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13 California opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Huynhgreen2 sentences2008A killing in the commission of a felony that is not inherently dangerous to human life, in contrast, has been recognized as involuntary manslaughter, notwithstanding the limited statutory definition of the offense, "if that felony is committed without due caution and circumspection." ( Burroughs, supra , 35 Cal.3d at p. 835 ; see People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662 , 679 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647 , 654 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) In Burroughs the Supreme Court reversed the second degree felony-murder conviction of the defendant, whose massage tre 2008A killing in the commission of a felony that is not inherently dangerous to human life, in contrast, has been recognized as involuntary manslaughter, notwithstanding the limited statutory definition of the offense, "if that felony is committed without due caution and circumspection." ( Burroughs, supra , 35 Cal.3d at p. 835 ; see People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662 , 679 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647 , 654 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) In Burroughs the Supreme Court reversed the second degree felony-murder conviction of the defendant, whose massage tre | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hansenred2 sentences2008In People v. Hansen, supra , 9 Cal.4th at page 312 , the court observed that a felonious assault committed without malice aforethought but resulting in death, although not properly the subject of a felony-murder instruction under the Ireland merger doctrine, is "punishable as manslaughter." Unanswered by the Hansen court, however, because unnecessary to the decision in that case, was whether the offense committed was voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. 2008In People v. Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at page 312 , the court observed that a felonious assault committed without malice aforethought but resulting in death, although not properly the subject of a felony-murder instruction under the Ireland merger doctrine, is “punishable as manslaughter.” Unanswered by the Hansen court, however, because unnecessary to the decision in that case, was whether the offense committed was voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. | 1 | 5 |
People v. Chunred2 sentences2020(People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1200 .) Gutierrez was not convicted on that theory. 9 D. 2009After reviewing the court’s jurisprudence in this area, the court held the state of the law regarding the Ireland merger doctrine was problematic, and found it necessary “to reconsider our merger doctrine jurisprudence.” (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1198 .) Disapproving prior decisions, the court set forth a different test of merger. | 1 | 3 |
PEOPLR v. Albrittongreen2 sentences2008A killing in the commission of a felony that is not inherently dangerous to human life, in contrast, has been recognized as involuntary manslaughter, notwithstanding the limited statutory definition of the offense, "if that felony is committed without due caution and circumspection." ( Burroughs, supra , 35 Cal.3d at p. 835 ; see People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662 , 679 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647 , 654 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) In Burroughs the Supreme Court reversed the second degree felony-murder conviction of the defendant, whose massage tre 2008A killing in the commission of a felony that is not inherently dangerous to human life, in contrast, has been recognized as involuntary manslaughter, notwithstanding the limited statutory definition of the offense, "if that felony is committed without due caution and circumspection." ( Burroughs, supra , 35 Cal.3d at p. 835 ; see People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662 , 679 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647 , 654 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) In Burroughs the Supreme Court reversed the second degree felony-murder conviction of the defendant, whose massage tre | 1 | 2 |
People v. Ramirezgreen2 sentences2016(Cf. People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 462-464 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677 , 139 P.3d 64 ] [although evidence that defendant entered the residence with the intent to commit murder or assault could not support a felony-murder conviction under the Ireland merger doctrine, evidence that one of defendant’s purposes in entering the victims’ residence was to steal was sufficient to uphold convictions for burglary and burglary felony murder and the burglary-felony-murder special-circumstance finding].) Thus, there is no reasonable doubt that the jury made the determinations necessary for a proper fin 2016(Cf. People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 462-464 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677 , 139 P.3d 64 ] [although evidence that defendant entered the residence with the intent to commit murder or assault could not support a felony-murder conviction under the Ireland merger doctrine, evidence that one of defendant’s purposes in entering the victims’ residence was to steal was sufficient to uphold convictions for burglary and burglary felony murder and the burglary-felony-murder special-circumstance finding].) Thus, there is no reasonable doubt that the jury made the determinations necessary for a proper fin | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bartongreen1 sentence2008A killing in the commission of a felony that is not inherently dangerous to human life, in contrast, has been recognized as involuntary manslaughter, notwithstanding the limited statutory definition of the offense, "if that felony is committed without due caution and circumspection." ( Burroughs, supra , 35 Cal.3d at p. 835 ; see People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662 , 679 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647 , 654 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) In Burroughs the Supreme Court reversed the second degree felony-murder conviction of the defendant, whose massage tre | 1 | 1 |
People v. Moralesgreen2 sentences2008A killing in the commission of a felony that is not inherently dangerous to human life, in contrast, has been recognized as involuntary manslaughter, notwithstanding the limited statutory definition of the offense, "if that felony is committed without due caution and circumspection." ( Burroughs, supra , 35 Cal.3d at p. 835 ; see People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662 , 679 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647 , 654 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) In Burroughs the Supreme Court reversed the second degree felony-murder conviction of the defendant, whose massage tre 2008A killing in the commission of a felony that is not inherently dangerous to human life, in contrast, has been recognized as involuntary manslaughter, notwithstanding the limited statutory definition of the offense, "if that felony is committed without due caution and circumspection." ( Burroughs, supra , 35 Cal.3d at p. 835 ; see People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662 , 679 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647 , 654 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) In Burroughs the Supreme Court reversed the second degree felony-murder conviction of the defendant, whose massage tre | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rhodesred2 sentences2008A killing in the commission of a felony that is not inherently dangerous to human life, in contrast, has been recognized as involuntary manslaughter, notwithstanding the limited statutory definition of the offense, "if that felony is committed without due caution and circumspection." ( Burroughs, supra , 35 Cal.3d at p. 835 ; see People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662 , 679 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647 , 654 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) In Burroughs the Supreme Court reversed the second degree felony-murder conviction of the defendant, whose massage tre 2008A killing in the commission of a felony that is not inherently dangerous to human life, in contrast, has been recognized as involuntary manslaughter, notwithstanding the limited statutory definition of the offense, "if that felony is committed without due caution and circumspection." ( Burroughs, supra , 35 Cal.3d at p. 835 ; see People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662 , 679 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647 , 654 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) In Burroughs the Supreme Court reversed the second degree felony-murder conviction of the defendant, whose massage tre | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robertsonred2 sentences2007Bejarano comes to this result by (1) analogizing shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246) to discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3) as occurred in Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th 987 , 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 725 , 111 P.3d 987 , in which our Supreme Court found the Ireland merger doctrine precluded using violation of section 246.3 as a predicate felony for second degree felony murder; and (2) distinguishing the facts of Bejarano from Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 156 , 17 Cal. *141 Rptr.3d 604, 95 P.3d 872 , in which, prior to Randle , our Supreme Court held that violation of sect 2007Bejarano comes to this result by (1) analogizing shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246) to discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3) as occurred in Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th 987 , 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 725 , 111 P.3d 987 , in which our Supreme Court found the Ireland merger doctrine precluded using violation of section 246.3 as a predicate felony for second degree felony murder; and (2) distinguishing the facts of Bejarano from Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 156 , 17 Cal. *141 Rptr.3d 604, 95 P.3d 872 , in which, prior to Randle , our Supreme Court held that violation of sect | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Randlered2 sentences2007Finding that the defendant's purpose in violating section 347 [poisoning food or drink], was financial gain, the court in Mattison concluded that the commission of this crime could serve as the predicate felony in a conviction for second degree felony murder because this purpose was collateral and independent from the assault. ( Id. at p. 185, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185 , 481 P.2d 193 .) Subsequently, in People v. Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 300 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 , our Supreme Court held that the collateral and independent purpose test articulated in Mattison was not dispositive of the a 2007Finding that the defendant's purpose in violating section 347 [poisoning food or drink], was financial gain, the court in Mattison concluded that the commission of this crime could serve as the predicate felony in a conviction for second degree felony murder because this purpose was collateral and independent from the assault. ( Id. at p. 185, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185 , 481 P.2d 193 .) Subsequently, in People v. Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 300 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 , our Supreme Court held that the collateral and independent purpose test articulated in Mattison was not dispositive of the a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ireland
green
2 sentences2016(See People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566 , 597 7 A homicide committed during an inherently dangerous felony not amounting to assault and therefore not subject to the Ireland merger doctrine (see People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 ) is either first or second degree felony murder, depending on whether the felony is one of those enumerated in section 189. 2016(See People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566 , 597 7 A homicide committed during an inherently dangerous felony not amounting to assault and therefore not subject to the Ireland merger doctrine (see People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 ) is either first or second degree felony murder, depending on whether the felony is one of those enumerated in section 189. | 7 | 2004–2018 |
People v. Mattison
green
2 sentences2007In People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 185 , 481 P.2d 193 ] (Mattison), the Supreme Court relied on People v. Taylor (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 57 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 697 ] (Taylor), 4 to formulate a new test with regard to the Ireland merger rule. 2007In People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 185 , 481 P.2d 193 ] (Mattison), the Supreme Court relied on People v. Taylor (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 57 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 697 ] (Taylor), 4 to formulate a new test with regard to the Ireland merger rule. | 3 | 2004–2007 |
People v. Cook
green
2 sentences2016(See People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566 , 597 7 A homicide committed during an inherently dangerous felony not amounting to assault and therefore not subject to the Ireland merger doctrine (see People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 ) is either first or second degree felony murder, depending on whether the felony is one of those enumerated in section 189. 2016(See People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566 , 597 7 A homicide committed during an inherently dangerous felony not amounting to assault and therefore not subject to the Ireland merger doctrine (see People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 ) is either first or second degree felony murder, depending on whether the felony is one of those enumerated in section 189. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Burroughs
red
2 sentences2008A killing in the commission of a felony that is not inherently dangerous to human life, in contrast, has been recognized as involuntary manslaughter, notwithstanding the limited statutory definition of the offense, "if that felony is committed without due caution and circumspection." ( Burroughs, supra , 35 Cal.3d at p. 835 ; see People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662 , 679 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647 , 654 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) In Burroughs the Supreme Court reversed the second degree felony-murder conviction of the defendant, whose massage tre 2008A killing in the commission of a felony that is not inherently dangerous to human life, in contrast, has been recognized as involuntary manslaughter, notwithstanding the limited statutory definition of the offense, “if that felony is committed without due caution and circumspection.” (Burroughs, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 835 ; see People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662, 679 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647, 654 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) In Burroughs the Supreme Court reversed the second degree felony-murder conviction of the defendant, whose massage treatme | 2 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2007In People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 185 , 481 P.2d 193 ] (Mattison), the Supreme Court relied on People v. Taylor (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 57 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 697 ] (Taylor), 4 to formulate a new test with regard to the Ireland merger rule. 2007In People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 185 , 481 P.2d 193 ] (Mattison), the Supreme Court relied on People v. Taylor (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 57 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 697 ] (Taylor), 4 to formulate a new test with regard to the Ireland merger rule. | 2 | 2004–2007 |
People v. Mixon
green
1 sentence2020(See People v. Mixon (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1486 .) Lastly, the so-called Ireland merger doctrine does not apply because that doctrine applies in cases involving second degree felony murder. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Wilson
red
2 sentences2009(See People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 462 P.2d 22 ].) Because first degree felony murder is specifically proscribed by statute (§ 189), what we say about the second degree felony-murder rule does not necessarily apply to the first degree felony-murder rule. [7] Justice Baxter makes some provocative arguments in favor of abolishing the Ireland merger doctrine entirely. 2009(See People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 462 P.2d 22 ].) Because first degree felony murder is specifically proscribed by statute (§ 189), what we say about the second degree felony-murder rule does not necessarily apply to the first degree felony-murder rule. [7] Justice Baxter makes some provocative arguments in favor of abolishing the Ireland merger doctrine entirely. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences2007When one of multiple theories presented to a jury has no application to the facts of the case, the verdict will nevertheless be affirmed "unless a review of the entire record affirmatively demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury in fact found the defendant guilty solely on the unsupported theory." ( People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1233 , 29 Cal. Rptr.3d 423 , 113 P.3d 100 , citing People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) Error in giving an instruction that has no applicability to the facts of the case is subject to review under Peop 2007When one of multiple theories presented to a jury has no application to the facts of the case, the verdict will nevertheless be affirmed "unless a review of the entire record affirmatively demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury in fact found the defendant guilty solely on the unsupported theory." ( People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1233 , 29 Cal. Rptr.3d 423 , 113 P.3d 100 , citing People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) Error in giving an instruction that has no applicability to the facts of the case is subject to review under Peop | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Guiton
green
2 sentences2007When one of multiple theories presented to a jury has no application to the facts of the case, the verdict will nevertheless be affirmed "unless a review of the entire record affirmatively demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury in fact found the defendant guilty solely on the unsupported theory." ( People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1233 , 29 Cal. Rptr.3d 423 , 113 P.3d 100 , citing People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) Error in giving an instruction that has no applicability to the facts of the case is subject to review under Peop 2007When one of multiple theories presented to a jury has no application to the facts of the case, the verdict will nevertheless be affirmed "unless a review of the entire record affirmatively demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury in fact found the defendant guilty solely on the unsupported theory." ( People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1233 , 29 Cal. Rptr.3d 423 , 113 P.3d 100 , citing People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) Error in giving an instruction that has no applicability to the facts of the case is subject to review under Peop | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Bejarano
green
2 sentences2007We are not persuaded that a contrary result is compelled by the recently decided People v. Bejarano (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 975 , 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 486 ( Bejarano ), which defendant discusses in a supplemental letter brief. [3] Bejarano concludes that the Ireland merger doctrine precludes using a conviction for shooting at an occupied motor vehicle in violation of section 246 as the predicate felony for second degree felony murder. 2007We are not persuaded that a contrary result is compelled by the recently decided People v. Bejarano (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 975 , 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 486 ( Bejarano ), which defendant discusses in a supplemental letter brief. [3] Bejarano concludes that the Ireland merger doctrine precludes using a conviction for shooting at an occupied motor vehicle in violation of section 246 as the predicate felony for second degree felony murder. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Perez
green
2 sentences2007When one of multiple theories presented to a jury has no application to the facts of the case, the verdict will nevertheless be affirmed "unless a review of the entire record affirmatively demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury in fact found the defendant guilty solely on the unsupported theory." ( People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1233 , 29 Cal. Rptr.3d 423 , 113 P.3d 100 , citing People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) Error in giving an instruction that has no applicability to the facts of the case is subject to review under Peop 2007When one of multiple theories presented to a jury has no application to the facts of the case, the verdict will nevertheless be affirmed "unless a review of the entire record affirmatively demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury in fact found the defendant guilty solely on the unsupported theory." ( People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1233 , 29 Cal. Rptr.3d 423 , 113 P.3d 100 , citing People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) Error in giving an instruction that has no applicability to the facts of the case is subject to review under Peop | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Smith
green
2 sentences2007People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 311 , 678 P.2d 886 ] (Smith), extended the Ireland merger rule to a case in which the predicate felony was felony child abuse in violation of section 273a. 2007People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 311 , 678 P.2d 886 ] (Smith), extended the Ireland merger rule to a case in which the predicate felony was felony child abuse in violation of section 273a. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.