cases cited doctrine in Pennsylvania

2022The cases cited by the defense in support of providing the jury instruction, Commonwealth v. Locks, 2014 WL 10788850 (Pa.Super. filed Nov. 14, 2014) (memorandum decision) and Commonwealth v. Marks, 704 A.2d 1095 (Pa.Super. 1997), are inapplicable because neither dealt with whether to provide jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter.

2006The cases cited by the defense in their brief, such as Young v. Washington Hospital, 761 A.2d 559 (Pa. Super. 2000) and Siegal v. Stefanyszyn, 718 A.2d 1274 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeal denied, 559 Pa. 693 , 739 A.2d 1059 (1999), involve situations much more egregious than what occurred here.

2006The cases cited by the defense in their brief, such as Young v. Washington Hospital, 761 A.2d 559 (Pa. Super. 2000) and Siegal v. Stefanyszyn, 718 A.2d 1274 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeal denied, 559 Pa. 693 , 739 A.2d 1059 (1999), involve situations much more egregious than what occurred here.

1987Respondent noted the cases cited by the hearing committee (Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lewis, 493 Pa. 519 , 426 A.2d 1138 (1981); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Knepp, 497 Pa. 396 , 441 A.2d 1197 (1982); and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucarini, 504 Pa. 271 , 472 A.2d 186 (1983)), are in-apposite.

1987Respondent noted the cases cited by the hearing committee (Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lewis, 493 Pa. 519 , 426 A.2d 1138 (1981); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Knepp, 497 Pa. 396 , 441 A.2d 1197 (1982); and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucarini, 504 Pa. 271 , 472 A.2d 186 (1983)), are in-apposite.

1987Respondent noted the cases cited by the hearing committee (Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lewis, 493 Pa. 519 , 426 A.2d 1138 (1981); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Knepp, 497 Pa. 396 , 441 A.2d 1197 (1982); and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucarini, 504 Pa. 271 , 472 A.2d 186 (1983)), are in-apposite.

1987Respondent noted the cases cited by the hearing committee (Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lewis, 493 Pa. 519 , 426 A.2d 1138 (1981); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Knepp, 497 Pa. 396 , 441 A.2d 1197 (1982); and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucarini, 504 Pa. 271 , 472 A.2d 186 (1983)), are in-apposite.

1987Respondent noted the cases cited by the hearing committee (Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lewis, 493 Pa. 519 , 426 A.2d 1138 (1981); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Knepp, 497 Pa. 396 , 441 A.2d 1197 (1982); and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucarini, 504 Pa. 271 , 472 A.2d 186 (1983)), are in-apposite.

1987Respondent noted the cases cited by the hearing committee (Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lewis, 493 Pa. 519 , 426 A.2d 1138 (1981); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Knepp, 497 Pa. 396 , 441 A.2d 1197 (1982); and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucarini, 504 Pa. 271 , 472 A.2d 186 (1983)), are in-apposite.

1956This case falls clearly within the doctrine of the cases cited by Mr. Chief Justice Horace Stern, in the case of Anchorage, Inc., v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, Local 301, A. F. L., 383 Pa. 547 , when he said, p. 549: “An injunction may not be issued against picketing carried on solely for the purpose of persuading the nonunion employes to join the union, or for the purpose of advertising the fact, if it be a fact, that the employes are on strike: Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local Union No. 776, 373 Pa. 19, 21 , 22 . . . ; Pappas v. Local Joint Executive Board, 374 Pa. 34, 36

1956This case falls clearly within the doctrine of the cases cited by Mr. Chief Justice Horace Stern, in the case of Anchorage, Inc., v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, Local 301, A. F. L., 383 Pa. 547 , when he said, p. 549: “An injunction may not be issued against picketing carried on solely for the purpose of persuading the nonunion employes to join the union, or for the purpose of advertising the fact, if it be a fact, that the employes are on strike: Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local Union No. 776, 373 Pa. 19, 21 , 22 . . . ; Pappas v. Local Joint Executive Board, 374 Pa. 34, 36

1956This case falls clearly within the doctrine of the cases cited by Mr. Chief Justice Horace Stern, in the case of Anchorage, Inc., v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, Local 301, A. F. L., 383 Pa. 547 , when he said, p. 549: “An injunction may not be issued against picketing carried on solely for the purpose of persuading the nonunion employes to join the union, or for the purpose of advertising the fact, if it be a fact, that the employes are on strike: Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local Union No. 776, 373 Pa. 19, 21 , 22 . . . ; Pappas v. Local Joint Executive Board, 374 Pa. 34, 36

1956This case falls clearly within the doctrine of the cases cited by Mr. Chief Justice Horace Stern, in the case of Anchorage, Inc., v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, Local 301, A. F. L., 383 Pa. 547 , when he said, p. 549: “An injunction may not be issued against picketing carried on solely for the purpose of persuading the nonunion employes to join the union, or for the purpose of advertising the fact, if it be a fact, that the employes are on strike: Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local Union No. 776, 373 Pa. 19, 21 , 22 . . . ; Pappas v. Local Joint Executive Board, 374 Pa. 34, 36

1956This case falls clearly within the doctrine of the cases cited by Mr. Chief Justice Horace Stern, in the case of Anchorage, Inc., v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, Local 301, A. F. L., 383 Pa. 547 , when he said, p. 549: “An injunction may not be issued against picketing carried on solely for the purpose of persuading the nonunion employes to join the union, or for the purpose of advertising the fact, if it be a fact, that the employes are on strike: Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local Union No. 776, 373 Pa. 19, 21 , 22 . . . ; Pappas v. Local Joint Executive Board, 374 Pa. 34, 36

1956And where the object of the picketing is lawful the mere fact that it may cause economic loss to the employer does not justify its restraint by injunction: Baderak v. Building and Construction Trades Council, 380 Pa. 477, 482 . . .

1942Not only are the cases cited by the hearing judge controlling, but we believe Baker’s Estate, 331 Pa. 33 , flatly rules the question.

1906N. C. 241; Croman v. Stull, Adm., 119 Pa. 91 ) if he afterward had taken letters of administration and brought suit upon the note, the plea of the statute would have been met successfully by satisfactory proof in that suit of such promise or acknowledgment.

1869J., in delivering the opinion of the court says: “ The construction of the act, — that if adverse possession be taken in the lifetime of the ancestor, and be continued for twenty years, and for ten years after the death of the ancestor, no entry being made by the ancestor or those claiming under him, the title is barred, — is established by the decisions of this court as well as the courts of Kentucky; 4 Wheat. 213 .” The uniform doctrine of the cases cited, as will be found on examination, is, that if twenty years have elapsed since the right of action accrued, and ten of those years have bee

1840The doctrine of the cases cited at bar are consistent with this view, although it is supposed Kelly v. Shepney, 4 Watts 69 , is not so.

1840The doctrine of the cases cited at bar are consistent with this view, although it is supposed Kelly v. Shepney, 4 Watts 69 , is not so.