equipment violation in California

2025(Evans, supra, at p. 1103; Manriquez, supra, at pp. 1232–1233.) In other words, contrary to Rieman’s argument, the DMV through the DS 367 form (and as augmented by the unsworn arrest report), met its initial burden.

2000Supp. 12, 221 Cal.Rptr. 776 .) Appellant argues that Perez, supra, 221 Cal.Rptr. 776 , 175 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8 , is not binding authority and urges us to adopt the reasoning of United States v. Jimenez-Medina (1999) 173 F.3d 752 , ( Jimenez-Medina) .

2000Supp. 11, 221 Cal.Rptr. 776 .) The court noted that the officer involved had extensive training and experience in driving under the influence cases. ( Ibid.) Finally, the court noted that an officer is justified in stopping a weaving vehicle to discover if the weaving is caused by an equipment violation. ( Id. at p.

2000Supp. 11, 221 Cal.Rptr. 776 .) The court noted that the officer involved had extensive training and experience in driving under the influence cases. ( Ibid.) Finally, the court noted that an officer is justified in stopping a weaving vehicle to discover if the weaving is caused by an equipment violation. ( Id. at p.

2000Corp. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 235, 241 , 125 Cal.Rptr. 640 ["An owner of land or a general contractor is not liable for injuries resulting from defective equipment used by an independent contractor unless that equipment was supplied, selected, or controlled by him." (Italics added.) ]; Holman v. State of California (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 317, 330 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 773 ["[A]n owner is not liable for injuries resulting from defective equipment used by the contractor unless the owner supplied the equipment or had the privilege of selecting it...." (Italics added.)].) These decisions predate Privette an

2000Corp. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 235, 241 , 125 Cal.Rptr. 640 ["An owner of land or a general contractor is not liable for injuries resulting from defective equipment used by an independent contractor unless that equipment was supplied, selected, or controlled by him." (Italics added.) ]; Holman v. State of California (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 317, 330 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 773 ["[A]n owner is not liable for injuries resulting from defective equipment used by the contractor unless the owner supplied the equipment or had the privilege of selecting it...." (Italics added.)].) These decisions predate Privette an

2000Supp. 12, 221 Cal.Rptr. 776 .) Appellant argues that Perez, supra, 221 Cal.Rptr. 776 , 175 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8 , is not binding authority and urges us to adopt the reasoning of United States v. Jimenez-Medina (1999) 173 F.3d 752 , ( Jimenez-Medina) .

1997In People v. Graybehl (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 210 [ 153 P.2d 771 ], the court held that in a former section 501 prosecution the unlawful act requirement was satisfied by evidence that the defendant drove his car with its windshield so dirty “ ‘. . . as to impair the driver’s vision,’ ” which is a violation of the Vehicle Code (§ 677). (67 Cal.App.2d at pp. 216-218.) In each of these cases, the equipment violation in question directly impaired the driver’s ability to drive the car in a manner so as to avoid an accident and proximately caused the injuries to a person other than the driver.

1997In People v. Graybehl (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 210 [ 153 P.2d 771 ], the court held that in a former section 501 prosecution the unlawful act requirement was satisfied by evidence that the defendant drove his car with its windshield so dirty “ ‘. . . as to impair the driver’s vision,’ ” which is a violation of the Vehicle Code (§ 677). (67 Cal.App.2d at pp. 216-218.) In each of these cases, the equipment violation in question directly impaired the driver’s ability to drive the car in a manner so as to avoid an accident and proximately caused the injuries to a person other than the driver.

1987It would be entirely impracticable, unreasonable and expensive to expect a [general contractor] to set up a system to monitor the manner in which [the component parts selected and assembled] are used by workmen and guard against misuse or negligent use of [such items] by workmen in day-to-day operations on the job. [Citations.]” (Stark v. Weeks Real Estate, supra, 94 Cal.App.3d 965, 973 .) In the case at bench, the circumstances showed only the subcon- . tractor Steelform’s routine negligence, rather than plaintiff’s participation in work to which peculiar risk attached.

1979It is now beyond question that "just as a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope ( Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 903 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878 ]), so may an investigatory detention exceed constitutional bounds when extended beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances which made its initiation permissible." ( Willett v. Superior Court (1969) supra, 2 Cal. App.3d 555, 559 ; accord, People v. Harris (1975) 15 Cal.3d 384, 390 [ 124 Cal. Rptr. 536 , 540 P.2d 632 ].) In Willett an off

1979It is now beyond question that “just as a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 903 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878 ]), so may an investigatory detention exceed constitutional bounds when extended beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances which made its initiation permissible.” (Willett v. Superior Court (1969) supra, 2 Cal.App.3d 555, 559 ; accord, People v. Harris (1975) 15 Cal.3d 384, 390 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 536 , 540 P.2d 632 ].) In Willett an officer

1975(McDonald v. Shell Oil Co., supra, 44 Cal.2d 785, at pp. 788-789 .) .

1971As with other searches without warrants, the burden of pointing to ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ such an intrusion properly rests with the People. [Citations.]” (Italics supplied.) In People v. Todd, 2 Cal.App.3d 389 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 574 ], an officer stopped a vehicle driven by one Hughes for an equipment violation.

1971As with other searches without warrants, the burden of pointing to ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ such an intrusion properly rests with the People. [Citations.]” (Italics supplied.) In People v. Todd, 2 Cal.App.3d 389 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 574 ], an officer stopped a vehicle driven by one Hughes for an equipment violation.

1956Contrary to Chief Jansen's assumption, the pad was not a pad of ordinary printed checks given to customers, but was a pad of plain scratch paper, and although such a pad would be commonplace equipment in an office (see People v. Sanders, ante, p. 247 [ 294 P.2d 10 ]), it is not ordinarily part of the equipment of a bar.

1956Contrary to Chief Jansen’s assumption, the pad was not a pad of ordinary printed checks given to customers, but was a pad of plain scratch paper, and although such a pad would be commonplace equipment in an office (see People v. Sanders, ante, p. 247 [ 294 P.2d 10 ]), it is not ordinarily part of the equipment of a bar.