limited scope inquiry in California

1982In People v. Bynum, supra, 4 Cal.3d 589, 596 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 241 , 483 P.2d 1193 ], the defendant was arrested in his home for the murder of the victim, and he was immediately advised of and waived his constitutional rights.

1982In People v. Bynum, supra, 4 Cal.3d 589, 596 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 241 , 483 P.2d 1193 ], the defendant was arrested in his home for the murder of the victim, and he was immediately advised of and waived his constitutional rights.

2016Relying on Spinks v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.App. 793 , the court in Chinn observed that ―[t]he cost statutes apparently codified case law interpreting a voluntary dismissal as a judgment in the defendant‘s favor.‖ (Chinn, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 187 .) But Spinks illustrates the limited scope of this rule.

2016Relying on Spinks v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.App. 793 , the court in Chinn observed that “[t]he cost statutes apparently codified case law interpreting a voluntary dismissal as a judgment in the defendant’s favor.” ( Chinn, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 187.) But Spinks illustrates the limited scope of this rule.

2007(See, In re Carissa G., supra, 76 Cal. App.4th at p. 736 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 ["dismissal of the petition did not alter minor's custody status"]; In re Tomi C. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 694, 698 , 267 Cal.Rptr. 210 [same].) Given the limited scope of the inquiry at the habeas hearing, it could not affect the children's custodial status, regardless of its outcome.

2007(See In re Carissa G., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 736 [“dismissal of the petition did not alter minor’s custody status”]; In re Tomi C. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 694, 698 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 210 ] [same].) Given the limited scope of the inquiry at the habeas corpus hearing, it could not affect the children’s custodial status, regardless of its outcome.

2007(See In re Carissa G., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 736 [“dismissal of the petition did not alter minor’s custody status”]; In re Tomi C. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 694, 698 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 210 ] [same].) Given the limited scope of the inquiry at the habeas corpus hearing, it could not affect the children’s custodial status, regardless of its outcome.

2007(See In re Carissa G., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 736 [“dismissal of the petition did not alter minor’s custody status”]; In re Tomi C. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 694, 698 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 210 ] [same].) Given the limited scope of the inquiry at the habeas corpus hearing, it could not affect the children’s custodial status, regardless of its outcome.

2002(See, e.g., Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1230 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 410 ] [“A case is not authority for an issue not raised by its facts.”].) In fact, in footnote 9 to its opinion, the Supreme Court acknowledged the limited scope of its analysis when it wrote: “Defendants do not contend that they did not ‘knowingly release or discharge’ a toxic chemical into water within the meaning of section 25249.5.

2002(See, e.g., Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1230 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 410 ] [“A case is not authority for an issue not raised by its facts.”].) In fact, in footnote 9 to its opinion, the Supreme Court acknowledged the limited scope of its analysis when it wrote: “Defendants do not contend that they did not ‘knowingly release or discharge’ a toxic chemical into water within the meaning of section 25249.5.

1985The trial court carefully considered the evidence and arguments submitted on behalf of the motion and did not abuse its discretion in denying it (see People v. Cartwright (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 369, 386 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 543 ] [trial court decision should be overturned only upon a showing of abuse of discretion]).

1985The trial court carefully considered the evidence and arguments submitted on behalf of the motion and did not abuse its discretion in denying it (see People v. Cartwright (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 369, 386 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 543 ] [trial court decision should be overturned only upon a showing of abuse of discretion]).

1984As we made clear in Birkenfeld , whether rental regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached. ( 17 Cal.3d 129, 165 .) That determination, of course, can only be made by analyzing a challenge to the regulation as applied. (13) Nevertheless, we will declare a regulation invalid on its face "when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its application to the complaining parties." ( Id. at p. 165; see also Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 280, 287, 291 [ 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 ]; Hutt

1984As we made clear in Birkenfeld , whether rental regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached. ( 17 Cal.3d 129, 165 .) That determination, of course, can only be made by analyzing a challenge to the regulation as applied. (13) Nevertheless, we will declare a regulation invalid on its face "when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its application to the complaining parties." ( Id. at p. 165; see also Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 280, 287, 291 [ 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 ]; Hutt

1984As we made clear in Birkenfeld , whether rental regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached. ( 17 Cal.3d 129, 165 .) That determination, of course, can only be made by analyzing a challenge to the regulation as applied. (13) Nevertheless, we will declare a regulation invalid on its face "when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its application to the complaining parties." ( Id. at p. 165; see also Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 280, 287, 291 [ 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 ]; Hutt

1984As we made clear in Birkenfeld , whether rental regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached. ( 17 Cal.3d 129, 165 .) That determination, of course, can only be made by analyzing a challenge to the regulation as applied. (13) Nevertheless, we will declare a regulation invalid on its face "when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its application to the complaining parties." ( Id. at p. 165; see also Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 280, 287, 291 [ 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 ]; Hutt

1984As we made clear in Birkenfeld , whether rental regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached. ( 17 Cal.3d 129, 165 .) That determination, of course, can only be made by analyzing a challenge to the regulation as applied. (13) Nevertheless, we will declare a regulation invalid on its face "when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its application to the complaining parties." ( Id. at p. 165; see also Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 280, 287, 291 [ 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 ]; Hutt

1984As we made clear in Birkenfeld , whether rental regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached. ( 17 Cal.3d 129, 165 .) That determination, of course, can only be made by analyzing a challenge to the regulation as applied. (13) Nevertheless, we will declare a regulation invalid on its face "when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its application to the complaining parties." ( Id. at p. 165; see also Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 280, 287, 291 [ 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 ]; Hutt

1984As we made clear in Birkenfeld , whether rental regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached. ( 17 Cal.3d 129, 165 .) That determination, of course, can only be made by analyzing a challenge to the regulation as applied. (13) Nevertheless, we will declare a regulation invalid on its face "when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its application to the complaining parties." ( Id. at p. 165; see also Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 280, 287, 291 [ 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 ]; Hutt

1984As we made clear in Birkenfeld , whether rental regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached. ( 17 Cal.3d 129, 165 .) That determination, of course, can only be made by analyzing a challenge to the regulation as applied. (13) Nevertheless, we will declare a regulation invalid on its face "when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its application to the complaining parties." ( Id. at p. 165; see also Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 280, 287, 291 [ 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 ]; Hutt

1984As we made clear in Birkenfeld , whether rental regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached. ( 17 Cal.3d 129, 165 .) That determination, of course, can only be made by analyzing a challenge to the regulation as applied. (13) Nevertheless, we will declare a regulation invalid on its face "when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its application to the complaining parties." ( Id. at p. 165; see also Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 280, 287, 291 [ 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 ]; Hutt

1984As we made clear in Birkenfeld , whether rental regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached. ( 17 Cal.3d 129, 165 .) That determination, of course, can only be made by analyzing a challenge to the regulation as applied. (13) Nevertheless, we will declare a regulation invalid on its face "when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its application to the complaining parties." ( Id. at p. 165; see also Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 280, 287, 291 [ 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 ]; Hutt

1984As we made clear in Birkenfeld , whether rental regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached. ( 17 Cal.3d 129, 165 .) That determination, of course, can only be made by analyzing a challenge to the regulation as applied. (13) Nevertheless, we will declare a regulation invalid on its face "when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its application to the complaining parties." ( Id. at p. 165; see also Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 280, 287, 291 [ 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 ]; Hutt

1984As we made clear in Birkenfeld , whether rental regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached. ( 17 Cal.3d 129, 165 .) That determination, of course, can only be made by analyzing a challenge to the regulation as applied. (13) Nevertheless, we will declare a regulation invalid on its face "when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its application to the complaining parties." ( Id. at p. 165; see also Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 280, 287, 291 [ 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 ]; Hutt

1978Foundation Research J., at p. 465) as was the case in both Greer and Younger . [16] (See Comden v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 916, fn. 4 .) This is substantiated by the limited scope of rule 2-111(A)(4) and the express exceptions to it.

1978Foundation Research J., at p. 465) as was the case in both Greer and Younger . 16 (See Comden v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 916, fn. 4 .) This is substantiated by the limited scope of rule 2-111(A)(4) and the express exceptions to it.