.2d 542, 548-549 [ 182 P.2d 241 ]; Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal.App. 404, 408 [ 3 P.2d 1023 ]; Donahoo v. Lovas, 105 Cal.App. 705, 709 [ 288 P. 698 ].) In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

1949(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 ]; Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal.2d 216, 221 [ 88 P.2d 695 ] and cases cited; Church v. Bloch, 80 Cal.App.2d 542, 548-549 [ 182 P.2d 241 ]; Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal.App. 404, 408 [ 3 P.2d 1023 ]; Donahoo v. Lovas, 105 Cal.App. 705, 709 [ 288 P. 698 ].) In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

11
Engelking v. Carlsongreen
cal · 1939 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1949–1949
2 sentences

1949(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 ]; Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal.2d 216, 221 [ 88 P.2d 695 ] and cases cited; Church v. Bloch, 80 Cal.App.2d 542, 548-549 [ 182 P.2d 241 ]; Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal.App. 404, 408 [ 3 P.2d 1023 ]; Donahoo v. Lovas, 105 Cal.App. 705, 709 [ 288 P. 698 ].) In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

1949(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 ]; Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal.2d 216, 221 [ 88 P.2d 695 ] and cases cited; Church v. Bloch, 80 Cal.App.2d 542, 548-549 [ 182 P.2d 241 ]; Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal.App. 404, 408 [ 3 P.2d 1023 ]; Donahoo v. Lovas, 105 Cal.App. 705, 709 [ 288 P. 698 ].) In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

11
Rising v. Veatchgreen
calctapp · 1931 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1949–1949
2 sentences

1949(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 ]; Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal.2d 216, 221 [ 88 P.2d 695 ] and cases cited; Church v. Bloch, 80 Cal.App.2d 542, 548-549 [ 182 P.2d 241 ]; Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal.App. 404, 408 [ 3 P.2d 1023 ]; Donahoo v. Lovas, 105 Cal.App. 705, 709 [ 288 P. 698 ].) In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

1949(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 ]; Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal.2d 216, 221 [ 88 P.2d 695 ] and cases cited; Church v. Bloch, 80 Cal.App.2d 542, 548-549 [ 182 P.2d 241 ]; Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal.App. 404, 408 [ 3 P.2d 1023 ]; Donahoo v. Lovas, 105 Cal.App. 705, 709 [ 288 P. 698 ].) In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

11
Donahoo v. Lovasgreen
calctapp · 1930 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1949–1949
2 sentences

1949(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 ]; Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal.2d 216, 221 [ 88 P.2d 695 ] and cases cited; Church v. Bloch, 80 Cal.App.2d 542, 548-549 [ 182 P.2d 241 ]; Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal.App. 404, 408 [ 3 P.2d 1023 ]; Donahoo v. Lovas, 105 Cal.App. 705, 709 [ 288 P. 698 ].) In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

1949(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 ]; Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal.2d 216, 221 [ 88 P.2d 695 ] and cases cited; Church v. Bloch, 80 Cal.App.2d 542, 548-549 [ 182 P.2d 241 ]; Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal.App. 404, 408 [ 3 P.2d 1023 ]; Donahoo v. Lovas, 105 Cal.App. 705, 709 [ 288 P. 698 ].) In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

11
County of Tulare v. City of Dinubagreen
cal · 1922 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1932–1932
2 sentences

1932R. 1172, 192 Pac. 442, 447 ], it said: ‘In this connection it may be stated that there has been a tendency to a much more liberal construction of such statutes in the more recent decisions, and this may in part be the result of more humane and liberal methods of dealing with those who are convicted of crime, and in part from the wide field now covered by the criminal law’; and again in County of Tulare v. City of Dinuba, 188 Cal. 664, 677 [ 206 Pac. 983, 988 ], when it said ‘A statute cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.

1932R. 1172, 192 Pac. 442, 447 ], it said: ‘In this connection it may be stated that there has been a tendency to a much more liberal construction of such statutes in the more recent decisions, and this may in part be the result of more humane and liberal methods of dealing with those who are convicted of crime, and in part from the wide field now covered by the criminal law’; and again in County of Tulare v. City of Dinuba, 188 Cal. 664, 677 [ 206 Pac. 983, 988 ], when it said ‘A statute cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.

11
Ex Parte Danielsgreen
cal · 1920 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1932–1932
2 sentences

1932The rule of all the cases cited is the rule of strict construction, a rule which our Supreme Court had in mind when in Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 646 [21 A. L.

1932R. 1172, 192 Pac. 442, 447 ], it said: ‘In this connection it may be stated that there has been a tendency to a much more liberal construction of such statutes in the more recent decisions, and this may in part be the result of more humane and liberal methods of dealing with those who are convicted of crime, and in part from the wide field now covered by the criminal law’; and again in County of Tulare v. City of Dinuba, 188 Cal. 664, 677 [ 206 Pac. 983, 988 ], when it said ‘A statute cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.

11
Calmon v. Sarraillegreen
cal · 1904 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1928–1928
11
The Edward Barron Estate Co. v. the Woodruff Co.green
cal · 1912 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1928–1928
1 sentence

1928(Calmon v. Sarraille, 142 Cal. 638, 641 [ 76 Pac. 486 ]; Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 576 [42 L.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (22)

CaseCitedYears
Coy v. Iowa green
scotus · 1988
2 sentences

2021And I don’t think counsel would disagree there were a lot of times where the pause was pushing a minute or maybe more than a minute.” After making additional observations about the victim’s conduct that are consistent with those evidenced by the record that we have already set forth, the trial court continued: “As far as my findings, this witness of course is not a child witness like the witnesses were [in the cases cited by the defense:] Coy [v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012 (Coy)] and Maryland versus [ [Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836 (Craig)] and [People v.] Sharp [(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1772 (Sharp)]

2021And I don’t think counsel would disagree there were a lot of times where the pause was pushing a minute or maybe more than a minute.” After making additional observations about the victim’s conduct that are consistent with those evidenced by the record that we have already set forth, the trial court continued: “As far as my findings, this witness of course is not a child witness like the witnesses were [in the cases cited by the defense:] Coy [v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012 (Coy)] and Maryland versus [ [Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836 (Craig)] and [People v.] Sharp [(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1772 (Sharp)]

22021–2021
Maryland v. Craig green
scotus · 1990
2 sentences

2021And I don’t think counsel would disagree there were a lot of times where the pause was pushing a minute or maybe more than a minute.” After making additional observations about the victim’s conduct that are consistent with those evidenced by the record that we have already set forth, the trial court continued: “As far as my findings, this witness of course is not a child witness like the witnesses were [in the cases cited by the defense:] Coy [v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012 (Coy)] and Maryland versus [ [Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836 (Craig)] and [People v.] Sharp [(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1772 (Sharp)]

2021And I don’t think counsel would disagree there were a lot of times where the pause was pushing a minute or maybe more than a minute.” After making additional observations about the victim’s conduct that are consistent with those evidenced by the record that we have already set forth, the trial court continued: “As far as my findings, this witness of course is not a child witness like the witnesses were [in the cases cited by the defense:] Coy [v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012 (Coy)] and Maryland versus [ [Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836 (Craig)] and [People v.] Sharp [(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1772 (Sharp)]

22021–2021
People v. Sharp green
calctapp · 1994
2 sentences

2021And I don’t think counsel would disagree there were a lot of times where the pause was pushing a minute or maybe more than a minute.” After making additional observations about the victim’s conduct that are consistent with those evidenced by the record that we have already set forth, the trial court continued: “As far as my findings, this witness of course is not a child witness like the witnesses were [in the cases cited by the defense:] Coy [v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012 (Coy)] and Maryland versus [ [Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836 (Craig)] and [People v.] Sharp [(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1772 (Sharp)]

2021And I don’t think counsel would disagree there were a lot of times where the pause was pushing a minute or maybe more than a minute.” After making additional observations about the victim’s conduct that are consistent with those evidenced by the record that we have already set forth, the trial court continued: “As far as my findings, this witness of course is not a child witness like the witnesses were [in the cases cited by the defense:] Coy [v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012 (Coy)] and Maryland versus [ [Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836 (Craig)] and [People v.] Sharp [(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1772 (Sharp)]

22021–2021
People v. Gonzales green
cal · 2012
2 sentences

2021And I don’t think counsel would disagree there were a lot of times where the pause was pushing a minute or maybe more than a minute.” After making additional observations about the victim’s conduct that are consistent with those evidenced by the record that we have already set forth, the trial court continued: “As far as my findings, this witness of course is not a child witness like the witnesses were [in the cases cited by the defense:] Coy [v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012 (Coy)] and Maryland versus [ [Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836 (Craig)] and [People v.] Sharp [(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1772 (Sharp)]

2021And I don’t think counsel would disagree there were a lot of times where the pause was pushing a minute or maybe more than a minute.” After making additional observations about the victim’s conduct that are consistent with those evidenced by the record that we have already set forth, the trial court continued: “As far as my findings, this witness of course is not a child witness like the witnesses were [in the cases cited by the defense:] Coy [v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012 (Coy)] and Maryland versus [ [Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836 (Craig)] and [People v.] Sharp [(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1772 (Sharp)]

22021–2021
United States v. Echeverri, Elkin A. green
ca3 · 1988
1 sentence

1994(U.S. v. LeMaux (9th Cir. 1993) 994 F.2d 684, 689 ; U.S. v. Pungitore (3d Cir. 1990) 910 F.2d 1084 , 1136; U.S. v. Hernandez-Escarsega (9th Cir. 1989) 886 F.2d 1560, 1572-1573 ; U.S. v. Echeverri (3d Cir. 1988) 854 F.2d 638, 642-643 .) However, only Echeverri clearly held that unanimity was required on the three predicate offenses which constitute a continuing criminal enterprise under federal law. (854 F.2d at pp. 642-643.) In the other cases cited by defense counsel, the reviewing courts did not find it necessary to decide the issue because they found the failure to instruct harmless or beca

11994–1994
United States v. Donaciano Hernandez-Escarsega green
ca9 · 1989
1 sentence

1994(U.S. v. LeMaux (9th Cir. 1993) 994 F.2d 684, 689 ; U.S. v. Pungitore (3d Cir. 1990) 910 F.2d 1084 , 1136; U.S. v. Hernandez-Escarsega (9th Cir. 1989) 886 F.2d 1560, 1572-1573 ; U.S. v. Echeverri (3d Cir. 1988) 854 F.2d 638, 642-643 .) However, only Echeverri clearly held that unanimity was required on the three predicate offenses which constitute a continuing criminal enterprise under federal law. (854 F.2d at pp. 642-643.) In the other cases cited by defense counsel, the reviewing courts did not find it necessary to decide the issue because they found the failure to instruct harmless or beca

11994–1994
cluster 546225 green
ca3 · 1990
1 sentence

1994(U.S. v. LeMaux (9th Cir. 1993) 994 F.2d 684, 689 ; U.S. v. Pungitore (3d Cir. 1990) 910 F.2d 1084 , 1136; U.S. v. Hernandez-Escarsega (9th Cir. 1989) 886 F.2d 1560, 1572-1573 ; U.S. v. Echeverri (3d Cir. 1988) 854 F.2d 638, 642-643 .) However, only Echeverri clearly held that unanimity was required on the three predicate offenses which constitute a continuing criminal enterprise under federal law. (854 F.2d at pp. 642-643.) In the other cases cited by defense counsel, the reviewing courts did not find it necessary to decide the issue because they found the failure to instruct harmless or beca

11994–1994
United States v. Kimbel A. Lemaux green
ca9 · 1993
1 sentence

1994(U.S. v. LeMaux (9th Cir. 1993) 994 F.2d 684, 689 ; U.S. v. Pungitore (3d Cir. 1990) 910 F.2d 1084 , 1136; U.S. v. Hernandez-Escarsega (9th Cir. 1989) 886 F.2d 1560, 1572-1573 ; U.S. v. Echeverri (3d Cir. 1988) 854 F.2d 638, 642-643 .) However, only Echeverri clearly held that unanimity was required on the three predicate offenses which constitute a continuing criminal enterprise under federal law. (854 F.2d at pp. 642-643.) In the other cases cited by defense counsel, the reviewing courts did not find it necessary to decide the issue because they found the failure to instruct harmless or beca

11994–1994
Clanebach, Inc. v. Las Vegas Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary Workers and Bartenders, Etc. green
ca9 · 1968
1 sentence

1985Wkrs and Bartenders (9th Cir. 1968) 388 F.2d 766 [whether a contract requires company to negotiate wage rates for certain classes of employees is arbitrable], Maj. opn. ante, at pp. 413, 414.) The cases cited for the rule that “employee-oriented” or “partisan” arbitration agreements are enforceable simply do not bear the weight which the majority place on them.

11985–1985
People v. Wallace green
cal · 1963
2 sentences

1984Both People v. Wallace (1963) 59 Cal.2d 548 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 381 P.2d 185 ]) and People v. Bradford (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 403 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 115 ], concerned the trial court’s failing or refusing to exercise its discretion when the issues were properly before the trial court.

1984Both People v. Wallace (1963) 59 Cal.2d 548 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 381 P.2d 185 ]) and People v. Bradford (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 403 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 115 ], concerned the trial court’s failing or refusing to exercise its discretion when the issues were properly before the trial court.

11984–1984
People v. Bradford green
calctapp · 1963
1 sentence

1984Both People v. Wallace (1963) 59 Cal.2d 548 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 381 P.2d 185 ]) and People v. Bradford (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 403 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 115 ], concerned the trial court’s failing or refusing to exercise its discretion when the issues were properly before the trial court.

11984–1984
People v. Knight green
calctapp · 1951
2 sentences

1972(People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636 [ 345 P.2d 282 ].) In People v. Kirk (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 687 , at page 692 [ 220 P.2d 976 ], the court stated: “A trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence contradicting it, and this rule applies to an affidavit.” (See People v. Parker (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 396 ]; People v. Perry (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 841 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; People v. Knight (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 312 [ 234 P.2d 992 ].) An exam

1972(People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636 [ 345 P.2d 282 ].) In People v. Kirk (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 687 , at page 692 [ 220 P.2d 976 ], the court stated: “A trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence contradicting it, and this rule applies to an affidavit.” (See People v. Parker (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 396 ]; People v. Perry (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 841 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; People v. Knight (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 312 [ 234 P.2d 992 ].) An exam

11972–1972
People v. Kirk green
calctapp · 1950
2 sentences

1972(People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636 [ 345 P.2d 282 ].) In People v. Kirk (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 687 , at page 692 [ 220 P.2d 976 ], the court stated: “A trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence contradicting it, and this rule applies to an affidavit.” (See People v. Parker (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 396 ]; People v. Perry (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 841 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; People v. Knight (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 312 [ 234 P.2d 992 ].) An exam

1972(People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636 [ 345 P.2d 282 ].) In People v. Kirk (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 687 , at page 692 [ 220 P.2d 976 ], the court stated: “A trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence contradicting it, and this rule applies to an affidavit.” (See People v. Parker (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 396 ]; People v. Perry (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 841 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; People v. Knight (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 312 [ 234 P.2d 992 ].) An exam

11972–1972
People v. Parker green
calctapp · 1961
2 sentences

1972(People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636 [ 345 P.2d 282 ].) In People v. Kirk (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 687 , at page 692 [ 220 P.2d 976 ], the court stated: “A trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence contradicting it, and this rule applies to an affidavit.” (See People v. Parker (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 396 ]; People v. Perry (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 841 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; People v. Knight (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 312 [ 234 P.2d 992 ].) An exam

1972(People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636 [ 345 P.2d 282 ].) In People v. Kirk (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 687 , at page 692 [ 220 P.2d 976 ], the court stated: “A trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence contradicting it, and this rule applies to an affidavit.” (See People v. Parker (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 396 ]; People v. Perry (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 841 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; People v. Knight (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 312 [ 234 P.2d 992 ].) An exam

11972–1972
People v. Perry green
calctapp · 1963
2 sentences

1972(People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636 [ 345 P.2d 282 ].) In People v. Kirk (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 687 , at page 692 [ 220 P.2d 976 ], the court stated: “A trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence contradicting it, and this rule applies to an affidavit.” (See People v. Parker (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 396 ]; People v. Perry (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 841 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; People v. Knight (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 312 [ 234 P.2d 992 ].) An exam

1972(People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636 [ 345 P.2d 282 ].) In People v. Kirk (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 687 , at page 692 [ 220 P.2d 976 ], the court stated: “A trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence contradicting it, and this rule applies to an affidavit.” (See People v. Parker (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 396 ]; People v. Perry (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 841 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; People v. Knight (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 312 [ 234 P.2d 992 ].) An exam

11972–1972
People v. Beck green
calctapp · 1961
2 sentences

1972(People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636 [ 345 P.2d 282 ].) In People v. Kirk (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 687 , at page 692 [ 220 P.2d 976 ], the court stated: “A trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence contradicting it, and this rule applies to an affidavit.” (See People v. Parker (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 396 ]; People v. Perry (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 841 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; People v. Knight (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 312 [ 234 P.2d 992 ].) An exam

1972(People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 636 [ 345 P.2d 282 ].) In People v. Kirk (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 687 , at page 692 [ 220 P.2d 976 ], the court stated: “A trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence contradicting it, and this rule applies to an affidavit.” (See People v. Parker (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 704 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 396 ]; People v. Perry (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 841 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; People v. Knight (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 312 [ 234 P.2d 992 ].) An exam

11972–1972
Barham v. Widing green
cal · 1930
2 sentences

1949The majority opinion, in an endeavor to escape the holdings in Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206 [ 291 P. 173 ], and other eases cited in connection therewith, has this to say: “In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

1949The majority opinion, in an endeavor to escape the holdings in Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206 [ 291 P. 173 ], and other eases cited in connection therewith, has this to say: “In the cases cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence that the defendant did not cause the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge from the nature of the injury that the result would not happen without carelessness or negligence.

11949–1949
Sheer v. Hoyt neutral
calctapp · 1910
11928–1928
Johnson v. Withers neutral
calctapp · 1908
11928–1928
Herdan v. Hanson green
cal · 1920
2 sentences

1928(Johnson v. Withers, 9 Cal. App. 52 [ 98 Pac. 42 ]; Sheer v. Hoyt, 13 Cal. App. 662 [ 110 Pac. 477 ]; Herdan v. Hanson, 182 Cal. 538 [ 189 Pac. 440 ].) As the plaintiffs had been the authorized agents of the vendors since October 10th, that fact is of particular importance as bringing this case within the doctrine of the cases cited.

1928(Johnson v. Withers, 9 Cal. App. 52 [ 98 Pac. 42 ]; Sheer v. Hoyt, 13 Cal. App. 662 [ 110 Pac. 477 ]; Herdan v. Hanson, 182 Cal. 538 [ 189 Pac. 440 ].) As the plaintiffs had been the authorized agents of the vendors since October 10th, that fact is of particular importance as bringing this case within the doctrine of the cases cited.

11928–1928
Lundy Furniture Co. v. White green
cal · 1900
11920–1920
Liver v. Mills green
cal · 1909
11920–1920

Where else courts name it

NY 21 (1852–2025) IL 16 (1875–2008) CA 13 (1920–2021) LA 9 (1916–2007) PA 8 (1840–2022) NE 7 (1886–1944) FL 7 (1955–2014) TX 4 (1878–1974) NJ 4 (1829–1986) RI 4 (1998–2017) IN 4 (1881–1904) KS 4 (1909–2020) OR 3 (1926–2002) MO 3 (1964–1969) MI 3 (1971–1981) OH 3 (1903–1988) NC 3 (1914–2006) AZ 2 (1972–1993) KY 2 (1960–2011) WA 2 (2002–2002) AR 2 (1937–1972) DE 2 (1990–2019) MA 2 (1877–2007) WI 2 (1885–2017) OK 2 (1924–1985)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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