legal or equitable claim in California

2025Corp. v. Dintino (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 333, 348 ); (6) a one-year or three-year statute of limitations applies for claims based on professional negligence, medical negligence, and medical malpractice (the earlier of one year from discovery or three years from injury) (§ 340.5); (7) a one-year or four-year statute of limitations applies for legal malpractice claims (the earlier of one year from discovery or four years from the wrongful act) (§ 340.6); and (8) the same limitation period for a declaratory relief claim as the legal or equitable claim upon which it is based (Bank of New York Mello

2025(See Bank of New York Mellon v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 935, 943 [“A claim for declaratory relief is subject to the same statute of limitations as the legal or equitable claim on which it is based.”].) Thus, regardless of which statute of limitation applies, any cause of action for cancellation and declaratory relief is time-barred. 26 Lee argues his causes of action for cancellation and declaratory relief are not time-barred because the deed of trust and the assignment of the deed of trust are void, and “void instruments are not time-barred.” Lee is wrong. “‘[S]tatutes of limitati

2024(Bank of New York Mellon v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 935, 943 [“A claim for declaratory relief is subject to the same statute of limitations as the legal or equitable claim on which it is based”].) “In an action involving tortious injury to property, the injury is considered to be to the property itself rather than to the property owner, and thus the running of the statute of limitations against a claim bars the owner and all subsequent owners of the property. [Citations.] In other words, the statute of limitations does not commence to run anew every time the ownership of the proper

2024It is undisputed the complaint was filed within three years of accrual of the claims. 16 and the obligations embodied in the Rules of Professional Conduct.” (Lee, at pp. 1236-1237.) By contrast, the Lee court reasoned, “[S]ection 340.6(a) does not bar a claim for wrongdoing—for example, garden-variety theft—that does not require proof that the attorney has violated a professional obligation, even if the theft occurs while the attorney and the victim are discussing the victim’s legal affairs.” (Lee, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1237 .) Moreover, section 340.6 does not apply merely because an attorne

2021Soc. (1944) 23 Cal.2d 719, 734 .) “To determine the statute of limitations which applies to a cause of action it is necessary to identify the nature of the cause of action, i.e., the ‘gravamen’ of the cause of action. [Citations.] ‘[T]he nature of the right sued upon and not the form of action nor the relief demanded determines the applicability of the statute of limitations . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 22-23 .) “What is significant for statute of limitations purposes is the primary interest invaded by [the] defendant’s wrongful conduct. [Citation.]” (

2021Soc. (1944) 23 Cal.2d 719, 734 .) “To determine the statute of limitations which applies to a cause of action it is necessary to identify the nature of the cause of action, i.e., the ‘gravamen’ of the cause of action. [Citations.] ‘[T]he nature of the right sued upon and not the form of action nor the relief demanded determines the applicability of the statute of limitations . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 22-23 .) “What is significant for statute of limitations purposes is the primary interest invaded by [the] defendant’s wrongful conduct. [Citation.]” (

2021Soc. (1944) 23 Cal.2d 719, 734 .) “To determine the statute of limitations which applies to a cause of action it is necessary to identify the nature of the cause of action, i.e., the ‘gravamen’ of the cause of action. [Citations.] ‘[T]he nature of the right sued upon and not the form of action nor the relief demanded determines the applicability of the statute of limitations . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 22-23 .) “What is significant for statute of limitations purposes is the primary interest invaded by [the] defendant’s wrongful conduct. [Citation.]” (

2021Code, § 17208.) And the statute of limitations on a declaratory relief claim is “the same limitations period as the underlying legal or equitable claim.” (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ward (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 678, 686 .) 12 A. Delayed Discovery 1.

2020(See Siskiyou County Farm Bureau v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 411 , 433–434 [“The dictionary is a proper source to determine the usual and ordinary meaning of words in a statute” 6 and “relevant dictionary definitions are those extant before or at least near in time to the statutory or contractual usage”].) Some dictionaries do, as Letterman says, define an “interest” as a “right, title, or legal share in something” (Merriam-Webster.com <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interest> [as of Dec. 30, 2020]), or a “legal share in something; all or part of a legal

2019"An action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" carries a four-year statute of limitations. (§ 337, subd. (a).) But a claim is founded upon a writing only when it "relies upon the language within a written instrument or contract." ( Smeaton v. Fidelity National Title (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1000 , 1004, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 591 .) The "sole object" of Chase's action would be to restore a lost instrument. ( Shores v. Withers (1913) 166 Cal. 403 , 405, 137 P. 7 .) Finding no other applicable limitations period, we believe the catch-all four-year period for "

2019"An action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" carries a four-year statute of limitations. (§ 337, subd. (a).) But a claim is founded upon a writing only when it "relies upon the language within a written instrument or contract." ( Smeaton v. Fidelity National Title (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1000 , 1004, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 591 .) The "sole object" of Chase's action would be to restore a lost instrument. ( Shores v. Withers (1913) 166 Cal. 403 , 405, 137 P. 7 .) Finding no other applicable limitations period, we believe the catch-all four-year period for "

2019"An action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" carries a four-year statute of limitations. (§ 337, subd. (a).) But a claim is founded upon a writing only when it "relies upon the language within a written instrument or contract." ( Smeaton v. Fidelity National Title (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1000 , 1004, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 591 .) The "sole object" of Chase's action would be to restore a lost instrument. ( Shores v. Withers (1913) 166 Cal. 403 , 405, 137 P. 7 .) Finding no other applicable limitations period, we believe the catch-all four-year period for "

2019"An action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" carries a four-year statute of limitations. (§ 337, subd. (a).) But a claim is founded upon a writing only when it "relies upon the language within a written instrument or contract." ( Smeaton v. Fidelity National Title (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1000 , 1004, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 591 .) The "sole object" of Chase's action would be to restore a lost instrument. ( Shores v. Withers (1913) 166 Cal. 403 , 405, 137 P. 7 .) Finding no other applicable limitations period, we believe the catch-all four-year period for "